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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, the examination of energy sector development is presented. The 
purpose is to understand and highlight the importance of financing access for innovation 
activities, along with the business transparency necessary for firm value and the impact of 
corruption on capital investments in energy companies. 
Globally, long-term energy confidence is dependent on energy security and supply. 
Based on our empirical estimations, we expect there to be an increasing need for 
understanding financing innovations in the European energy industry. We expect more 
support for corporate governance integrity within Russia, as Russia is the main energy 
supplier for the European energy sector. It is expected that corruption will be a dominant 
issue for countries that are rich in natural resources. 
The main empirical findings and concluding comments are as follows: 
 The EU energy sector requires substantial financial support for promoting 
innovations, especially among ‘younger’ energy companies and those in the 
newest EU countries. 
 We expect to see increased discussion and long-term development of 
corporate governance integrity (transparency and disclosure, in particular) 
among Russian energy firms based on the long-term investment 
attractiveness of sustained energy production and supplies to countries that 
are energy dependent. 
 We conclude that investment activities in natural resource exploitation are 
directly linked with the presence of corruption, and that tightening up on 
corruption should facilitate FDI (foreign direct investment) in the primary 
industry and enable the effective use of received natural resource gains. 
 To summarise, in this assessment, we empirically studied the EU, Russian and 
global energy industries, focusing on the issue of the development of energy within three 
key areas: the examination of financing for innovation, corporate governance integrity and 
corruption within primary FDI inflows. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
1. Background 
 
In this dissertation, the examination of energy sector development is presented with 
the aim of understanding the importance of efficient, long-term industry sustainability. The 
empirical analysis is built on the concept that the energy industry is at the core of economic 
development and societal wealth. That is, the energy industry is a fundamental block of an 
activity within a country where a reliable sector provides long-term guarantees of energy 
supplies. 
Virtually every activity is dependent on energy supply, from households to the 
public sector, and from manufacturing enterprises to transportation activities. As such, all 
economic and social activities require confidence in a stable energy industry. The benefits 
of an efficient energy sector are the creation of employment, earnings and taxation, the 
outputs of exploration and production companies, and distribution and supply of the energy 
sources to those who require them. Thus, the constant development of the energy sector, 
the transparency of the sector and the security of the resource supplies are all critical 
factors in a stable and long-term supply. As such, these three areas form the examination of 
the energy industry: 
 First, the development of the energy sector is dependent on research and 
development activities, which are known to be capital intensive. These 
innovation activities, in turn, require substantial financial support. Thus, in 
the first empirical study, we examine financing for innovations within 
energy companies. 
 Second, the development of the energy sector is dependent on investor 
confidence, and transparency of such a complicated business is a vital 
factor. Following that, we examine the effects of corporate governance 
(CG) integrity within energy companies, which should stimulate firm value 
and, therefore, should attract investors. 
 Third, securing energy supplies leads to investment in resource-abundant 
countries, providing not only secure energy supplies, but also substantial 
resource exploitation gains for the host countries. We therefore examine the 
impact of natural resource activity and the existence of corruption on 
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primary foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow attractiveness in the host 
countries. 
 Despite the increasing research in the given areas of the energy industry, these 
issues remain unexplored. We hope the examination we pursued and the empirical results 
we obtained will provide additional understanding of these issues, and encourage further 
discussion among policy-makers and company management in order to foster a better 
understanding of the long-term needs and development of the energy industry. 
 
First area of study: Financing for innovations 
In the first empirical analysis, in Chapter 3, the financing of research and 
development (R&D) is examined. R&D is considered to be of paramount importance for 
an economy, as technological innovation is a key driver of economic growth (Solow, 1957; 
Myers, 1977; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Indeed, Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) and Mulder 
(2008) argued that investment in energy does not pay off in innovation activities, and it 
requires substantial levels of subsidies, which lead to investor uncertainty in R&D 
decision-making scenarios. In addition, the knowledge gained regarding new goods and 
services cannot be kept secret and therefore cannot be enjoyed solely by the investing firm, 
but also by other companies operating in the industry. Hence, the latter may act as an 
impediment to the financing of research and innovation.  
In this analysis, the particular focus is on the European energy sector. The need for 
R&D activities has been increasingly highlighted by the EU commitment announced in 
March 2000 in Lisbon. The EU Heads of State and governments set the target of becoming 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy. However, more 
importantly, innovation in energy technology is becoming increasingly important in terms 
of meeting the growing demand for energy amidst concerns about the security of energy 
supplies and calls for greater environmental protection. 
At the same time, the present knowledge about financing innovation in the energy 
industry remains rather limited. Much of the existing literature consists of country level 
empirical studies (Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and only some 
firm-level studies relate to the energy industry (see Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993 on the 
mining sector and Mulder, 2008 on the wind energy sector). 
Thus, the analysis contributes to the limited literature on the firm-level financing of 
innovation in the energy industry. Furthermore, the differences between the two major 
European energy sectors – utilities and oil and gas producers – are highlighted. To the best 
of the author’s knowledge, this has not been tackled in the existing studies. 
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Second area of study: Corporate governance (CG) integrity for firm value 
The second empirical study, in Chapter 4, is motivated by the significant 
importance of Russian energy companies providing energy supplies to the European 
region. In general, existing research highlighted that financial markets attract higher prices 
and provide investment incentives when CG laws protect investors against expropriation 
by controlling owners. In limiting expropriation by the controlling owners, CG laws 
encourage external financing of corporate investment and, thus, value and growth. 
The analysis is focused on Russia, which is a special case in point. Until 2002, 
Russia had no recognised accounting standards or other official CG mechanism capable of 
ensuring the type of corporate integrity within companies to stimulate investment 
incentives and financial markets. The introduction of CG codes in 2002 marked a 
significant development in Russia’s corporate history. Although Russia quickly caught up 
with the West in adjusting its company and bankruptcy laws to Western standards, low 
protection levels for property rights remain a preferred policy of the rich in a country 
plagued with a very high degree of income inequality due to widespread corruption in the 
courts, regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies (Pistor et al., 2000). In this respect, 
Russian firms are greatly undervalued and, therefore, need to adhere to higher CG 
standards to induce external investment.  
The question raised by the research is whether the introduction of transparency and 
disclosure (T&D) in this type of investment climate can boost firm value. While the 
introduction of T&D rules (and overall CG codes) can resolve the conflict of interest 
between the controlling and minority owners, it may worsen the conflict between the state 
and the controlling owners: increasing the transparency of businesses may make them easy 
targets for aggressive tax-enforcement policies. 
In the absence of any prior evidence in this regard, this chapter empirically explores 
the net effects of the introduction of CG codes in Russia, with special reference to T&D 
rules. 
 
Third area of study: Natural resource abundance and corruption in relation to FDI 
The final empirical analysis, undertaken in Chapter 5, was facilitated by the 
existing research, which suggests that FDI is regarded as a good instrument for economic 
policies, providing the potential for economic growth. Nevertheless, the studies highlighted 
the issue of attracting investments to those industries with greater economic returns, in 
particular, for natural resource-rich countries, where those natural resources provide higher 
economic rents compared to other industries (Dunning, 1974 and 1980; World Bank, 2006; 
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Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2009; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010). More importantly, it 
is emphasised that corruption exists at every stage of natural resource activity, from pre-
exploration activities and licensing agencies, to complex financial arrangements, because 
corruption allows investors to protect their returns and governments to stay in power 
(Bloningen, 2005). 
In this regard, the analysis contributes to a growing literature on natural resource 
abundance and corruption for primary FDI investments. While earlier literature tended to 
focus on aggregated FDI (Smarzynska and Wei, 2000; Bloningen, 2005), the focus in more 
recent literature has shifted to natural resource foreign capital investments (Asiedu and 
Lien, 2011; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010). For instance, Kronenberg (2004) 
explored the effects of natural resource intensity on economic development, but not on 
FDI. In a more recent paper, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) focused on the relations 
between natural resources and corruption. In another study, Asiedu (2002) and, later, 
Asiedu and Lien (2011) linked resource activity with the effects of democracy. Poelhekke 
and van der Ploeg (2010) and van der Ploeg (2011) explored the effects of natural 
resources on FDI through institutional quality, but the authors considered aggregated FDI, 
not primary FDI. The general agreement is that resource abundance and the resulting 
potential economic benefits both influence and are influenced by the institutional 
environment. 
The analysis goes beyond the above-mentioned literature in that, in the absence of 
prior evidence, the research has allowed for the identification of the possible means 
through which the introduction of access to natural resources can influence FDI inflows in 
the primary sector. In doing so, the analysis highlights that corruption, as a proxy of the 
institutional environment, is especially prone to primary FDI decision-making, after 
controlling for other factors. We are not aware of any existing study that considers the 
effects of natural resources and corruption on primary FDI inflows. 
 
1.1. Aims and objectives 
 
The aims and objectives of the dissertation are as follows: 
 The aim of the second chapter is to provide theoretical background knowledge. 
This chapter is intended to explore the panel data-estimation models that we 
consistently refer to throughout the empirical chapters. 
 The aim of the third chapter is to examine the role of financing access to R&D 
activities. The particular focus is on European energy firms’ access to finance 
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and examination of the leverage effect on R&D (lower leverage facilitates 
higher R&D, while higher leverage adversely affects R&D). The study is 
conducted in the light of the growing demand for energy alongside concerns 
about security and stability, as well as the rising demand for new technologies 
for the more efficient use of energy. Further, the effects of operating income 
availability as an internal financing boost for R&D activity is studied in periods 
when it is difficult to obtain external borrowing. The analysis is based on more 
than 250 companies located within 24 old and new European member countries, 
between 1995 and 2007. The data for the analysis was primarily obtained from 
the Bureau van Dijke Electronic Publishing (BvDEP) OSIRIS database. 
 In the fourth chapter, the role of CG mechanisms is explored, especially 
regarding whether T&D rules can boost firm value. The research focused on 
Russian companies, which cumulatively covered 80% of the Russian Stock 
Market capitalisation in 2007. In particular, we concentrated on energy sector 
firms. Focusing on Russia until 2002 was of special interest, as this country had 
no recognised accounting standards or a CG mechanism to ensure integrity 
within companies that could stimulate investment incentives and financial 
markets. The study is based on T&D indexes obtained from Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P’s) data for 2003–2007, while the overall CG examination 
extended the analysis for the years 2000–2008, where the most firm-level 
observations are available. Firm-level data was obtained from the OSIRIS 
database. 
 The fifth chapter examines the roles of natural resources and corruption in 
attracting FDI inflows in the primary sector. This is based on the notion that, 
generally, FDI has been recognised as a good instrument for economic policy. 
However, the decisions in allocating FDI are made by considering the expected 
profitability of the investments – in particular, for countries that are rich in 
natural resources, where the natural resource gains are greater when compared 
to other industries. Further, it is emphasised that corruption exists at every stage 
of natural resource activity, from pre-exploration of the resource to financing 
arrangements and the share of economic gains, allowing investors to receive 
their returns and governments to stay in power. The analysis is based on a panel 
of more than one hundred countries that have an abundance of natural 
resources, covering the period from 1992 to 2001, with a primary focus on 
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inward FDI data availability from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) database. 
 The final, sixth chapter provides the main findings and concluding comments, 
and derives implications for energy sector companies and governments, where 
possible. The limitations of the study and scope for further research are 
considered and explained. 
 
1.2. Significance of the dissertation 
 
This research integrated the literature on energy sector development: the financing 
for R&D activities in European energy companies; the impact of CG (T&D, in particular) 
on the value of Russian energy companies in attracting investment; and the relationship 
between natural resource abundance and the presence of corruption, as it affects primary 
FDI inflow attractiveness at a country level. In doing so, the issue has been considered 
from the point of view of energy firms and two major subsectors (utilities and oil and gas), 
from non-energy sectors and in terms of the overall effect for all companies. The questions 
raised and the hypotheses introduced are mostly unexplored in the existing literature. 
Therefore, the implemented empirical analyses add value in terms of providing a better 
understanding of the energy sector. 
In essence, the research aimed to examine three emerging questions regarding the 
development of the energy sector: 
 What is the relationship between general corporate leverage and innovation 
activities (R&D) in the European energy sector? 
This was of interest because innovation in energy technologies is becoming 
increasingly important for securing the growing demand for energy, but the 
knowledge regarding financing innovations is rather limited. The empirical 
results showed that companies that are less financially overburdened 
experience advantages with higher R&D levels, which have been influenced by 
other control factors, such as tax shields, firm maturity, EU integration and the 
ownership status of the companies. 
 How do Russian energy firms introduce CG? 
This was important to explore because the CG mechanism is a significant 
element that affects how attractive a firm appears to be in the eyes of potential 
investors. This is especially important for Russian energy companies, which 
are the main suppliers for the European energy sector, yet until 2002, there was 
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no common corporate integrity mechanism to otherwise induce investment 
incentives in Russian energy companies from outside investors. 
The empirical results showed that the introduction of CG codes, information 
transparency and disclosure in particular, have boosted firm value in both 
energy and non-energy sector firms. However, the limited effect of information 
disclosure for oil and gas companies might have contributed to fears that too 
much transparency might open firms to attacks from the state and from 
competitors. 
 What is the effect of natural resource abundance, corruption and their 
interaction on primary FDI inflows worldwide? 
We followed the complex relationship between natural resource activities, 
which provide higher economic gains compared to other industries, and the 
existence of corruption at every stage, from resource findings to financial 
arrangements, and the interaction with FDI, as FDI has been regarded as a 
good instrument for economic development. In the absence of prior empirical 
evidence, in this study we argue that corruption significantly undermined 
primary capital investments in natural resource activities. 
We hope that our findings in answering these three questions will stimulate interest 
through a better understanding of financing R&D, CG and corruption toward capital 
investment activities in the energy sector for the countries studied. First, financing for 
R&D should be controlled, so as not to overburden companies’ liabilities, and other 
incentives are able to stimulate innovation activities. Second, the introduction of CG 
mechanisms has been successful in providing a better investment climate for energy 
companies. However, such mechanisms should be introduced carefully; otherwise, too 
much or too rapid a corporate information disclosure may lead to fear on the part of the 
owners and may curtail corporate effectiveness. Third, the focus on corruption, natural 
resource gains and the effect of these two factors on primary FDI inflows suggest that 
better corruption control should be in place to encourage capital inflows in the energy 
sector. 
 
1.3. An overview of the empirical chapters 
 
The present study consists of three main empirical chapters. First, Chapter 3 
examines the importance of financing for innovations in the European area, as R&D is 
becoming increasingly important in terms of meeting the growing demand for energy 
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amidst concerns of supply security in the common European territory. Second, Chapter 4 
advances to the Russian energy companies, which are the main energy suppliers to 
European countries. In doing so, the control for the effect of CG integration is 
implemented, which may allow for greater company value and, therefore, higher levels of 
credibility from investors. Third, Chapter 5, through non-European and non-Russian 
companies, examines the global importance of the abundance of natural resources and the 
impact of corruption on attracting primary FDI inflows. This was of interest because the 
interrelated effect of these two factors in attracting FDI is unclear: natural resources attract 
FDI because of high economic gains; however, corruption exists at every stage of natural 
resource wealth. 
 
Chapter 3: Financing innovations: Implications for European energy sector firms 
We examined the role of financing for R&D activity (using leverage as the ratio of 
debt to total assets, and R&D as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets) and operating 
income availability for energy companies in the European countries. We were able to 
control for the energy sector in general and were also able to distinguish between two 
major sectors: utilities and oil and gas producers. We found empirical support for our two 
hypotheses that a lower leverage level and availability of operating income enable the 
promotion of investments in R&D in energy companies, even after controlling for other 
factors. 
We found that a moderate financing level allowed companies to attract investments, 
resulting in the financial support for innovation. Regarding the control in terms of 
leverage, lower debt levels stimulated innovation in the energy companies, whereas over-
financing adversely affected R&D activities, irrespective of sector choice. Estimates of 
operating income demonstrated that financing in ‘younger’ companies was enhanced by 
operating income availability. Control for additional factors showed that privately owned 
companies (owned by other companies) were more likely to attract financing compared to 
state-owned firms. Further, we found that companies in the established EU countries were 
in a better position to receive financing sources compared to energy firms from new EU 
member countries (those who have joined since 2004). Overall, the findings supported 
those of Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), Bhagat and Welch (1995), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Booth et al. (2001). The findings on control measures are in line with 
Audtretsch (1991), Shleifer (1998), Brown and Medoff (2003), Gros and Mortensen (2004) 
and Ayygari et al. (2007). 
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The empirical results are explained in a number of ways: 
 First, a lower leverage level stimulates activities in R&D because controlled 
financing allows for financial liabilities not to be overburdened, which are 
associated with greater uncertainty of future returns from investing in 
innovations. 
 Second, ‘younger’ companies (different age group periods are introduced) are 
less credible in the eyes of lending institutions. That is, more mature companies 
tend to have easier access to financing because lending institutions use firm age 
as a proxy for economic sustainability and greater market experience. This is 
why the estimates for operating income availability are significant for 
‘younger’ energy companies, as it is used as a financing boost towards 
innovation activities. 
 Third, estimates show that privately owned energy companies are better at 
attracting financing for R&D because private companies are stimulated by 
competition incentives with other companies. This is in opposition to state-
owned companies, which are often characterised as being monopolistic giants 
lacking development in the absence of a competitive environment. 
 Finally, the results on EU integration demonstrate that companies in old EU 
countries have an advantage in securing financing for innovation versus those 
companies in new EU countries. This is, perhaps, because there are not enough 
financing incentives in place (or they may not be readily available) within new 
EU member states. For instance, the estimates show that tax incentives are 
significant among companies located in established EU countries, but are not 
significant for those firms in new EU countries. 
The importance of the study is that it has focused on the European energy sector, 
distinguishing between two major subsectors, which, to our knowledge, have not been 
examined in the firm-level literature on financing and innovations. 
In future research, the aim is to examine the differences in the factors for R&D 
between two major energy sectors: utilities and oil and gas. That is, we can contribute to 
knowledge on the sustained improvement in innovation for R&D in the energy industry, 
especially concerning energy companies in new EU member countries. 
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Chapter 4: Does corporate governance reform necessarily boost firm value? Recent 
evidence from Russia 
While the effect of financing on R&D in the energy sector has been pronounced, 
there is a great deal of variety in the CG mechanisms in place across the main energy 
supplier for the European region – Russia – which remains rather underexplored. This is 
partly because CG has been in place only since 2002, which means that only relatively 
recently have international investors acquired opportunities to assess commonly used 
international management standards and accounting principles in relation to such an 
important energy industry. Therefore, the role of the effects of CG mechanisms on firms’ 
value (measured through Tobin’s Q) is examined for the Russian energy companies, with 
an extension into the two major sectors, utilities and oil and gas, as well as non-energy 
industries. We considered not only the role of CG, but also T&D rules. The analysis 
focused on the largest listed companies in the Russian energy sector, including such energy 
giants as Gazprom, Lukoil, Rosneft and the TNK-BP (British Petroleum) Holding. The 
S&P’s T&D indexes were used for the proxy of CG, where firm-level data was obtained 
from the OSIRIS database. There are three sets of estimates for examining the significance 
of CG implementation and T&D evolvement and, as such, which contribute to the growing 
literature on Russian CG practice: 
 First, T&D, and especially financial and operational sub-measures, was found 
to be important for a company’s value in the energy sector, which is the 
driving force for all industries pooled together. 
 Next, the overall introduction of CG is considered (as a binary indicator) with 
demonstrated support for the importance of T&D control within firms, 
especially for those listed on international stock markets, as it allows a 
company to gain greater investor credibility. It became apparent that CG 
enforcement was weaker when it related to T&D factors, perhaps highlighting 
the conflict of interest between the state and the controlling owners, especially 
in the oil and gas subsector. That is, too much transparency may weaken 
companies in such a competitive environment. 
Taken together, while the introduction of CG reform has been successful in 
resolving the conflict of interest between minority and controlling owners, it has generated 
a conflict of interest between the state and the controlling owner, which to some extent 
contradicts with the purpose of introducing CG reform in the first place. The latter has 
gradually paved the way for foreign investment in Russia, which has been highlighted by 
the BP investment in the oil and gas sector of the country. 
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It would be interesting to see whether and how foreign multinational investments 
can resolve the conflict of interest between the state and the controlling owner, thus 
contributing to the sustained improvement in firm values in Russia. We aim to examine 
this in further research. 
 
Chapter 5: Resource abundance, resource rents, corruption and FDI: A panel-country 
analysis 
In the final chapter, the roles of natural resource abundance and the existence of 
corruption in terms of FDI inflows in the primary sector have been examined. The results 
also compared estimations of the overall FDI inflows in the countries under observation. 
Existing studies have shown that the extent of institutional mechanisms may or may 
not lead to decreasing or increasing primary FDI inflows; that is, the impact of resource 
activity and corruption on FDI is unclear. While much of the natural-abundance resource 
literature has focused on aggregated FDI, a limited number of studies pertained to primary 
FDI, and even fewer explored the effects of natural resource-richness on resource 
investments. We examined the complex relationship between natural resource activities, 
corruption and FDI inflows in the primary industry. Our main FDI source was the 
UNCTAD dataset, where natural resource rents are from the World Bank, and corruption 
was measured using the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) proxy. 
In the context of the natural resource levels and corruption, this analysis contributes 
to a growing body of literature on primary FDI investments through the examination of 
three hypotheses: 
 Whether greater access to natural resources promotes primary FDI. 
 Whether greater corruption increases or decreases inward FDI in                
primary FDI. 
 Whether the effect of natural resource activity on primary FDI depends on 
the extent of corruption. 
The analysis focused on a panel of 133 natural resource-rich countries for the 
1992–2001 period, when most primary FDI observations were available from the 
UNCTAD database. We found evidence that the presence of corruption significantly 
reduced the attraction of natural resource activities and, therefore, significantly impacted 
FDI investments in the primary industry. However, the effects of income from natural rents 
and corruption remained insignificant for total country level FDI, even after controlling for 
other measures (trade openness, GDP per capita, credit provided by the banking sector, the 
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military being involved in politics and infrastructure [established through the number of 
telephone lines]). 
We explain our findings in that natural resource-rich countries are not only 
attracted by resource exploitation possibilities and the potential of receiving high economic 
gains from the investments, but also that corruption becomes a factor, which is proxied for 
in terms of the institutional quality. 
In other words, corruption, on the one hand, eases access to natural resources and 
allows for profits to stay with investors, but on the other hand, the presence of corruption 
weakens FDI, as investors are likely to be asked for bribes and are required to bear extra 
contractual risks. Nevertheless, the natural resource remains highly economically 
attractive. This is why, despite the presence of corruption, primary industries still attract 
investor attention around the globe. This also, perhaps, explains the weak exposure of 
natural resource gains to other economic sectors: investors may prefer greater returns in the 
corrupted environment compared to lower returns in the more stable industries. These 
investment priorities are highlighted in a number of existing studies (e.g. Hausman and 
Rigobon, 2002; Kinoshita and Campos, 2010; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010). 
Overall, this study revealed that corruption is especially prone to primary FDI 
decision-making events after controlling for other factors. We are not aware of any existing 
study pertaining to the effect of the relationship between natural resources and corruption 
on primary FDI inflows. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. Theoretical methodology for the empirical estimations 
 
This chapter explains the theoretical background that we consistently rely on during 
the empirical assessment. The theoretical background mechanics are well documented in 
corresponding studies (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991; Baltagi and Wu, 1999; Greene, 
2002; Woldridge, 2002, Baum et. al., 2009; among others); hence, the purpose of this 
chapter is to demonstrate that we are aware of the issues and the related analysis 
specifications which we have to consider. 
The examination of the energy sector highlights the need for appropriate theoretical 
modelling to be able to study multiple observations on the same economic units over a 
given time period (firms or countries and years, in our case). For this reason, panel data 
analysis has been applied, specifically with a large number of observations and a smaller 
number of time periods. Furthermore, we deal both with balanced and unbalanced panel 
data. Following Greene (2002), there is no clear advantage from the econometric 
perspective in operating with data having all the cross-sectional units captured within each 
time period (balanced panel) or if the panel has some missing observations (unbalanced 
panel). 
Below, we discuss the most common types of panel data analytical estimations 
such as the pooled ordinary least squares model (pooled-OLS), random effects (OLS-RE), 
fixed effects (OLS-FE) and first differencing (FD). We also cover a dynamic type of panel 
data with the application of a GMM estimator. Along with the panel data description, we 
summarise the common issue of heterogeneity, heteroscedasticity, the inclusion of time 
effects, the joint test for the significance of the explanatory variables, weak instrument 
identification and a test for over-identifying restrictions. 
We start with the simplest type model, the pooled-OLS model, which has a 
constant coefficient in both the intercept and the slopes. In this model, each observed 
element will have two subscripts: the company (or country) identifier ‘i’ and a within-
group timing index ‘t.’ This form of the model clarifies that there is no significant effect 
that has occurred within the company (or country) and across the time period observed. 
Although this assumption may exist, most of the time, there will be either a specific 
observation or time-based effect, and hence, we have to consider employing other 
specifications. That is, we start with the pooled-OLS equation: 
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Yit = βXit + αi
 
+ uit (Eq. 2.1) 
 
where 
Yit = an independent variable, 
β = is the coefficient of X, 
Xit = is a matrix of variables (or regressors) that vary over individual units (firms, 
companies) and time, 
i = 1,…,N is the number of individual units, 
t = 1,…,T is a number of periods as years, 
αi = the unobserved time-invariant unit-specific effect, 
uit = is a unique time-varied observation-specific error term. 
 
The given equation should meet two assumptions. That is, the unobserved time 
invariant ‘αi’ should not correlate with ‘Xit’ variables and there should not be a correlation 
between the observation-specific error term ‘uit’ and the ‘Xit’ regressors: 
 
E(αi│ Xit) = 0, an assumption of mean independence, 
E(eit│ Xit) = 0, an assumption of exogeneity. 
 
In this instance, if the unobserved variables included in the model are believed to 
be random and uncorrelated with the independent variables satisfying the assumption of 
mean independence: E(αi│ Xit) = 0, the random effect (OLS-RE) model may be 
implemented. However, if there is a correlation between the individual and/or time effects 
and the independent variables imposed: E(αi│ Xit) ≠ 0, the OLS-FE specification may be 
applied in order to mitigate the endogeneity issue. 
The general way to justify the selection between the two is through the use of 
Hausman test. The Hausman test examines the difference between the two estimated 
covariance-matrixes towards weighting the difference between the ‘RE’ and ‘FE’ vectors 
of the slope coefficients. The hypothesis rejection, in which there is a correlation with an 
insignificant p-value and ‘Prob>Chi2’ greater than 0.05, suggests the application of the 
OLS-FE model. That is, the ‘FE’ specification accounts for ‘αi’ to be a group-specific 
constant term in the regression model. 
The alternative to OLS-FE, which removes the control for the heterogeneity, can be 
exercised through the FD of the original pooled-OLS model removing the constant term 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Through the differencing, the first time period for each cross section 
will be lost; that is, there will be ‘T−1’ periods for each observed ‘i’ rather than ‘T.’ That 
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is, in recalling Eq. (2.1), the first differencing form of the regression using two periods will 
become: 
 
∆Yit = β∆Xit + ∆uit,  (Eq. 2.2) 
 
where 
∆ is the change from e.g. the time period t=0 to t=1: 
∆Yit = Yit – Yit-1, 
∆Xit = Xit – Xit-1, 
∆uit = uit – uit-1. 
 
The advantage of the first differencing is that the fixed effects ‘αi’ have been 
removed, relaxing the assumption that ‘uit’ is uncorrelated with regressors ‘Xit.’ The 
general intuition of first-difference estimation is that it implies the within-unit changes, but 
not the between-unit changes. 
 
Dynamic panel data (GMM estimator) 
However, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable ‘Yit-1’ on the right-hand side 
of the regression may make the OLS-FE model yield biased estimates. The presence of the 
lagged dependent variable creates dynamic panel bias, causing the correlation between the 
explanatory and error term ‘eit-1’,  which is a function of the time-invariant, country 
specific fixed effects ‘αi’ (eit = αi
 
+ uit). 
The appropriate and preferred estimator for the dynamic model is the GMM 
estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator removes the country 
fixed effects through the differencing, and any endogeneity that might arise due to a 
correlation between country FE and explanatory variables will be removed. That is, first, 
the fixed effects need to be removed from Eq. (2.1) through the first differences, as per Eq. 
(2.1): ∆Yit = β∆Xit + ∆uit. 
Yet, when the fixed effects are removed, the lagged dependent ‘Yit-1’ variable is 
still potentially endogenous: ‘Yit-1’ in ∆Yit-1 = Yit-1 – Yit-2 and is correlated with ∆uit = ∆uit 
– ∆uit-1. Similarly, any other regressors ‘Xit’ that are not strictly exogenous become 
potentially endogenous as these may also relate to uit-1. In order to obtain consistent 
estimates, the lags for the endogenous instruments are required: consequently, this will not 
relate to ∆uit, and will also allow for a large enough sample estimation. The second lag is 
often introduced because it does not correlate with the error term, while the first lag does. 
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Potentially, the higher number of lags may result in a better instrument, but this would 
reduce the size of the observations: 
 
Yit-2 is mathematically related to ∆Yit-1 = Yit-1 – Yit-2 
but not to the unique error term ∆uit = uit – uit-1. 
 
Following Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimator, the lagged dependent variables 
treated as endogenous, and the independent variables are treated strictly exogenous. GMM 
estimator used the second lag of endogenous variable. 
Introduction of the dynamic panel data models requires testing for the weak 
instruments and the test for the overidentifying restrictions. The ‘weak instruments’ issue 
refers to the level of potential correlation (nonzero but small) between the endogenous 
regressors and the excluded instruments. In other words, there is a potential of selecting the 
"weak" instruments that are poor predictors of the endogenous predictor in the first-stage 
equation. The F-statistics is often used as a test for weak-instruments (Baum et. al., 2007). 
When the additional external instruments are introduced, the validity of the moment 
conditions under the dynamic panel is commonly tested for the overidentifying restrictions. 
The two similar tests associated with the overidentification are the Sargan test (Sargan, 
1958) and Hansen test (Hansen, 1982). Both tests are based on the notion that the residuals 
should be uncorrelated with the set of exogenous variables if the instruments are truly 
exogenous. 
 
Heteroscedasticity, joint testing, time effects and elasticity 
  With regard to panel data estimation techniques, we are also aware of related 
issues such as heteroscedasticity, a test for the joint significance of the explanatory 
variables included and a time effects test to determine whether a control for specific 
unobserved effects is required. 
At first, a heteroscedasticity test detects violation of the panel assumption that the 
conditional variance is not dependent on the ‘Xit’, and that the unconditional variance is the 
same for each of the periods. In other words, heteroscedasticity is expected to be found in 
the disturbance term when dealing with companies or countries that vary in size. As noted 
by Wooldridge (2002) the presence of heteroscedasticity on its own does not affect the 
consistency of the estimators. Heteroscedasticity due to group-wise differences can be 
mitigated by considering the group means. Heteroscedasticity can commonly be assessed 
with the White, Breusch-Pagan or Wald tests for group-wise heteroscedasticity. The null 
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hypothesis tested is the presence of homoscedasticity (or constant variance), while 
rejection of the null will indicate the existence of heteroscedasticity. 
As noted above, the presence of heteroscedasticity causes the standard errors to be 
biased compared to the OLS assumption that the errors are independent and identically 
distributed. Throughout the empirical analysis, we apply White’s standard errors to 
account for heteroscedasticity. This application of robust standard errors will relax the 
assumption that the errors are identically distributed. 
Second, we consider the joint test hypothesis that allows testing whether selected 
explanatory variables have an effect on the dependent variable selected. For instance, in 
the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3), we were interested to know how the debt and 
operating income variables affected R&D. To this end, we included explanatory variables 
such as liquidity and tax proxy and tested whether these were jointly significant. The null 
hypothesis is that none of the selected right-hand-side variables explain the dependent 
variable. The alternative test is that at least one of the selected variables explains the 
dependent variable. Rejection of the null hypothesis would mean that the variables 
examined are jointly significant and need to be included.  
Third, we include a timing effect control. Time effects can account for unexpected 
variation (events) that may affect the dependent variable. These events may include 
inflation rates, GDP data, accountancy rules and institutional regimes, etc.  A proxy to deal 
with such factors is to control for time effects (time dummies) within panel data models to 
solve for the potential endogeneity issue. To establish if the time effects are required, we 
refer to a joint test to see if the coefficient dummies for the time period examined are equal 
to zero. Failure to reject the null hypothesis that the year coefficients are equal to zero will 
mean that no time effect control is required.  
In addition to panel data techniques and post-estimation tests, we discuss estimation 
results in terms of elasticity. Elasticity is a tool that is applied to measure the sensitivity or 
responsiveness of the dependent variables to a change in the explanatory measure (e.g., 
Bagad, 2008). The advantage of elasticity over the estimated coefficients is that it avoids 
the likely issue of unit sizes. Responsiveness is measured in proportionate (percentage) 
terms (Wang and Jain, 2003). The mathematical expression is: 
 
E = (∆Y/  ) /(∆X/  ) * 100 
 
where 
E = elasticity, and   and   denote the average values of the measures. 
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Estimated coefficients would essentially produce the elasticity of dependent ‘Y’ to 
explanatory variables denoted as ‘X’. In other words, the elasticity measure is defined as 
the percentage change in ‘Y’ for a 1% change in ‘X’. 
At first, the degree to which the dependent variable reacts to a change in the 
explanatory variable can be perfectly inelastic (E = 0), inelastic (│E│ < 1), elastic 
(│E│>1) and unit elastic (│E│ = 1). Second, the sign of the elasticity indicates the 
direction of change; for instance, a negative sign would mean a negative proportionate 
effect between ‘Y’ and ‘X’. A perfectly inelastic relationship would imply that a change in 
the explanatory variable ‘X’ creates no change at all in the ‘Y’ dependent variable, i.e. the 
change in ‘X’ is irrelevant to ‘Y’. An inelastic relationship implies that the dependent 
variable is relatively insensitive to the explanatory variable. For instance, │E│= 0.5 means 
that a 1% change in the ‘X’ explanatory variable will lead to 0.5% change in the dependent 
‘Y’ (Gillespie, 2007). On the contrary, │E│= 2 (implying an elastic relationship) means 
that the percentage change in the dependent variable is twice the percentage change in the 
explanatory variable.  
The economic importance of different variables (e.g. in terms of leverage, corporate 
governance and corruption) can be assessed through their elasticities. We focus in 
particular on inelastic relationships, for in these cases small changes in one variable may 
have large effects on another. Such inelastic relationships are found widely in the 
literature: an energy industry related example is the demand for residential electricity 
demand discussed by Wang and Jain (2003). In their case, a one percent change in electric 
price reduces the demand for electricity by 0.79 percent (implying an inelastic 
relationship). In another example, relating to the company finance decision, Hovakimian et 
al. (2001) find that two important inelastic determinants of the debt versus equity decision 
are post stock returns (with an elasticity of 0.122) and the market-to-book ratio (with an 
elasticity of 0.105).  
This thesis also uncovers a number of important inelastic relationships. We find 
that, for instance, small changes in leverage can have large R&D effects (Chapter 3); small 
changes in corporate governance can have large effects on company valuation (Chapter 4); 
and corruption effect on FDI inflows (Chapter 5). 
 
Summary remarks on theoretical background 
This chapter on theoretical background provides an explanation of the applied 
panel data specifications and estimation techniques on which we depend in the empirical 
examination undertaken in subsequent chapters. Each of the empirical analyses is 
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presented for the pooled OLS, the OLS with random and fixed effects controls, the first-
difference after removing unobserved fixed effects, and elasticity. We also use a GMM 
estimator to address the dynamic specifications of the panel data after the inclusion of 
lagged dependent variables among selected regressors. Post-estimation tests indicating the 
validity of the results are considered. The joint significance of the inclusion of explanatory 
variables, the significance of year control, and selection between OLS-RE and OLS-FE are 
examined. The dynamic panel data post-estimation tests are presented using weak 
instruments and overidentifying restrictions when applicable. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3. Financing innovation: implications for European firms in the energy sector 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines whether and how the measures of corporate leverage, such as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets and operating income availability, can stimulate financing 
for research & development (R&D) in the European energy sector. It is argued that 
financing innovations not only depend on controlling for tax payments as tax shields and 
firm operating age as a proxy for financing opportunities, but also on whether the energy 
company is privately owned, and whether it is located in an old or new-EU country. Using 
firm-level data for 1995–2007 from 24 European countries, we find that the leverage level 
and operating income availability have stimulated R&D among major energy firms: 
utilities as well as oil and gas producers. We found that, in the context of facilitating R&D 
activities, leverage is more important for the oil and gas sector, while operating income is 
more important for utilities. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Investment in research and development (R&D) is of paramount importance for 
any economy because technological innovation is a key driver of economic growth (Solow, 
1957). In general, the R&D literature has assumed that research activities positively 
influence firm value (Solow, 1957; Myers, 1977; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). However, 
important externalities are involved in financing for R&D. The primary output of R&D 
investment is to generate knowledge about new goods and services, and this knowledge 
cannot be kept secret. Thus, the benefits of research are enjoyed not only by the investing 
firm but also by other companies operating in the industry. Hence, the latter may act as an 
impediment to the financing of research and innovation. Indeed, Balakrishnan and Fox 
(1993) and Mulder (2008) argued that investment in energy does not pay off in innovation 
activities and requires substantial subsidization. In addition, it has been stressed that R&D 
investors exhibit great uncertainty in decision-making. However, amidst concerns about 
the security of energy supplies and calls for greater environmental protection, innovation in 
energy technology is becoming increasingly important to meet the growing demand for 
energy. At the same time, our knowledge about financing innovation in the energy industry 
remains rather limited. This chapter is an attempt to bridge the gap in the literature by 
assessing the relationship between general corporate leverage levels and innovation 
activities in the European energy industry. 
A limited amount of literature exists on this topic, especially regarding the strategic 
management of firms: 
 The existing research has shown that a higher degree of R&D intensity is 
associated with not only better firm value but also reduced leverage because 
R&D investment creates intangible assets, which cannot be used as 
collateral (Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Nevertheless, debt level is found to be an important predictor of R&D, 
because it highlights the strategic importance of innovation for firm 
development. 
 Vincente-Lorente (2001) further argued that R&D investments 
characterised by a high degree of specificity are associated with reduced 
leverage; however, those R&D activities that are less specific are more 
capable of supporting debt. One could also conceive a reverse causation in 
that minimal leverage could be a priority for firms that compete on the basis 
of innovation (see O’Brien, 2002). This is because minimal leverage 
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ensures: (i) continuous uninterrupted investment in R&D; (ii) the funds 
necessary to launch new products when needed; and (iii) the firm’s ability 
to expand its knowledge base through acquisition when it is potentially 
beneficial to do so. 
 Finally, much of the existing literature consists of country-level empirical 
studies (Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). There are 
only a few firm-level studies on the energy industry (see Balakrishnan and 
Fox, 1993 on the mining sector; Mulder, 2008 on the wind energy sector). 
 Thus, our analysis contributes to the limited literature on financing 
innovation in the energy industry. Furthermore, we highlight sectoral 
differences between the two major European energy sectors: utilities and oil 
and gas producers. 
By considering different strands in the existing literature and the growing 
importance of expanding the energy industry, the present chapter develops and examines 
the following central hypothesis: 
 Reduced leverage corresponds to more R&D at energy companies. This 
hypothesis highlights the trade-off between lower and higher levels of   
debt in the company in relation to R&D spending (as increased leverage 
may lead to overwhelming financial liabilities and depress R&D    
investments). 
Furthermore, we extend the research literature with an additional hypothesis: 
 Operating income complements the effects of leverage on R&D in energy 
companies. 
It may be argued that differences in the financing of innovation could result 
from the availability of operating profit to support the finance of innovation 
(see e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bhagat and Welch, 1995; and Brown and 
Petersen, 2011). The importance of operating income for financing R&D 
emerges from the notion that when it is more difficult to obtain leverage 
from financing institutions, when investors cannot measure the quality of 
future opportunities and when it is challenging to predict future cash flow, it 
companies may use operating income as a buffer to finance R&D 
expenditures. Further, the research on operating income appears to suggest 
that greater stability in the operating environment would allow the firm’s 
management more strategic options in terms of raising R&D expenditure, 
should it be required. 
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We also control for the commonly discussed measures known to influence R&D 
activity: tax shields to offset R&D expenses, liquidity, firm operating age as a measure of 
the company’s likely long-term viability, firm ownership status according to the private 
versus state ownership effect on financing innovation, and EU integration (Gros and 
Mortensen, 2004; Ayygari et al., 2007; Hadlock and Pierce, 2009; Brown and Petersen, 
2011). Section 3.2 of this chapter develops the related hypotheses for the ultimate inclusion 
of these control measures. 
Our results demonstrate that the relationship among corporate leverage level, 
operating income and R&D activities is consistent through the use of various control 
factors: both reduced leverage and operating availability help to finance innovation among 
energy companies: 
 First, the level of R&D activity is dependent on the level of leverage—
although R&D in both sectors increases with debt, it does so at a decreasing 
rate. This means too much leverage may overwhelm the financial 
attractiveness of the company. 
 Second, operating income availability is an important financing factor for 
utilities but not for oil and gas companies. Operating income availability is 
an important financial boost for ‘younger’ companies as compared to 
established energy firms. 
 Third, we also determined that privately owned companies as compared to 
state-owned firms can more easily secure financing for innovation. This is 
due to the competition incentives private companies face in any sector of 
the market. In this respect, state-owned companies are often large 
monopolistic giants and therefore lack competition incentives, which in turn 
can stagnate R&D. 
 Fourth, access to financing for innovation is contingent for firms in 
established EU countries: firms in the new EU states (that have joined since 
2004) rely solely on operating income as a source of financing for R&D. 
The companies in established EU countries are able to use financial 
incentives more effectively; such countries also have more credible lending 
institutions. For instance, we find that tax incentives are significant for 
energy companies in the old-EU countries but not in new EU member 
countries. 
 Overall, our estimates show that ‘younger’ energy companies and those from 
newly established EU countries require substantial help and the introduction of various 
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incentive mechanisms in order to become active in R&D. This is especially important 
because innovation in the energy sector is also a key goal for EU energy policy, which 
aims to improve energy efficiency, reduce energy dependence and achieve sustainable 
environmental development. We test the robustness of these results against various R&D 
and leverage specifications. 
Our main data source is the OSIRIS database, which consists of detailed balance 
sheets, profit and loss accounts, and cash flow data for virtually all existing and currently 
operating energy-industry firms in 24 European countries, including both old and new 
member countries. We concentrate on the period from 1995–2007, for which we had the 
most observations. 
After various experiments, we selected commonly known R&D proxies, defined as 
the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets and of R&D expenditure to sales (see e.g., 
Bhagat and Welch, 1995). To determine corporate leverage, we applied the general total 
debt to the total assets ratio and applied total liabilities to total assets ratios (see e.g., Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Cole, 2008). While we focus on energy sector firms, we classify the 
energy industry firms into two sectors (utilities and oil and gas producers) that comprise 
more than 80% of all energy firms in our sample. We argue that this distinction is 
important, in that these two groups of firms are rather different in their financing patterns, 
as borne out by our analysis (see the discussion in Section 3). 
We operate with the panel data analysis and present the relevant estimation 
specifications. In particular, we start with pooled-OLS and concentrate on the validity of 
such specifications as OLS with random and fixed effects and selection between the two. 
We also use an OLS first-difference estimator and discuss the results using elasticities. The 
GMM estimator is employed to control for inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
among the regressors. Heteroscedasticity is controlled with White’s standard errors. We 
use various post-estimation tests such as the joint test to determine the significance of the 
explanatory variables, the years test for the significance of time control, Hausman’s test for 
selection between OLS with random or fixed effects and the weak-instruments test for the 
GMM estimator. 
The study is developed as follows. Section 3.2 develops hypotheses that examine 
financing for innovation. Section 3.3 describes the data for R&D, leverage and operating 
income measures, control variables, and distinguishes the two major energy sectors. 
Section 3.4 explains the methodology and model used to assess financing for innovation. 
Section 3.5 analyses the results. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes and provides suggestions 
for further research.  
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3.2. Hypotheses 
 
While our research builds on the existing literature to explore the relationship 
between corporate leverage and R&D in European energy sector companies, we extend the 
relevant literature by establishing two hypotheses. The main null hypothesis is that reduced 
leverage may correspond to higher levels of R&D. The second hypothesis is that operating 
income may be used as a buffer to leverage financing for R&D. 
 
3.2.1. H1: Lower levels of debt correspond to higher levels of R&D 
Examination of the relationship between the capital structure of a firm and its 
propensity to engage in R&D has seen the focus of much research in the past. In an early 
investigation, Myers (1977) considered R&D as the ultimate future growth opportunity for 
the firm. The certainty of the intangibility of the R&D assets to pay off the associated 
borrowing cost to lenders and relatively lower cost of raising external debt (compared to 
profits used internally) impacts the availability of leverage with respect to financing 
innovations, and so the level of R&D itself. This implies that R&D depends on 
discretionary investments, which in turn suggests that firms that are highly leveraged 
would tend to reduce their R&D expenditure because, as a matter of priority, the firm’s 
generated resources should be allocated towards making the principal and interest 
payments. Following that, with some exceptions, the observed studies find mostly negative 
effects of leverage for innovation activities, which we will discuss in this subsection. 
Furthermore, most of the studies cover country-level data for each firm examined 
(e.g., Bhagat and Welch, 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and only limited research 
concerning energy industries (e.g., Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993 examined mining 
industries; Mulder, 2008 studied the wind energy sector). To our knowledge, there is no 
study controlling for the impact of leverage on R&D among European energy companies. 
This gap in the literature was used to establish our central hypothesis: lower levels of debt 
correspond to higher levels of R&D. Conversely, increased leverage may decrease R&D. 
Those studies finding negative effects of leverage for R&D discuss that the 
relationship is not straightforward. For instance, Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) found 
leverage to be negatively correlated with R&D expenditure among 295 mining and 
manufacturing firms. However, Bhagat and Welch (1995) found that the relationship 
varied among countries by conducting an empirical study on firms located in various 
OECD nations. They found that leverage from the previous year was negatively correlated 
with present-year R&D expenditures in US firms. This correlation was positive in the case 
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of Japanese firms. They explain that US companies preferred to safeguard R&D 
investments by controlling the amount of debt within the company. Bhagat and Welch 
(1995) indicated that their results may be biased due to inherently different levels of 
leverage across OECD nations. Notwithstanding, the results of Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Booth et al. (2001) suggest that the capital structures of firms across developed nations 
may be more similar to one another than suspected, which requires further exploration of 
any possible common drivers. 
A separate approach to the relationship between capital structure and R&D 
expenditure has been taken from the strategic management discipline. Simerly and Li 
(2000) considered the case of environmental dynamism, measured in terms of the 
variability of the industry value (e.g., returns on assets) of shipments. They studied a 
situation where R&D may be a critical factor for differentiating between one firm and the 
next. They found that capital structure affects the way that the firm relates to the R&D 
environment by adjusting the corporate governance structure of the firm. In cases of high 
leverage, control over the company takes on an external focus, which suggests that, for 
firms with a highly dynamic environment, an increase in leverage would tend to lead to a 
decrease in R&D expenditure. 
Another discussion on attracting financing for R&D using state subsidies and 
incentives was highlighted by Mulder (2008), who found that investments in energy, and 
particularly the renewables sector, do not pay off innovation activities because of the high 
capital cost involved. He highlighted the issue with the capital-intensive energy sector, 
stressing R&D investors’ uncertainty in decision-making with regard to future returns. 
The findings of the subsequent literature highlighted a common observation: the 
negative relationship between leverage and R&D arises because companies tend not to 
overburden themselves with debt liability. This is because it is difficult to estimate future 
incomes based on capital-intensive R&D activities. Thus, the level of R&D activity would 
depend on the level of leverage. Therefore, the following hypothesis was developed: 
Lower levels of debt correspond to higher levels of R&D. In order to explore the 
role of financing for R&D in this relationship, we examine the effect of the internal 
financing source—operating income for R&D. 
3.2.2. H2: Operating income complements the effects of leverage on R&D 
The importance of operating income for financing R&D emerges from the notion 
that when it is more difficult to obtain leverage from financing institutions, when investors 
cannot measure the quality of future opportunities and when it is challenging to predict 
future cash flows, it is likely that the company may use operating income as a buffer to 
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finance R&D expenditure. Thus, we explore how operating income may complement the 
effect of leverage on R&D. 
 As indicated by Simerly and Li (2000), the effects of capital structure on R&D 
differ depending on the dynamism of the environment in which the firm operates. Simerly 
and Li (2000) further elaborated that in more stable environments, the company may 
increase its leverage because debt financing could be cheaper for the company whereas 
equity financing may be the better option due to the alignment between the interests of 
management and shareholders. This extends a thread of the argument developed by Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), who viewed the choice between equity and debt financing in terms of 
the principal-agent problem. In heavily leveraged firms, the management of the company 
tends to have a heavy risk imposed upon them. This is not a condition that is conducive for 
risk-taking behaviour such as that manifested by increasing R&D expenditures. Given 
these asymmetric information considerations, internally generated income may be the 
likely source of R&D capital. Similarly, Bhagat and Welch (1995) argued that the extent to 
which capital investments and R&D expenditures have similar determinants, operating 
income would correlate positively with future R&D, where operating income variability is 
defined using net income plus depreciation as a percentage of total assets. 
 Myers and Majluf (1984) have argued that when investors cannot distinguish 
between high-quality and low-quality future opportunities, managers with good 
information are more likely to finance projects internally, less likely to raise outside debt, 
and less likely to raise outside equity. The resulting adverse selection raises the cost of 
external equity compared with internal finance. Thus a company may use operating income 
flows to finance required developments. 
Related to the uncertainty of income availability, Loof and Heshmati (2006) found 
that uncertainty about a firm’s income (measured as the variance of sales) may influence 
its optimal leverage level negatively. The more variable a firm’s operating income is, the 
greater the risk that the firm will be unable to cover its interest payments and the higher the 
probability of bankruptcy. Similar research has also been undertaken more recently by 
Brown and Petersen (2011), who found that firms, particularly young firms, use cash as a 
buffer to smooth their cash outflows due to R&D expenditure by building cash reserves 
when financing is easily obtained and drawing down on those cash reserves when 
financing is more difficult to get. Although Brown and Petersen (2011) discuss the R&D 
smoothing effect in terms of equity financing, the research appears to suggest that greater 
stability in the operating environment would allow the firm’s management more strategic 
options in terms of raising R&D expenditure, should it be required. In other words, in less 
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competitive environments, management would be able to more accurately predict the 
firm’s cash flow sources and needs and could therefore be more confident in undertaking 
more risky activities such as R&D. 
Therefore that not only must the direct relationship between leverage and R&D be 
understood, but it also it is very likely that operating income influences R&D as well. This 
means that the availability of operating income (as a ratio of total assets) may alter the 
effect of leverage on R&D. Thus, the following hypothesis is established: 
 Operating income complements the effects of leverage on R&D.  
 
 
3.3. Data  
 
Data for the analysis were obtained from the OSIRIS firm-level dataset for 24 
European countries, including both old and new member states
1
. The database holds 
necessary information for the period from 1984–2008 on more than 250 firms in EU 
countries. Given the emergence of new member states in addition to the regulatory changes 
in Europe and data availability, we focus on the period from 1995–2007, for which we 
have the maximum number of observations. The total company sample has increased 
consistently over time from 73 to 261 firms. Although the number of observations has 
increased over the study period, certain data are still lacking. This means that the 
estimation sample is likely to explain innovation activities only partially. This important 
data caveat is discussed in the results section along with the findings. 
In order to understand corporate financing behaviour in the energy industry, it is 
also important to classify companies into relevant sectors. Different industry classifications 
are available in the OSIRIS database (e.g., NAIC 2007; GICS code; Industry Classification 
Benchmark; Financial Times Industry Class; US SIC code(s); NAICS 2007 code(s); and 
NACE Rev. classification codes). For our data analysis, we have focused on the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB). Using the ICB, we identify 11 subsectors within the 
energy industry; among these, utilities and oil and gas producers represent the largest 
sectors. Firms belonging to these two sectors account for more than 80% of our 
observations, and hence our analysis focuses on them. Furthermore, utilities are 
represented by a higher number of companies than oil and gas producers, although the 
                                                 
1
 The 24 European countries covered in the study are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, 
Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden and Slovakia. 
 
  
38 
 
difference diminishes over time. Table 3.1 highlights the heterogeneity among these 
sectors and therefore the need to differentiate them when analysing financing and 
innovation.  
Figure 3.1 presents the distribution of energy firms between the major energy 
sectors and other sectors over the observed time period. The aim of this chapter is to 
analyse the European energy companies; we do not pursue analysis of the individual 
countries and companies. WE are aware that the majority of companies are located in the 
UK, France, Italy, Spain and Germany (Figure 3.2). Further research including country-
level analysis is planned for the future. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Industry classification  
 
Industry Classification Benchmark 
(2007) 
Nr. of 
firms 
% 
Two largest sectors:   
Oil and gas producers 108 41.4% 
Utilities 107 41.0% 
   
Other sectors: 46 17.6% 
Industrial 10 3.8% 
Basic resources 10 3.8% 
Oil equipment, services and distribution 8 3.1% 
Financial services & investment instruments 6 2.3% 
Basic materials 4 1.5% 
Industrial engineering 3 1.1% 
Construction & materials 2 0.8% 
Retail 2 0.8% 
Technology 1 0.4% 
Total 261 100.0% 
We present the company distribution for 2007. The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) was accessed 
through the OSIRIS database. Note that firms engaged in providing utilities or producing oil and gas 
constitute more than 80% of our observations. Our analysis therefore focuses on these two sectors. 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of energy sector companies, 1995–2007 
 
 
Company observations were obtained from OSIRIS firm-level data for a number of European countries 
including both old and new member states. Given the emergence of new member states as well as the 
regulatory changes in Europe and data availability, we focused on the period from 1995–2007, for which we 
have the maximum number of observations. There is a clear increase in the number of emerging companies 
across Europe, from 73 in 1995 to 261 companies in 2007.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of energy sector companies by country in 2007 
 
 
In this figure, we show the distribution of utilities, oil and gas companies among countries included in the 
OSIRIS database. In our analysis, we refer to the general European area, which includes 24 countries (old 
and new members) and the TOP5 countries: the UK (105 firms), France (26 firms), Italy (23 firms), Spain 
(21 firms) and Germany (19 firms). 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Other energy companies 12 12 13 15 17 21 23 25 32 34 37 45 46
Utilities 34 38 45 50 54 55 66 74 80 92 100 105 107
Oil& Gas 27 31 35 41 44 45 54 58 64 80 96 107 108
Total energy companies 73 81 93 106 115 121 143 157 176 206 233 257 261
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3.3.1. Dependent variable (R&D)  
In examining the effect of leverage on R&D, related studies have used various 
innovation measures, depending on the data available for the selected country samples. It is 
important to select the most appropriate R&D measure, as this will constitute the 
dependent variable in our central hypothesis. With regard to R&D usage, the most 
common measures are ratios of R&D to total assets and R&D to sales. For instance, 
Bhagat and Welch (1995) used R&D expenditure to total assets, as this ratio represents 
costs incurred for the development of new products and services. However, Balakrishnan 
and Fox (1993) used ratios of R&D and advertising expenditure, respectively, to net sales. 
The ‘innovation expenditure to net sales’ ratio is dictated by the use of the ‘net sales 
proportion’ to allow control for non-debt tax shields. Instead of measuring the level of 
R&D, Cole (2008) measured the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Booth et al. (2001) 
was not able to measure R&D in his study, as the selected data source did not provide 
information on intangible assets. However, studies by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Simerly 
and Li (2000), and Mulder (2008) discussed the importance of innovation as compared to 
leverage but did not investigate R&D due to the lack of available data for the selected 
firms and countries. 
In addition to the ratios of R&D expenditure to total assets and net sales in firm-
level studies, other country-level studies included the number of patents granted, the R&D 
to GDP ratio and R&D defined as an investment in knowledge.  We do not include these 
additional country-level R&D proxies in the empirical estimation, as these do not directly 
relate to our energy firm sample. Appendix 3.B discusses these additional R&D proxies. 
Taking commonly used firm-level R&D measures, we concentrate on both R&D 
expenditure to total assets and R&D expenditure to net sales ratios.. The R&D measures 
are derived from balance sheets obtained from the OSIRIS database. 
We applied both measures in our empirical analysis. It is expected that because the 
energy sector is a capital-intensive industry, the level of R&D expenditure on intangible 
assets as compared to total assets is a more appropriate measure than the sales ratio. We 
also used as the number of patents registered, the ratio of R&D to GDP and the ratio of 
R&D to employment, but did not find these significant in our sample. Appendix 3.B and 
3.C provide details about these additional R&D proxies. Table 3.2 provides descriptive 
statistics for R&D in both sectors and compares these values with those obtained for the 
energy sector as a whole. The energy industry R&D maintained at a 10% level seems to be 
driven by R&D in the oil and gas sector (16%), whereas utility companies spend on 
average half this amount (7%) on innovation.  
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Table 3.2: Means and standard deviation of selected sectoral R&D, 1995–2007 
 
 
Utilities 
Oil and 
gas 
producers 
Energy 
sector 
 
   
R&D intangibles to total assets:    
Mean 
Std. dev. 
0.0708 
0.1010 
0.1590 
0.2328 
0.1030 
0.1698 
R&D intangibles to total sales:    
Mean 
Std. dev. 
0.1422 
0.1911 
0.1222 
0.1929 
0.1282 
0.1893 
R&D intangibles are defined as the ratio of expenditures to total assets. We adjust the ratio by including 
ratios of 0 to 1 only. The R&D definition is based on the methodology used by Bhagat and Welch (1995).  
 
 
We do not perform an empirical estimation for each country because of the small 
number of observed companies in many countries; instead, we provide an overall 
estimation for all countries in the sample. However, using the average R&D expenditure 
values by countries and over time, we show that the countries differ in terms of innovation. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates that, for instance, the ratio of R&D to total assets does not exceed 
15% (Ireland) in the oil and gas sector; in the majority of companies, the amount is lower 
than 7%. The ratio of R&D to total asset spending among utilities firms is about the same 
as for the study sample as a whole and does not exceed 16% (Belgium). Furthermore, 
European energy firms tend to spend different proportions of the company’s assets on 
R&D over time. At the aggregated EU level, companies tend to spend more on innovation 
every other year. There is a significant year-on-year increase in R&D spending in each of 
the major energy sectors, which drives the general industry level. R&D expenditure is still 
relatively small and only in rare years has exceeded 10% of total assets, but in 2007, this 
ratio was approximately twice that of the 1995 figures in both utilities and the oil and gas 
sectors. This means that R&D has become an important instrument in the energy sector 
and that innovation is likely to receive increased attention from energy firms in the future. 
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of R&D by year, 1995–2007 
 
 All energy firms Oil and gas firms Utilities firms 
           
• Ratio of R&D intangibles to total assets  
• Ratio of R&D intangibles to sales  
 
This figure represents the distribution of R&D among the firms in Europe. The yearly level charts show that 
at R&D activities tend to increase in Europe as a whole. The data were obtained from the OSIRIS firm-level 
database. The R&D proxies are defined in Section 3.3.1. 
 
 
3.3.2. Regression measures 
 We have defined two regression measures according to our hypotheses. These are 
leverage and operating income. 
 
Leverage 
In examining the effect of leverage on R&D, related studies used various financing 
measures, depending on the data available for the selected country samples. The main issue 
raised by the studies is how to define leverage. The observed studies commonly refer to 
both book ratios (based on balance sheet data) and market ratios (considered when firms 
are registered on stock markets). Our data sample covers both non-listed and listed 
companies. However, the firm data obtained from the OSIRIS database does not present 
consistent market-type ratios, so we concentrated on book ratios. The most commonly used 
book-type leverage measures are total debt to total assets and total liabilities to total assets 
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ratios. These measures represent general leverage within companies. The difference in 
comparing debt vs. liabilities to total assets is that the first comparison includes both short-
term and long-term debt, while the latter ratio is viewed as a proxy for what is left for 
shareholders in case of liquidation (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Further, both Booth et al. 
(2001) and Cole (2008) explained that these leverage proxies are viewed as an essential 
way of doing business with controls for both current and long-term liabilities. More 
importantly, these measures reflect the assessment of the amount of borrowed long-term 
debt, which represents, for instance, plants, buildings or land, as well as business loans. 
These significantly affect liquidation cost, and thus companies with many illiquid assets 
should be financed with relatively less debt. Similarly, Balakrishnan and Fox (1993), 
Bhagat and Welch (1995) and Simerly and Li (2000) used long-term and short-term debt to 
assets ratios. Mulder (2008) discussed the implications of debt and R&D measures but has 
not used these in estimations. Instead, he selected tax incentives, turbine sales prices and 
interest rates as explanatory measures to investigate the attraction of investments in wind 
energy. 
Amongst other possible measures of capital structure, Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
and later Simerly and Li (2000) and Booth et al. (2001), used long-term book-debt ratios 
and long-term market debt ratios. However, the data necessary for these ratios is only 
available for those companies registered on the stock exchange and further limited by the 
availability of stock data. Rajan and Zingales (1995) showed that another way to measure 
leverage is to determine total debt to net assets, where net assets are total assets less 
accounts payable and other liabilities. Although this measure is not influenced by trade 
credit, it is affected by factors that may have nothing to do with financing. For example, 
assets held against pension liabilities may decrease this measure of leverage. 
When considering the availability of various leverage measures and that we deal 
with book type ratios, in our study we refer to two common leverage proxies, denoted as 
total debt to total assets and total liabilities to total assets ratios. A detailed explanation of 
other leverage proxies and their use in the literature is provided in Section 3.2. Table 3.3 
shows selected leverage measure descriptive statistics for two major energy sectors and 
compares them with the general energy industry. 
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Table 3.3: Means and standard deviation of selected leverage proxies, 1995–2007 
 
 
Utilities 
Oil and 
gas 
producers 
Energy 
sector 
 
   
Total debt to total assets:    
Mean 
Std. dev. 
0.2649 
0.1829 
0.1836 
0.3501 
0.2411 
0.1779 
Total liabilities to total assets:    
Mean 
Std. dev. 
0.6021 
0.2051 
0.3501 
0.2411 
0.4905 
0.2532 
We measure corporate leverage as the ratio of total debt to total assets. These ratios are also used by Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001). 
 
 
The selected leverage measures have been used widely in the existing literature and 
represent the potential risk of a company. A ratio level between 0 and 0.5 indicates that a 
company tends to finance on the balance sheet, whereas a ratio greater than 0.5 shows that 
company is likely to rely more on external funds. For instance, the average ratio of 26% for 
utilities (Table 3.3) means that the creditors have put up EUR 0.26 for every EUR 1 the 
company owners have put in; that is, the debt of a company is less than its assets. The 
leverage measures are derived from balance sheets obtained from the OSIRIS database.  
The utility firms tend to have much higher average debt (26% for ‘total assets’-
based and 60% for ‘total liabilities’-based) compared with oil and gas producers (19%). 
We also compared the sample averages with those obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and Booth et al. (2001)
2
. In agreement with Rajan and Zingales (1995), our study finds that 
the energy industry has the same average debt ratio (24%) as that calculated for the G-7 
countries for the period from 1987–1991 (23%). Although the overall leverage data are 
similar to those in the existing literature, the comparison should be treated with caution, as 
different countries, firms and time periods were used for these analyses. 
Figure 3.4 highlights that the debt level varies, and it is difficult to determine any 
pronounced tendency when comparing major energy sectors. However, when looking at 
the aggregated EU level year-by-year, the leverage in oil and gas companies is at about the 
same level (a 19% debt-to-total assets ratio), whereas the utilities tend to become more 
leveraged over time (e.g., an increase to 27% in 2007 from 21% in 1995). The increase in 
utilities leveraging may demonstrate the development of these companies in the EU 
territory as the energy sector of each European country has become more open to 
immigrants and therefore has required additional investments for financing innovation. 
                                                 
2
 Note that the studies by both Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001) have only four countries in 
common with our country sample (Germany, France, the UK and Italy). However, these countries provide 
the majority of firm data used for our research. 
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Leverage by years, 1995–2007 
 
 All energy firms Oil and gas firms Utilities firms 
                   
• Ratio of debt to total assets  
• Ratio of liabilities to total assets  
 
This figure represents the distribution of the two alternative leverage measures among the firms in the 
European countries. The yearly level charts show that leverage in oil and gas firms tends not to change over 
time as compared to increased levels among the utilities sector. The data were obtained from the OSIRIS 
firm-level database. The leverage proxies are defined in Section 3.3.2. 
 
 
Operating income 
According to Loof and Heshmati (2006) and Brown and Petersen (2011), operating 
income should be significant for companies having difficulties in obtaining leverage for 
R&D activities. That is, financing innovation with operating income may provide an 
additional boost when the leverage available is not sufficient. We used the same 
operational income measure applied by Bhagat and Welch (1995), which is the sum of net 
income and depreciation as a proportion of total assets. Table 3.4 shows that in our sample, 
the average ratio of operating income to total assets is higher for oil and gas producers at 
0.17 (average operating income is EUR 635,000). Utilities, at 0.15 (average operating 
income is EUR 427,000), are similar to the energy industry average level of 0.15 (average 
operating income is EUR 444,000). 
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Table 3.4: Means and standard deviation of operating income, 1995–2007 
 
 
Utilities 
Oil and 
gas 
producers 
Energy 
sector 
 
   
Operating income, millions  (EUR):    
Mean 
Std. dev. 
426,979 
1,239,971 
635,062 
3,310,031 
444,184 
2,282,136 
Ratio of operating income 
to total assets: 
   
Mean 
Std. dev. 
0.1542 
0.1849 
0.1017 
0.0335 
0.2197 
0.2622 
Operating income denotes the net income plus depreciation as a percentage of total assets, following Bhagat 
and Welch (1995). 
 
 
3.3.3. Control measures 
It may be argued that differences in the financing of innovation could result from 
other factors. These may consist of tax shields to offset R&D expenses, liquidity, firm 
operating age as a measure of the company’s long-term viability, firm ownership status 
according to the private versus state ownership effect on financing innovation, and EU 
integration. These control variables are obtained from the balance sheets, and similar to the 
data on R&D and leverage, were extracted from the OSIRIS database. The number of years 
for which the country has been a member of the EU is used as a proxy for EU integration
3
. 
 
Tax shields 
We refer to the significance of an effect of tax shields on financing R&D because 
increasing leverage is desirable due to the tax shield on debt that can accrue to the 
company (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). It is a common finding in the literature that tax 
existence positively affects leverage in the company; however, tax issues related to 
financing opportunities are complicated by the fact that countries frequently allow 
companies undertaking R&D activities to claim tax credits, which emerge from both non-
debt (refers to the depreciation of assets) and debt tax shields. 
Bradley, Greg and Han Kim (1984) investigated the relationship between R&D on 
one hand and both non-debt tax shields and debt tax shields on the other. They found that 
R&D tax shields should not be considered as a substitute for debt tax shields due to the 
perverse relationship between the level of R&D expenditure and R&D tax shields. There 
was a significant positive relationship between leverage and the level of non-tax shields. 
Bradley, Greg and Han Kim (1984) postulated that this was because non-debt tax shields 
                                                 
3
 The EU membership of a country is denoted by its official joining year, as obtained from 
http://www.eucountrylist.com 
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represent the securability of the firm's assets, where firms with more securable assets tend 
to have higher leverage ratios. This is supported by Loof and Heshmati (2006) who found 
that, using the ratio of depreciation to total assets in order to measure the existence of non-
debt tax shields, suggested a negative relationship between a tax shield and the leverage 
level in highly leveraged countries like Sweden. However, the measure was insignificant in 
low-leverage companies located in the UK and US. 
In a more recent study completed by Bhagat and Welch (1995), R&D expenditure 
follows the value of related tax subsidies, which increase with a firm’s marginal tax rate. 
They find mixed evidence of the tax shield fostering R&D. The authors used total taxes 
payable to total assets to control for the tax shied level. The results among countries differ 
according to the degree of tax legislation. According to Bhagat and Welch (1995), the most 
complicated R&D-related tax incentives are to be found in Japan, whereas in other 
countries, including those in Europe, R&D tends to be subsidized by various forms of tax 
incentives, e.g., government grants which offset tax levels. In contrast, Hines Jr. (1993) 
found that R&D activities were fairly inelastic to changes in R&D tax incentives at US 
firms. That is to say those firms in the US tended to maintain a pattern of R&D spending 
somewhat independently of the changes in tax incentives for R&D activity. 
Cole (2008) considered the optimal balance between tax-deductible expenses in 
relation to R&D among privately held US manufacturing firms. He found that the balance 
of tax shields for R&D should be at a level such that the marginal benefit of the shield is 
not greater than the marginal cost associated with the probability of financial distress of 
acquiring the leverage. 
These papers argue that there should be a relationship between the level of tax 
shields and leverage, where increased tax rates lead to higher recoverable tax shields, thus 
increasing the incentive to increase leverage and increasing the incentive to engage in 
R&D. With regard to the quantification of tax shields, we used the ratio of total taxes 
payable by the firm to total assets (Bhagat and Welch, 1995). The descriptive statistics in 
Table 3.5 show that the average tax ratio for both major sectors and the energy industry on 
average does not exceed 0.01 and may be only marginally higher in oil and gas production 
firms. 
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Table 3.5: Means and standard deviations of selected tax proxies, 1995–2007 
 
 
Utilities 
Oil and 
gas 
producers 
Energy 
sector 
 
   
Tax to total assets:    
Mean 
Std. dev. 
0.0153 
0.0185 
0.0174 
0.0335 
0.0152 
0.0262 
The ratio of tax payments to total assets is the ratio of total taxes payable by the company to total assets, 
according to Bhagat and Welch (1995). 
 
 
 
Liquidity 
The presence of liquidity has a mixed impact on R&D activity. The liquidity issue 
in relation to R&D has been widely discussed in the existing literature. The common 
ground is that liquidity provides advantages in the form of unexpected short-term 
investment opportunities without the need to raise new capital (e.g., Cole, 2008). This may 
suggest that those companies with greater liquidity possess a lower probability of financial 
distress and hence are likely to attract investments towards innovations when they are 
needed. Nevertheless, Rajan and Zingales (1995) indicated that it is difficult to establish an 
effective level of liquidity, as each industry and even every company faces unique business 
challenges. Explicitly, Hall (2002) and Bougheas et al. (2002) found strong evidence for 
the importance of liquidity among industrial companies and demonstrated the presence of 
liquidity constraints for R&D-oriented companies. Further, Sarmistha and Driffield (2008) 
highlighted that a company should be concerned with its level of liquidity, as otherwise it 
might be caught in a liquidity attack (i.e., having short-term debt but long-term assets). 
With regard to the observed sample of energy companies, we operate with two 
common liquidity proxies: the current ratio and the liquidity ratio (both are measures of 
current assets, but the liquidity ratio excludes stock from the current assets). The 
descriptive statistics in Table 3.6 indicate that both ratios are high in both major energy 
sectors, where oil and gas producers seem to dominate the energy market. The high 
average ratio values (greater than 1) indicate that energy companies are fully covered 
against potential liquidity. 
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Table 3.6: Means and standard deviations for selected liquidity proxies, 1995–2007 
 
 
Utilities 
Oil and 
gas 
producers 
Energy 
sector 
 
   
Current ratio 
(current assets to current liabilities): 
   
Mean 
Std. dev. 
3.56 
31.32 
5.29 
13.88 
4.24 
23.17 
Liquidity ratio 
(current assets excl. stocks to current liabilities): 
   
Mean 
Std. dev. 
3.92 
31.75 
5.30 
13.86 
4.52 
23.43 
Liquidity measures are widely discussed in the related literature, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995), Hall 
(2002), Bougheas et al. (2002), and Sarmistha and Driffield (2008). 
 
 
Firm age 
Previous studies have found that firm age is a factor in surviving economic stress 
and business and market competition. These studies found that more mature companies 
have an advantage over younger firms. The firm’s age was found to be especially 
important in capital-intensive industries (Audtretsch, 1991; Brown and Medoff, 2003). 
Therefore, the advantage of controlling for a firm’s operating age is that it allows us to 
determine how the number of years in an industry reflects the ambient business conditions 
and, in our case, the ability to attract leverage for financing R&D. 
Although firm age is known to positively affect company development, there is 
evidence that younger firms are more likely to introduce new products and new 
technology, upgrade existing product lines, open new plants, sign joint ventures, and bring 
in previously outsourced activities. However, older firms are more likely to discontinue 
products or close existing plants (Ayygari et al., 2007). In contrast to Ayygari et al. (2007), 
Hadlock and Pierce (2009) performed a more recent study that applied a qualitative index 
based on information disclosed by a large random sample of companies. They found that 
younger firms are affected by financial constraints, but more importantly, firm age and 
firm size (as total assets) were the two most important proxies observed by lending 
institutions that decided to provide financing opportunities. In another recent study, Brown 
and Petersen (2011) found that younger firms (those with operations for fewer than 15 
years) face more financial constraints; they explained that more mature companies have 
more experience in the industry and thus garner more respect from lending institutions. 
Thus, building on the mixed empirical findings that firm age may or may not 
facilitate financing decisions for R&D activities, we include the age of a firm as a 
regressor. For instance, Brown and Petersen (2011) define ‘younger’ companies as those 
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with operational ages of less than 15 years; more ‘mature’ companies are those with more 
than 15 years of experience in operations (following Brown and Petersen, 2011). In our 
analysis, we control for the firm’s operational age through the use of various “age groups” 
(5, 10 and 20 years). We believe this would allow us to see the effect of firm age on 
financing innovation. 
 
 
Table 3.7: Means and standard deviation of firm age, 1995–2007 
 
 
Utilities 
Oil and 
gas 
producers 
Energy 
sector 
 
   
Firm age across the full period    
Mean 
Std. dev. 
24 
36 
12 
25 
20 
34 
    
Number of companies by 
operational age: 
   
101+ years 13 2 7 
51-100 years 25 6 15 
21-50 years 22 8 7 
16-20 years 13 6 4 
11-15 years 21 9 9 
6-10 years 32 13 15 
0-5 years 134 65 49 
The importance of a firm’s age for R&D and other company-related measures is discussed by Ayygari et al. 
(2007), Hadlock and Pierce (2009), and Brown and Petersen (2011), among others. 
 
 
We expected that the firm age of younger companies is likely to restrict access to 
leverage when financing innovations. Table 3.7 shows that oil and gas companies are on 
average twice as young (12 years) as utilities (24 years), with European energy industry 
firms an average of 24 years old. The majority of energy companies across subsectors of 
the industry are less than 5 years old, which indicates that stronger and more 
entrepreneurial companies tend to survive and remain in the business. 
 
 
Private ownership of the company 
With regard to the legal ownership status of the firm, we refer to a very early paper 
by Marshall (1907) and relatively recent studies by Shleifer (1998) and Ayygari et al. 
(2007), who found that privately owned companies have stronger incentives than state-
owned enterprises to create profits. Privately owned companies therefore pay off financing 
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expenditures by engaging in innovative technologies. At a more general level, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) found that in G-7 countries, institutional differences can play a significant 
role in corporate leverage, and that it is necessary to measure the effects of country-
specific conditions, such as the effects of taxes, bank-based versus market-based countries 
and ownership control.  
We define the major owner of the company based on the entity that holds the 
largest stake in the company’s future. The OSIRIS database manual defines a company that 
is owned by another company as privately owned; when the company is owned by the 
state, governmental agencies, governmental departments or local authorities, it is 
considered to be owned by the state. 
The argument in favour of private companies refers to the very basic assertion of 
Marshall (1907) that the government is generally a poor innovator because managers of 
state firms have relatively weak incentives to operate efficiently; more importantly, the 
managers of state firms lack the ownership rights and hence the motivation to lead 
businesses in a cost-effective manner. Recent studies have strengthened these two 
arguments. An extensive study by the World Bank (1995) found that in every industry 
ranging from grocery to air transportation, privately owned firms delivered the same and in 
many instances better quality services, at lower production costs. The main explanation for 
the success of private companies over state businesses lies in competition, which private 
companies face in the marketplace, whereas government firms are often large and 
monopolistic enterprises with no or few incentives to compete for their share of the market. 
In this regard, Shleifer (1998) and Ayyagari et al. (2007) support existing studies reporting 
that public managers have relatively weak incentives to make adequate returns on received 
investments because the motivation provided by ownership and profit is lacking. 
The ownership literature describes a positive effect of private ownership on access 
to financing compared. Table 3.8 demonstrates that private ownership is associated with 
greater access to financing compared to state or any other form of ownership.  
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Table 3.8: Major ownership types, by countries, as per firm-level data 
 
 
Private State 
Emplo-
yees 
Self-
owned 
Public 
Other 
type 
Major 
owner- 
ship 
Major 
owner type 
Slovakia 88% 0% 0% 0% 13% 0% 88% Private 
Romania 72% 0% 0% 0% 28% 0% 72% Private 
Austria 71% 10% 0% 0% 16% 3% 71% Private 
Finland 59% 1% 0% 0% 41% 0% 59% Private 
Spain 50% 1% 0% 0% 15% 34% 50% Private 
Belgium 50% 0% 0% 0% 21% 29% 50% Private 
Germany 48% 7% 0% 0% 30% 15% 48% Private 
Hungary 46% 0% 0% 0% 20% 34% 46% Private 
Greece 45% 9% 0% 4% 31% 11% 45% Private 
France 45% 5% 0% 2% 16% 32% 45% Private 
Italy 44% 10% 0% 1% 20% 25% 44% Private 
Lithuania 41% 48% 0% 0% 11% 0% 48% State 
Portugal 38% 0% 0% 0% 12% 50% 50% Other type 
Denmark 32% 0% 4% 13% 32% 19% 32% Private/Public 
Latvia 32% 0% 0% 0% 2% 66% 66% Other type 
Ireland 28% 0% 0% 0% 41% 31% 41% Public 
Cz. Republic 27% 20% 0% 0% 13% 40% 40% Other type 
Poland 23% 0% 0% 0% 27% 50% 50% Other type 
UK 16% 0% 0% 0% 34% 50% 50% Other type 
Luxemburg 15% 13% 0% 0% 5% 67% 67% Other type 
Sweden 9% 0% 0% 0% 8% 83% 83% Other type 
Cyprus 7% 0% 0% 0% 93% 0% 93% Public 
Estonia 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% Other type 
Netherlands 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 100% Other type 
Average 
ownership type 
37% 5% 0% 1% 22% 35% 37% Private 
This table lists the major owner of the company, according to the definitions outlined above. We concentrate 
on private status (owned by another company) and state status (owned by states, governmental agencies, 
governmental departments, or local authorities). The ownership segregation methodology follows the 
OSIRIS database’s manual handbook. We provide other ownership types as a reference point only. 
 
 
EU integration 
Gros and Mortensen (2004) argued that integration into the EU market should 
facilitate R&D activity. They referred to the EU commitment, announced in March 2000 in 
Lisbon, where EU heads of state and government set the strategic goal to become the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. These goals were 
confirmed at the Barcelona European Council, which added that investment in European 
R&D should be increased to 3% of GDP by 2010. 
To our knowledge, no previous study has examined the impact of country 
integration on the European energy sector; therefore, we control for EU integration. We 
expect that older EU member countries have an advantage over companies in new-EU 
countries in attracting financing for R&D. That is, companies from the established EU 
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countries may be able to use financial incentives more effectively; these companies are 
more familiar to investment providers and hence more trustworthy. 
We control for the influence of integration on the energy sector companies since 
2004 (new-EU countries), when nine countries joined the European Union, which then 
included 15 countries
4
. Those countries that joined the EU before 2004 are referred to as 
‘old EU’ countries. 
 
3.4. A model of financing and innovations 
 
Our main empirical model is an unbalanced data panel (panel variable as company, time 
variable as year) on a yearly basis. We focused on the years with the most observations for 
R&D and leverage data, which cover the period from 1995–2007. Our estimation extends 
the existing firm-level studies in the energy industry (see e.g., Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; 
Mulder, 2008) by focusing on two major sectors: utilities and oil and gas producers. 
 The dependent variable is R&D, and financing is investigated as leverage and 
operating income, as discussed in Section 3.3. Given that there could be additional factors 
influencing leverage for innovation activities, we also analyse the effects of tax shields, 
liquidity, firm operating age (various age groups), firm ownership status (privately owned 
versus state-owned firms), and integration in the EU, as discussed in Section 3.3.3. 
We follow the theoretical background procedure discussed in Chapter 2. We begin 
our estimation using the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. However, each 
firm has its own individual characteristics, which may or may not influence the regression 
results. The initial OLS regression may be biased because unobserved time-invariant 
country effects may be correlated with regressors; hence, we have to decide between the 
OLS-FE and the OLS-RE. Therefore we report various panel data specifications such as 
OLS-RE, OLS-FE, and OLS-FD and use the GMM estimator to control for the inclusion of 
the lagged dependent variable among the regressors. Further, following Arellano and 
Bond’s GMM estimator, the lagged dependent variable is treated as endogenous, and the 
independent variables are treated as strictly exogenous (leverage, operating income, and a 
set of control measures). The GMM estimator used the second lag of the endogenous 
variable. We utilize only internal instruments and do not include additional external 
instruments. In each of the panel estimation specifications, we control for 
                                                 
4
 EU integration separates between old and new-EU countries. We define new EU member countries (9) as those that 
joined the EU on or after 2004. These are Cyprus (2004), the Czech Republic (2004), Estonia (2004), Hungary (2004), 
Lithuania (2004), Latvia (2004), Poland (2004), Romania (2007) and Slovakia (2004). 
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heteroscedasticity by means of White’s standard errors. We also apply post-estimation tests 
for the statistical validity of the findings following the theoretical background presented in 
Chapter 2. Our empirical scrutiny focuses on the size, sign and significance of the 
estimated coefficients.  We also produce results in terms of elasticities that allow us to 
measure the responsiveness of the dependent variable R&D to a change in the explanatory 
measure (refer to Chapter 2 for more explanation and Table 3.12 in the results section). 
The general equation is: 
 
R&Dit =  γ1R&Dit-1 + γ2Leverageit +δ1Leverageit
2+ γ3OperIncomeit + γ4Taxit + 
+ γ5Liabilitiesit + αi + uit Eq. (3.1) 
 
where  
R&Dit = R&D of the i-th firm in the t-th year, 
αi = represents a time-invariant unobserved intercept for each firm, commonly known as 
fixed effects, 
uit= is a unique firm’s error term. 
 
At first, to test the initial hypothesis that reduced leverage positively influences 
R&D, while higher leverage reduces R&D, we start with Eq. (3.1), which considers 
leverage, and then add the square of leverage. The inclusion of both leverage and its square 
term suggests that there is some potential threshold level after which an increased level of 
leverage may harm innovation activities (Tables 3.9 and 3.10). Eq. (3.1) is non-linear and 
parabolic; that is, the threshold of the leverage measure means calculating the inflexion 
point for the parabola
5
: 
Leverage
*
 =   
where 
Leverage
*
 = an inflexion point (threshold) for leverage  
γ2 and δ1 = coefficients of the Leverageit and Leverageit
2
 variables from Eq. (3.1) 
 
Further, we segregate companies with a total debt to total assets ratio of less than 
0.5 from those with a ratio greater than 0.5. This leverage segmentation enables a 
                                                 
5
 Eq. (3.1) follows the parabola shape of a general equation (y=x + x
2
 + c). The inflexion point is that where 
the slope of ‘x’ changes from positive to negative or from negative to positive. The parabola may become 
concave upwards or downwards depending on the signs of ‘x’ and ‘x2’. The relevant theoretical background 
is widely discussed in fundamental calculus and geometry books (e.g., Stewart, 2009 and Brannan et al., 
2003).  
1
2
2
1



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distinction between the ‘threshold’ impact on leverage of companies that tend to balance 
sheet debt compared to those that rely more on external debt (Table 3.11 and additional 
detailed sub-sectoral tables in Appendix 3.A). 
In order to test the second hypothesis that income may supplement financing for 
R&D, we introduce the operating income term. There is a possibility that in addition to 
leverage and operating income, there is a set of control variables that could result in 
diverse patterns of financing for R&D. For this reason, we introduce control measures that 
are commonly known to influence R&D activity, as described in Section 3.2. Also, 
inclusion of the lagged dependent on the right-hand-side of the equation serves as a control 
for the previous period’s R&D activity. 
In addition, we present estimates for Eq. (3.1) that control for operating age, 
employing 5-, 10- and 20-year age groups (Table 3.13 summarizes these age groups; the 
specifics are presented in Appendix 3.A). Further, we distinguished between estimates for 
privately owned and state-owned companies (Table 3.14 and additional tables in Appendix 
3.A). Finally, we introduced controls for integration with the European Union. As stated 
above, countries that joined the EU after 2004 are called ‘new EU’ countries (Table 3.15; 
detailed subsector tables are presented in Appendix 3.A). In all control examinations, we 
distinguish the results for utilities, oil and gas producers and compare these with the 
overall energy sector estimates. 
 
 
3.5. Results 
 
 
This subsection provides panel data analysis to estimate the impact of financing 
ability on innovation activities (both measured by two proxies each) within the European 
energy industry and the two major subsectors—utilities and oil and gas production. Our 
results serve to document empirical regularities that are consistent with the relevant 
literature. In particular, we find that levels of debt within energy companies are 
differentially related to the engagement with innovation. Subsection 3.5.1 and Tables 3.9-
3.12 present the summary findings, while the subsequent sub-sections suggest the 
importance of firm operating age (Table 3.13), ownership status (Table 3.14) and EU 
integration in innovation financing (Table 3.15). The tables presented in the main 
discussion are for all industries and energy industries, while Appendix 3.A provides 
additional detailed results tables covering two subsectors—utilities and oil and gas. 
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3.5.1. Summary of panel estimates of R&D 
 
Firms with greater financial burden may find lenders reluctant to provide 
investment funds for capital-intensive technology developments with regards to 
uncertainty about generating enough future income to pay back the principal and cover 
interest payments. The findings of debt non-linearity for R&D activities are similar for the 
overall energy industry and both major sub-sectors (Tables 3.9 and 3.10)
6
.
 
That is, the 
broad evidence on innovation financing is in line with the general studies on leverage and 
the R&D relationship—that the level of financial burden has a potential to adversely 
impact on innovation activity (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et. al., 2001; Cole, 
2008, among others). 
The control for the leverage non-linearity effect suggests that there is a threshold 
level of debt in relation to the extent to which companies engage in innovation. In other 
words, there is a particular point at which the debt level starts to adversely affect R&D 
activity. Notably, Eq. (3.1) is parabola shaped and the inflexion point can be calculated. 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 indicate that the leverage threshold level for the energy industry is at 
about 30%, higher for utilities at around 40%, and lower for oil and gas producers at 
around 25%. Further, the threshold varies when considering various company age groups 
(Appendix Table 3.A.5) and the country’s integration to the European Union (see Table 
3.15). Thus, the low threshold level, which is even negative for companies located in 
countries that have recently joined the EU, suggests that energy companies are considered 
to be a risky business when investors are deciding whether or not to lend toward R&D 
engagement. Nonetheless, utilities inspire greater confidence than oil and gas firms. 
We further distinguish between those companies with debt levels greater than 0.5 (a 
tendency for external debt financing) and those with levels lower than 0.5 (a tendency 
toward balance-sheet financing). Table 3.11 shows that an energy sector firm with a low 
 
  
                                                 
6
 The estimates with an alternative R&D proxy, such as ‘R&D expenditure to sales ratio’, yield weaker 
results (refer to Appendix 3.A.1). The literature notes that ‘sales’ may not be a valid proxy for ‘total assets’ 
due because the energy industry is capital intensive. Hence the ratio of R&D to total asset base is more 
appropriate. 
Estimates of innovation financing based on an alternative leverage ratio indicate that having more liabilities 
distorts investments (refer to Appendix 3.A.2). Essentially, the liabilities ratio is viewed as a proxy for what 
is left for the shareholders in case of liquidation and may not be as representative as the main leverage 
considered, i.e., the total debt to total assets ratio (as discussed by Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Note that the 
descriptive statistics in Table 3.3 indicate that the liabilities ratio is much higher than the debt ratio, which 
explains why estimates of the ‘liabilities’ ratio demonstrate a negative impact of both the term and the square 
term on R&D (refer to Appendix 3.A). This finding of an alternative leverage measure is in line with the 
argument proposed by Mulder (2008), which states that a high level of leverage means the company takes an 
external focus, which is in turn associated with reduced R&D expenditure. 
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Table 3.9: A summary of panel estimates with control variables for R&D in 
energy sector firms, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
controlling 
for year) 
Pooled OLS OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
the lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.122* 0.0948 0.0948* 0.123** 0.113 0.120*** 
(0.0664) (0.0650) (0.0557) (0.0585) (0.104) (0.0360) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.183** -0.175** -0.175** -0.200** -0.214 -0.209*** 
(0.0892) (0.0881) (0.0862) (0.0906) (0.139) (0.0616) 
Operating income -0.0351 -0.0453 -0.0453* -0.0118 -0.0108 -0.0409** 
(0.0375) (0.0380) (0.0234) (0.0242) (0.0304) (0.0194) 
Tax to total assets 0.0426 0.103 0.103 0.0515 -0.0870 0.0344 
(0.118) (0.117) (0.124) (0.128) (0.0915) (0.0948) 
Liquidity -0.00310 -0.00326 -0.00326*** -0.00406*** 0.00275* 0.00190*** 
(0.00223) (0.00224) (0.000742) (0.000757) (0.00153) (0.000543) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.721*** 
     (0.0298) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0853*** -8.579*** -8.579*** -7.815*** 0.000491 30.53** 
(0.0177) (2.080) (2.229) (2.227) (0.00356) (12.71) 
 
 
     
Threshold debt level 0.33 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.29 
Observations 1,191 1,191 1,191 1,191 976 1,136 
Number of 
companies 
193 193 193 193 170 188 
       
Joint test 0.0687 0.0323 0.0000 0.0000 0.1273 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0000 0.0002  0.0295 
Hausman test    0.0000   
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table demonstrates the main focus: the effects of corporate leverage (H1) and operating income (H2) on 
innovation, with controls for tax shields and liquidity. The regression results are based on various panel data 
specifications, with alternative R&D and leverage proxies estimated as in Appendix 3.A. The regression 
methodology is discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D 
expenditure to total assets’. Definitions of the measures used are presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint 
test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the 
coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
 
 
ratio has less total debt in comparison to its asset base and hence is less financially 
stressful, which allows for engagement in R&D activities (for the details of both subsectors 
refer to Appendix 3.A.: Tables 3.A.3 and 3.A.4). The results also indicate that operating 
income may be used as an additional financing supplement for funding innovations, but the 
evidence for this is weak and rather mixed.  
We also find that the previous year’s R&D activity positively impacts the current 
level of innovation (refer to the last column in each of the tables). The preceding 
engagement with R&D may indicate the company’s ability to find the required sources of 
investment and thus provides an additional level of credibility while securing the funds. 
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Table 3.10: Summary of panel estimates of R&D including control variables: Utilities 
and oil and gas sectors, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled OLS OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. Utilities 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.201*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.136** 0.00136 0.116** 
(0.0606) (0.0565) (0.0540) (0.0565) (0.0747) (0.0466) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.225*** -0.189** -0.189** -0.167** -0.0525 -0.233*** 
(0.0826) (0.0785) (0.0802) (0.0829) (0.0823) (0.0800) 
Operating income -0.0259 -0.0383 -0.0383 -0.0226 -0.0270* -0.0353 
(0.0358) (0.0349) (0.0436) (0.0447) (0.0161) (0.0403) 
Tax to total assets 0.397** 0.263* 0.263 0.290 0.203* 0.0968 
(0.155) (0.145) (0.181) (0.185) (0.112) (0.181) 
Liquidity 0.000284 0.00127 0.00127 0.00102 -0.000780 0.00678** 
(0.00570) (0.00559) (0.00293) (0.00304) (0.0111) (0.00277) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.769*** 
     (0.0354) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0499*** -7.817*** -7.817*** -7.812*** 0.00473** 19.55 
(0.0137) (2.232) (2.313) (2.333) (0.00208) (15.11) 
 
 
      
Threshold debt level 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.01 0.25 
       
Observations 649 649 649 649 548 630 
Number of 
companies 
94 94 94 94 87 93 
       
Joint test 0.0005 0.0161 0.0168 0.0753 0.0844 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0001 0.0001  0.0657 
Hausman test    0.9565   
Weak-instrument 
test 
     0.0000 
B. Oil and gas producers 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.322* 0.316* 0.316* 0.518*** 0.441* 0.0723 
(0.182) (0.182) (0.164) (0.177) (0.259) (0.0908) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.689** -0.708** -0.708** -1.028*** -0.958** -0.123 
(0.290) (0.291) (0.287) (0.315) (0.395) (0.159) 
Operating income -0.0108 -0.0139 -0.0139 0.0432* 0.0217 0.00284* 
(0.0626) (0.0603) (0.0447) (0.0466) (0.0469) (0.0357) 
Tax to total assets 0.0894 0.192 0.192 0.0525 -0.0618 0.202 
(0.186) (0.190) (0.248) (0.256) (0.129) (0.161) 
Liquidity -0.00385* -0.00380* -0.00380*** -0.00451*** 0.00244 0.00105 
(0.00222) (0.00228) (0.00108) (0.00108) (0.00150) (0.000719) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.765*** 
     (0.0437) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.129*** -6.503 -6.503 -3.930 -0.00899 56.68* 
(0.0377) (4.613) (5.635) (5.597) (0.00990) (31.30) 
 
 
      
Threshold debt level 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.05 0.29 
       
Observations 348 348 348 348 270 323 
Number of 
companies 
67 67 67 67 54 63 
       
Joint test 0.0224 0.0170 0.0013 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Years test  0.3361 0.6623 0.6161  0.6199 
Hausman test    0.0041   
Weak-instrument 
test 
     0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table continues Table 3.9 but concentrates on the two energy sub-sectors. As in Table 3.9, the regression 
results are based on various specifications for panel data estimation. The regression methodology is discussed 
in Chapter 2; the threshold approach in discussed in Methodology Section 3.4. The main dependent R&D 
proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total assets’. Definitions of the measures are presented 
in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint test, years test and weak-instrument tests are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The 
legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01).  
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Table 3.11: Panel estimates for R&D: Energy sector with leverage levels, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. Tendency to finance with balance sheet (ratio <0.5) 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.0575** 0.0349 0.0349 0.0436* -0.0287 0.00821 
(0.0253) (0.0243) (0.0218) (0.0231) (0.0417) (0.0131) 
Operating income 0.0184 0.00355 0.00355 0.0412 0.0183 0.0187 
(0.0383) (0.0391) (0.0292) (0.0309) (0.0365) (0.0252) 
Tax to total assets 0.103 0.182 0.182 0.148 -0.120 0.0615 
(0.152) (0.149) (0.143) (0.149) (0.121) (0.103) 
Liquidity 0.00199 0.00194 0.00194** 0.00197** 0.00151 0.00148*** 
(0.00180) (0.00181) (0.000863) (0.000938) (0.00150) (0.000546) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.704*** 
     (0.0350) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0668*** -8.829*** -8.829*** -8.294*** -0.00317 36.48*** 
(0.0140) (2.146) (2.083) (2.097) (0.00491) (13.47) 
 
 
     
Observations 1,044 1,044 1,044 1,044 862 1,001 
Number of 
companies 
175 175 175 175 157 174 
       
Joint test 0.0970 0.1483 0.0600 0.0471 0.3379 0.0000 
Years test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0218 
Hausman test    0.0213   
Weak-instrument 
test 
     0.0000 
B. Tendency to finance with external debt (ratio >=0.5) 
Total debt to total 
assets 
-0.128** -0.142** -0.142** -0.0584 -0.0400 -0.0421 
(0.0498) (0.0557) (0.0562) (0.0633) (0.0356) (0.0342) 
Operating income -0.00952 -0.0307 -0.0307 -0.00267 -0.0478*** -0.0835** 
(0.0265) (0.0278) (0.0383) (0.0388) (0.0118) (0.0326) 
Tax to total assets 0.600*** 0.606*** 0.606* 0.579 -0.261 0.199 
(0.225) (0.226) (0.325) (0.385) (0.232) (0.185) 
Liquidity -0.00468 -0.00489 -0.00489*** -0.00522*** 0.0119*** 0.00677*** 
(0.00320) (0.00302) (0.00187) (0.00188) (0.00171) (0.00214) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.676*** 
     (0.0503) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.200*** -7.778*** -7.778 -5.661 0.0146 -13.86 
(0.0421) (2.780) (9.874) (9.623) (0.0169) (35.24) 
 
 
     
Observations 147 147 147 147 114 135 
Number of 
companies 
66 66 66 66 52 62 
       
Joint test 0.0296 0.0092 0.0071 0.0579 0.0000 0.0000 
Years test  0.1380 0.8910 0.7823  0.1098 
Hausman test    0.0000   
Weak-instrument 
test 
     0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table advances on Tables 3.9 and 3.10 by segmentation of the leverage between those companies with 
tendency of debt financing through the balance sheets and those with external debts. As in Tables 3.9 and 
3.10 the regression results are based on various specifications for data estimation. The regression 
methodology was performed as discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy is defined as the 
ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total assets’. Definitions of the measures are presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. 
The joint test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of 
the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 3.12 shows the degree to which R&D is affected by a change in the 
explanatory variables measured by elasticity. Elasticity follows the same pattern for 
utilities and oil and gas producers. That is, R&D is highly inelastic to the lower debt levels, 
and also operating income, taxes, liquidity and last period R&D activity. The elasticity of 
innovations to the greater leverage level indicates that these are of the importance towards 
R&D engagement. To this extent, a 1% change in the greater leverage levels will lead to a 
negative elastic change in R&D (for oil and gas between -1.59% to -2.37% and for utilities 
between -1.25% and -1.68%). That is the greater change in leverage (Leverageit
2
) will deter 
companies from R&D due to the higher financing burden associated with larger borrowing. 
 
 
Table 3.12: Panel estimates R&D: as elasticity, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. Energy sector 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.29 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.28 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.86 -0.82 -0.82 -0.94 -1.00 -0.98 
Operating income -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02 -0.09 
Tax to total assets 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Liquidity -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.18 0.12 0.08 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.72 
B. Utilities 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.75 0.58 0.58 0.51 0.01 0.43 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-1.68 -1.41 -1.41 -1.25 -0.39 -1.74 
Operating income -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 
Tax to total assets 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.02 
Liquidity 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.04 0.38 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.77 
C. Oil and gas producers 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.37 0.36 0.36 0.60 0.01 0.08 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-1.59 -1.64 -1.64 -2.37 -0.13 -0.28 
Operating income -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Tax to total assets 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
Liquidity -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 -0.15 -0.03 0.04 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.77 
 
This table continues on Tables 3.9 and 3.10 by presenting the elasticity for Energy sector and two sub-
sectors. The elasticity defines the per cent change in the dependent for a 1% change in the explanatory. The 
mathematical presentation is ‘Elasticity = Estimated explanatory coefficient * (Mean explanatory 
measure/Mean dependent measure)’. Chapter 2 provides detailed explanation on elasticity calculation. For 
instance, in GMM application for the Energy sector, the ‘total debt to total assets’ elasticity of 0.28 means 
that on average for a 1% increase in debt, R&D would increase by 0.28% (Elasticity = 
0.120*(0.2411/0.1030) = 0.28, where the explanatory coefficient is from Table 3.9, and the mean measures 
are from Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.) 
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It has to be cautioned that our results do not provide an effect of the variety of debt 
specifications arising directly from collateral availability, company valuation or specific 
tax shields and regulations imposed by the financial institutions. Instead we concentrate on 
the common debt proxies that are viewed as an essential of doing business, with control for 
both current and long-term liabilities (total debt to total assets, and total liabilities to total 
assets ratios). Nevertheless, the selection of the debt proxies opens a question as to whether 
the selected measures do appropriately capture the relevant financial conditions within the 
energy sector. Our logic in selecting the ‘general’ debt ratio is rather driven by the aim of 
the research—that is to uncover the relation between financing and R&D, while further 
research may use it as a foundation to concentrate on specific conditions and relationships 
within energy innovations area. 
The implemented empirical approaches to panel data estimation including 
controlling for heteroscedasticity and the reported post-estimation tests suggest that the 
given results are valid. That is, from the OLS perspective, the OLS-FE and GMM are the 
most appropriate panel data estimation methods, as discussed in the theoretical background 
Chapter 2. The reported statistics for the joint significance of the included explanatory 
variables suggests that these are jointly significant and hence should be included. The years 
test indicates that control for the specific time occurrences is important (i.e. inclusion of 
year dummies). Also the Hausman test indicates that fixed effects should be preferred in 
the OLS specification allowing control for the correlation between the individual and/or 
time effects and the independent variables. In regards to the dynamic panel specification 
(GMM), the F-statistics is used as a test for ‘weak’ instruments (Baum et. al., 2007). We 
do not include additional external instruments and therefore the Sargan test is not reported. 
The external instruments are not included as there are too many measures to choose from 
and this is rather left for the future analysis along with the concentration on individual 
countries in order to form more detailed understanding of the financing innovations. 
In a summary, the above empirical results of debt and operating income suggest 
that the energy industry and in particular major subsectors—utilities and oil and gas 
companies—may be driven by various other factors too. For this reason we introduce an 
examination of the financing relation to R&D through the selected control groups: time in 
operation (firm age), ownership status (state versus privately owned) and the EU 
integration effect on the innovation activities. The group controls may also explain why at 
a general results level the additional explanatory variables (tax to assets, and liquidity 
ratios) are not significant in the current relation to R&D. 
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3.5.2. Panel estimates of R&D: control for firm age, 1995–2007 
 
Estimates of the effect of operational age on financing innovations suggest that age 
is an important characteristic. The age control indicates that the more mature companies 
tend to use significantly more debt than younger rival companies; however as we show the 
age segmentation allows us to identify some important occurrences within the energy 
industry (refer to Table 3.13 and for the detailed age groups refer to Appendix 3.A.5). The 
difference in financing between various age level firms is most likely reflected by the 
aptitude to operate with its presence in the market (as a capacity to do the business) for 
which the new companies are lacking. In other words, the company’s long-term presence 
in the business may indicate the ability to borrow and repay on the received liabilities and 
hence possess higher opportunities to convince lenders to provide required funds for R&D. 
This supports general literature findings on company’s age importance (see e.g., Ayygari et 
al., 2007, Hadlock and Pierce, 2009, Brown and Petersen, 2011). 
The age control results suggest that company may not be able to borrow 
continuously when it is needed. That is using experiments with operational age subgroups 
we identified the borrowing availability ‘windows’ as of 5, 10 and 20 years. That is once 
companies were able to access financing for R&D, these do not engage in the capital 
intensive investments for the specific period of time; and the more mature a company 
becomes the more borrowing ‘window’ widens. That is firms, which were able to borrow 
in the past, have higher borrowing capacities and access to the funds relative to R&D 
activities. Thus, rather than indicating the age effect, there is a possibility that established 
companies are naturally able to borrow when needed, as these firms possess the borrowing 
record which may be used as an assurance to lenders for receiving future repayments from 
R&D generated incomes. 
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Table 3.13: Panel estimates of R&D: Energy sector with additional control for firm 
age group (summary estimates), 1995–2007 
 
 
Pooled OLS 
(without years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
1. Firm age (<5 years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.0078 -0.00269 -0.00269 -0.01 -0.0784 0.0093 
(0.0680) (0.0699) (0.0992) (0.1060) (0.0858) (0.0827) 
Total debt to total assets, squared -0.0408 -0.057 -0.057 -0.0413 0.0686 -0.035 
(0.0760) (0.0820) (0.1340) (0.1430) (0.0902) (0.1250) 
Operating income -0.115 -0.0842 -0.0842 0.194 0.0849 0.0734 
(0.2490) (0.2600) (0.1810) (0.1790) (0.0812) (0.0724) 
2. Firm age (6-10 years) 
Total debt to total assets -0.115 -0.0842 -0.0842 0.194 0.0849 0.0734 
(0.2490) (0.2600) (0.1810) (0.1790) (0.0812) (0.0724) 
Total debt to total assets, squared 0.169 0.141 0.141 -0.166 -0.0452 -0.077 
(0.3640) (0.3780) (0.2840) (0.2740) (0.1090) (0.1180) 
Operating income -0.0574 -0.0777 -0.0777 0.00857 0.00172 -0.0103 
(0.0545) (0.0607) (0.0646) (0.0592) (0.0160) (0.0306) 
3. Firm age (11-15 years) 
Total debt to total assets -0.253* -0.250* -0.250** -0.294** -0.427** -0.0985 
(0.1440) (0.1440) (0.1110) (0.1150) (0.2000) (0.0772) 
Total debt to total assets, squared 0.454* 0.447* 0.447** 0.417** 0.742** 0.256* 
(0.2550) (0.2550) (0.1920) (0.1920) (0.3520) (0.1450) 
Operating income -0.101 -0.0991 -0.0991 0.0062 -0.139 -0.198*** 
(0.0723) (0.0816) (0.0632) (0.0626) (0.0875) (0.0554) 
4. Firm age (16-25 years) 
Total debt to total assets -0.272 -0.26 -0.26 -0.164 0.137 0.144 
(0.1810) (0.2270) (0.2240) (0.2780) (0.2020) (0.1170) 
Total debt to total assets, squared 0.298 0.28 0.28 0.185 -0.285 -0.291 
(0.2340) (0.3060) (0.3550) (0.4210) (0.2630) (0.1880) 
Operating income -0.105 -0.0899 -0.0899* -0.0467 -0.0728 -0.0865** 
(0.0878) (0.0984) (0.0539) (0.0552) (0.0535) (0.0339) 
5. Firm age (26-45 years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.669*** 0.631** 0.631** 0.213 0.686*** 0.402*** 
(0.1590) (0.2930) (0.3160) (0.2040) (0.2200) (0.1350) 
Total debt to total assets, squared -0.893*** -0.751 -0.751 -0.233 -1.086*** -0.677*** 
(0.2740) (0.4670) (0.5070) (0.3170) (0.3580) (0.2120) 
Operating income 0.177 -0.368 -0.368* 0.469*** 0.431*** 0.471*** 
(0.1840) (0.4420) (0.1890) (0.1240) (0.0880) (0.1130) 
6. Firm age (46-65 years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.0473 0.218 0.218 0.0421 -0.0128 0.155 
(0.1190) (0.1720) (0.1880) (0.1740) (0.0849) (0.0976) 
Total debt to total assets, squared 0.0957 -0.124 -0.124 0.157 0.0912 -0.158 
(0.1810) (0.2700) (0.2690) (0.2330) (0.1230) (0.1590) 
Operating income -0.276*** -0.111 -0.111 -0.316** -0.0219 0.107 
(0.1010) (0.1520) (0.1490) (0.1370) (0.0434) (0.0850) 
7. Firm age (66-85 years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.601** 0.502** 0.502** 0.414 0.573 0.264** 
(0.2600) (0.2220) (0.2440) (0.3610) (0.4280) (0.1250) 
Total debt to total assets, squared -1.118** -0.883 -0.883* -1.045 -1.494** -0.703** 
(0.5460) (0.5700) (0.5360) (0.6550) (0.7310) (0.2720) 
Operating income -0.356 -0.847** -0.847*** -0.393 0.137 -0.000154 
(0.3400) (0.3770) (0.2830) (0.3280) (0.1440) (0.1510) 
8. Firm age (86-105 years) 
Total debt to total assets -0.253 -0.445* -0.445*** -0.467** -0.0373 0.037 
(0.2690) (0.2490) (0.1690) (0.1800) (0.2580) (0.1160) 
Total debt to total assets, squared -0.0801 0.0473 0.0473 0.0533 -0.195 -0.217 
(0.4750) (0.4310) (0.3060) (0.3260) (0.3130) (0.2100) 
Operating income 0.12 0.112 0.112 0.129 0.0411 -0.0943 
(0.1790) (0.1760) (0.1610) (0.1760) (0.1190) (0.0944) 
9. Firm age (106+ years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.953** 1.159*** 1.159*** 1.287*** 0.766 0.844*** 
(0.4160) (0.2720) (0.2150) (0.4650) (0.5570) (0.2100) 
Total debt to total assets, squared -1.702** -2.131*** -2.131*** -2.141*** -1.703** -1.649*** 
(0.7280) (0.4760) (0.3820) (0.7400) (0.8130) (0.3780) 
Operating income -0.858** -1.877*** -1.877*** -0.336 -0.232 -0.963*** 
(0.3890) (0.2850) (0.2520) (0.3980) (0.5360) (0.2920) 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table advances on Tables 3.9-3.12. As before, the regression results are based on various panel data 
specifications with detailed age groups as explained in Appendix 3.A. The regression methodology is 
discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total 
assets’. The dependent and explanatory variables definitions are presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint 
test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the 
coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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3.5.3. Panel estimates of R&D: control for ownership status, 1995–2007 
 
The ownership analysis of the energy industry suggests that debt is an important 
variable for R&D activities for both state-owned and privately owned energy firms (Table 
3.14 and for the two subsectors in the Appendix Table 3.A.6 and Table 3.A.7). Recalling 
on definitions, we refer to state ownership if the government owns more than 51% of the 
firm; otherwise we denote as privately owned (those owned by other companies as a major 
owner). If anything, debt is more important for gas companies across the two ownership 
types (see Appendix Table 3.A.7). However, comparing results from Table 3.A.7 with 
Table 3.A.6, the results indicate that state controlled companies, whether these are utilities 
or oil and gas, are less affected by the burden of greater borrowing compared to privately 
owned firms. 
Further, the estimates demonstrate that the energy sector liquidity (liquidity ratio) is 
most neglected in the oil and gas subsector. Moreover, the state-owned oil and gas 
companies require even greater liquidity improvements compared to the privately-owned 
firms. 
Ownership control implementation yields similar results as if no ownership is 
applied, yet provides an insight of how ownership segmentation may to a greater or lesser 
effect reflect on the R&D activities among the utilities and oil and gas companies. That is, 
the R&D is greater impacted by financing in oil and gas firms in both ownership type 
companies, while the negative effect of low liquidity on R&D is more concerned within 
the state companies. The findings are in line with Shleifer (1998) and Ayygari et al. (2007), 
who found that private firms are more likely to attract financing as these firms have higher 
incentives to engage in R&D in order to compete with other firms in the market. 
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Table 3.14: Panel estimates of R&D: Energy sector with additional control for 
ownership type, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled OLS OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. ‘Private’ ownership 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.0940 0.0719 0.0719 0.104* 0.119 0.0992** 
(0.0725) (0.0714) (0.0606) (0.0635) (0.112) (0.0386) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.162* -0.160* -0.160* -0.185* -0.227 -0.181*** 
(0.0964) (0.0964) (0.0931) (0.0976) (0.149) (0.0658) 
Operating income -0.0330 -0.0407 -0.0407* -0.00838 -0.00951 -0.0442** 
(0.0374) (0.0377) (0.0244) (0.0252) (0.0307) (0.0199) 
Tax to total assets 0.0455 0.0910 0.0910 0.0242 -0.105 0.0729 
(0.125) (0.124) (0.134) (0.137) (0.0972) (0.101) 
Liquidity -0.00325 -0.00340 -0.00340*** -0.00414*** 0.00272* 0.00158*** 
(0.00223) (0.00225) (0.000772) (0.000786) (0.00154) (0.000554) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.696*** 
     (0.0304) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0966*** -7.973*** -7.973*** -7.090*** -0.000638 40.89*** 
(0.0198) (2.374) (2.500) (2.499) (0.00426) (14.01) 
 
 
      
Threshold debt level 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.26 0.27 
       
Observations 1,034 1,034 1,034 1,034 843 980 
Number of 
companies 
170 170 170 170 147 165 
       
Joint test  0.1386 0.0678 0.0000 0.0000 0.1120 0.0000 
Years test   0.0001 0.0025 0.0079  0.0115 
Hausman test    0.0174   
Weak-instrument 
test 
     0.0000 
B. ‘State’ ownership 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.366*** 0.271*** 0.271** 0.189* 0.0713 0.209** 
(0.109) (0.104) (0.129) (0.150) (0.243) (0.0929) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.422** -0.275 -0.275 -0.126 -0.0546 -0.322* 
(0.173) (0.172) (0.225) (0.251) (0.304) (0.164) 
Operating income -0.0363 0.00916 0.00916 -0.0273 -0.134 -0.119 
(0.180) (0.160) (0.199) (0.206) (0.143) (0.176) 
Tax to total assets -0.0109 0.482* 0.482 0.718 -0.0870 -0.160 
(0.330) (0.255) (0.435) (0.449) (0.260) (0.380) 
Liquidity 0.00454 0.00134 0.00134 0.00323 0.0210 0.00672 
(0.00642) (0.00453) (0.00730) (0.00917) (0.0132) (0.00500) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.746*** 
     (0.0726) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant -0.00375 -12.88*** -12.88*** -14.15*** 0.00628 -35.29 
(0.0174) (2.883) (4.054) (4.134) (0.00392) (26.45) 
 
 
      
Threshold debt level 0.43 0.49 0.49 0.75 0.65 0.32 
       
Observations 157 157 157 157 133 156 
Number of 
companies 
23 23 23 23 23 23 
       
Joint test  0.0111 0.0028 0.0250 0.0328 0.4288 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0002 0.0004  0.0517 
Hausman test    0.0932   
Weak-instrument 
test 
     0.0001 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table summarises the R&D estimates between private and stated owned companies. As before the 
regression results are based on various specifications for data estimation (refer to Chapter 2). The dependent 
R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total assets’. The variables definitions are 
presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as 
‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01).  
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3.5.4. Panel estimates of R&D: control for EU integration, 1995–2007 
 
In our prior estimation, we considered the effect of control measures on financing 
innovation including the firm’s operational age as a proxy for the firm’s economic 
credibility and the greater attraction of private ownership for investment in R&D activities. 
In this subsection, we proceed with regressions to examine the importance of a firm’s 
integration in the EU area to its ability to attract investments in R&D (refer to Tables 3.15 
and 3.A.9 and Appendix 3.A.8 for sub-sectoral estimates). We distinguished between old-
EU (joined the EU before 2004) and new-EU (joined the EU on or after 2004) member 
countries. This may highlight the importance of introducing incentives to invest in R&D 
among companies in new EU states in order to compete with established firms. 
The results are different for old and new-EU countries. We find that both leverage 
and operating income hold their significance for established companies in old-EU 
countries. Whereas energy companies in newly joined EU countries are finding issues with 
access to external financing and rely more on the internally generated operating income. 
Even tax shields are not able to provide financing incentives in the new-EU countries. 
The control for EU integration provides an important opportunity to discuss what 
could be done to attract financing for innovation. The introduction of additional incentives 
and the ease of access to a common European energy market might stimulate investment. 
Furthermore, EU membership and tax incentives may only encourage investment over the 
long term. This finding is in line with findings reported by Gros and Mortensen (2004), 
who argued that new-EU countries are required to facilitate sustainable economic growth 
in the EU and therefore invest heavily in R&D. 
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Table 3.15: Panel estimates of R&D: The energy sector with additional controls for 
EU integration, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled OLS OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. Old-EU countries (joined prior to 2004) 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.123 0.0943 0.0943 0.189** 0.0319 0.000822 
(0.0932) (0.0873) (0.0701) (0.0745) (0.0825) (0.0445) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.111 -0.132 -0.132 -0.258** -0.0663 -0.0154 
(0.148) (0.140) (0.115) (0.119) (0.122) (0.0803) 
Operating income -0.0253 -0.0268 -0.0268 0.0302 -0.0211 -0.0363* 
(0.0597) (0.0578) (0.0260) (0.0268) (0.0315) (0.0205) 
Tax to total assets 0.258 0.283* 0.283* 0.279* 0.0777 -0.106 
(0.167) (0.156) (0.154) (0.153) (0.0804) (0.131) 
Liquidity 0.00200 0.00160 0.00160 -0.000333 -0.00296 0.00246* 
(0.00397) (0.00377) (0.00195) (0.00207) (0.00518) (0.00143) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     1.114*** 
     (0.0479) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0519*** 0 0 -14.59*** 0.00810*** 21.13* 
(0.0173) (0) (0) (2.622) (0.00228) (12.45) 
 
 
     
Threshold debt level 0.55 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.24 0.03 
       
Observations 603 603 603 603 475 572 
Number of 
companies 
123 123 123 123 108 119 
       
Joint test  0.0513 0.1884 0.1270 0.0570 0.7565 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0255 
Hausman test    0.0000   
Weak-instrument 
test 
     0.0001 
A. New-EU countries (joined post 2004) 
Total debt to total 
assets 
-0.0106 -0.00960 -0.00960 -0.0430 0.128 0.242*** 
(0.105) (0.104) (0.0913) (0.106) (0.157) (0.0568) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.0679 -0.0695 -0.0695 -0.0193 -0.249 -0.386*** 
(0.126) (0.125) (0.129) (0.146) (0.207) (0.0933) 
Operating income -0.0515 -0.0552 -0.0552 0.00850 0.00885 -0.0343 
(0.0455) (0.0452) (0.0367) (0.0391) (0.0506) (0.0354) 
Tax to total assets 0.0799 0.0951 0.0951 -0.0185 -0.176 0.0916 
(0.157) (0.155) (0.178) (0.189) (0.127) (0.137) 
Liquidity -0.00213 -0.00217 -0.00217** -0.00300*** 0.00303* 0.00215*** 
(0.00291) (0.00292) (0.000846) (0.000868) (0.00169) (0.000665) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.602*** 
     (0.0440) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.116*** 0 0 2.422 -0.00359 27.58* 
(0.0258) (0) (0) (5.834) (0.00408) (14.80) 
 
 
     
Threshold debt level -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -1.11 0.26 0.31 
       
Observations 588 588 588 588 501 564 
Number of 
companies 
185 185 185 185 162 179 
       
Joint test  0.5085 0.4523 0.0283 0.0194 0.0748 0.0000 
Years test   0.0001 0.0000 0.0600  0.0344 
Hausman test    0.0008   
Weak-instrument 
test 
     0.0001 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is similar to Table 3.14 but concentrates on financing for R&D upon EU integration. As before, the 
regression results are based on various specifications for panel data estimation. The regression methodology 
is discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to 
total assets’. The dependent and explanatory variable definitions are presented in Sections 3.3.1.-3.3.3. The 
joint test, years test and weak-instrument tests are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the 
coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01).  
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3.6. Concluding comments 
 
This chapter primarily investigates the effects of leverage on financing R&D in the 
European energy industry for the period from 1995–2007. This study period was selected 
based on the availability of company data. Due to the incomplete nature of the data set, the 
results presented should be treated as rather exploratory. 
We indicate that in order to understand innovation financing, factors such as tax 
shields, liquidity, firm age, differences in ownership type and EU integration should be 
considered. Unlike many existing studies, our analysis has accounted for the increasing 
importance of innovation in the energy sector. These efforts at innovation strive to meet 
the growing demand for energy amid concerns about security and stability as well as the 
demand for new technologies for more efficient energy use. We were able not only to 
consider the energy industry, but also to compare the major sectors—utilities and oil and 
gas production—with respect to their obvious contributions to the European economy.  
There is consistent evidence that controlling for leverage and operating income 
availability has met with limited success among energy companies in new-EU member 
countries. This is, perhaps, because of the inability to compete with already existing 
companies throughout the EU and the lack of financial assistance for efforts to attract R&D 
activities. On the positive side, we find that leverage levels affect innovation in established 
EU countries, and that a firm’s age provides a proxy for economic credibility in attracting 
financing for innovation. In this respect, we determined that privately owned companies 
are able to secure financing for innovation more effectively than state-owned companies 
because of competition incentives.  
In summary, the evidence suggests that leverage and the availability of operating 
income attract R&D investment in energy companies. New-EU countries are behind their 
old-EU counterparts in both respects. It would be beneficial to resolve the paucity of 
financing for R&D in newly established EU countries and less mature companies, which 
would in turn contribute to sustained R&D activity throughout the EU energy industry. We 
hope to address this issue in future research. 
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Appendix 3.A: Detailed Regression estimates for various controls and energy sub-
sectors, 1995–2007 
 
Table 3.A.1: A summary of panel estimates of R&D (with an alternative proxy for 
R&D) with control variables: The energy sector, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.157 0.124 0.124 0.116 -0.119 0.244*** 
(0.168) (0.167) (0.0979) (0.106) (0.162) (0.0675) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
0.0391 0.0488 0.0488 0.107 0.382 -0.371*** 
(0.294) (0.295) (0.151) (0.163) (0.314) (0.112) 
Operating income 0.0713 0.0529 0.0529 0.127*** 0.00566 -0.0129 
(0.0483) (0.0505) (0.0457) (0.0479) (0.0394) (0.0351) 
Tax to total assets 0.279 0.319 0.319 0.303 -0.243 -0.0792 
(0.227) (0.227) (0.219) (0.231) (0.159) (0.168) 
Liquidity 0.00891** 0.00896** 0.00896*** 0.00648** 0.00488 0.0114*** 
(0.00426) (0.00417) (0.00272) (0.00292) (0.0101) (0.00270) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.655*** 
     (0.0443) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0848*** -11.45*** -11.45*** -10.82*** 0.00353 -0.819 
(0.0234) (3.505) (3.988) (3.982) (0.00374) (23.19) 
 
 
     
Threshold debt level -0.12  -0.20  -0.20  -0.46  1.61  0.76  
       
Observations 1,108 1,108 1,108 1,108 907 1,040 
Number of companies 174 174 174 174 158 171 
       
Joint test 0.0005 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0393 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0004 0.0009  0.0451 
Hausman test    0.0004   
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is similar to Table 3.9 but now with an alternative R&D proxy. This table presents corporate 
leverage (H1) and operating income (H2) in relation to innovation, with controls for tax shields and liquidity. 
The regression results are based on various specifications for panel data estimation. The regression 
methodology was performed as discussed in Chapter 2. The alternative dependent R&D proxy is defined as 
the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total sales’. The dependent and explanatory variable definitions are 
presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as 
‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01). 
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Table 3.A.2: Summary of panel estimates of R&D (with alternative leverage proxy): 
Energy sector with inclusion of control variables, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Total liabilities to total 
assets 
-0.557*** -0.551*** -0.551*** -0.420*** -0.123 -0.183*** 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.0773) (0.0835) (0.144) (0.0618) 
Total liabilities to total 
assets, squared 
-0.461*** -0.449*** -0.449*** -0.366*** -0.128 -0.150*** 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.0745) (0.0792) (0.132) (0.0556) 
Operating income -0.0833*** -0.0904*** -0.0904*** -0.0579** 0.00912 -0.0719*** 
(0.0316) (0.0317) (0.0259) (0.0269) (0.0360) (0.0245) 
Tax to total assets 0.0482 0.0663 0.0663 -0.000162 -0.0715 0.0174 
(0.0928) (0.0907) (0.139) (0.142) (0.0922) (0.124) 
Liquidity -0.000889 -0.000945 -0.000945* -0.00160*** 0.00113 0.00216*** 
(0.00150) (0.00153) (0.000552) (0.000612) (0.00116) (0.000496) 
Lag of R&D dependent      0.651*** 
     (0.0373) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.260*** -5.282** -5.282* -4.088 0.00243 33.96* 
(0.0403) (2.294) (2.845) (2.854) (0.00274) (17.48) 
 
 
     
Threshold Liabilities 
level 
-0.41  -0.41  -0.41  -0.44  -0.52  -0.41  
       
Observations 1,333 1,333 1,333 1,333 1,093 1,259 
Number of companies 219 219 219 219 191 213 
       
Joint test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.6033 0.0000 
Years test   0.0025 0.1233 0.2146  0.6397 
Hausman test    0.0000   
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is similar to Table 3.9 but now with an alternative leverage proxy. As in the initial table, these data 
show the effects of corporate leverage (H1) and operating income (H2) on innovation, with controls for tax 
shields and liquidity. The regression results are based on various specifications for data estimation. The 
regression methodology was performed as discussed in Chapter 2. The alternative dependent leverage proxy 
was defined as the ratio of ‘total liabilities to total assets’. The dependent and explanatory definitions are 
presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as 
‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01). 
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Table 3.A.3: Panel estimates for R&D: Utilities sector with leverage levels, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled OLS OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. Tendency to finance with balance sheet (ratio <0.5) 
Total debt to 
total assets 
0.101*** 0.0746*** 0.0746*** 0.0780*** -0.0292 -0.0203 
(0.0273) (0.0253) (0.0225) (0.0244) (0.0393) (0.0156) 
Operating 
income 
-0.161 -0.205** -0.205** -0.173* -0.177** -0.0292 
(0.103) (0.0983) (0.0861) (0.0957) (0.0860) (0.0723) 
Tax to total 
assets 
0.308* 0.140 0.140 0.211 0.0935 0.0570 
(0.173) (0.163) (0.195) (0.201) (0.129) (0.201) 
Liquidity -0.00367 -0.00262 -0.00262 -0.00259 -0.0118 0.00132 
(0.00411) (0.00410) (0.00296) (0.00309) (0.0112) (0.00287) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.751*** 
     (0.0390) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0616*** -8.781*** -8.781*** -8.881*** -0.000443 18.50 
(0.0136) (2.283) (2.242) (2.269) (0.00680) (15.91) 
 
 
     
Observations 573 573 573 573 481 557 
Number of 
companies 
91 91 91 91 83 91 
       
Joint test  0.0000 0.0006 0.0001 0.0005 0.0808 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0000 0.0001   
Hausman test    0.09265  0.4173 
Weak-
instrument test 
     0.0000 
B. Tendency to finance with external debt (ratio >=0.5) 
Total debt to 
total assets 
-0.0594*** -0.0267 -0.0267 -0.0196 -0.0813** -0.0334 
(0.0224) (0.0345) (0.0270) (0.0279) (0.0357) (0.0477) 
Operating 
income 
-0.00988 -0.0192 -0.0192 -0.0180 -0.0290*** -0.0899 
(0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0107) (0.0623) 
Tax to total 
assets 
0.326** 0.287 0.287 0.302 0.00464 -0.0100 
(0.136) (0.205) (0.223) (0.227) (0.120) (0.551) 
Liquidity -0.00229 -0.00334 -0.00334 -0.00518 0.00311 0.0450*** 
(0.00441) (0.00418) (0.00498) (0.00514) (0.00734) (0.0102) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.577*** 
     (0.124) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.136*** 0 0 12.86*** 0.0248 13.00 
(0.0311) (0) (0) (4.519) (0.0247) (43.18) 
 
 
     
Observations 76 76 76 76 67 73 
Number of 
companies 
31 31 31 31 30 30 
       
Joint test  0.0033 0.0252 0.3097 0.3544 0.0000 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0001 0.0227  0.0695 
Hausman test    0.9980   
Weak-
instrument test 
     0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is a continuation of Table 3.11 that concentrates on the utilities sector. As in Table 3.10, the 
regression results are based on various specifications for data estimation. The regression methodology was 
performed as discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D 
expenditure to total assets’. The dependent and explanatory definitions are presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. 
The joint test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of 
the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 3.A.4: Panel estimates of R&D: Oil and gas sectors with leverage levels, 1995–
2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled OLS OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. Tendency to finance with balance sheet (ratio <0.5) 
Total debt to 
total assets 
0.0447 0.0294 0.0294 0.0478 -0.0987 0.0229 
(0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0544) (0.0564) (0.0854) (0.0354) 
Operating 
income 
0.0730 0.0743 0.0743* 0.103** 0.0248 0.0838** 
(0.0463) (0.0479) (0.0434) (0.0450) (0.0463) (0.0378) 
Tax to total 
assets 
0.0666 0.265 0.265 0.0674 -0.165 0.327** 
(0.233) (0.240) (0.287) (0.301) (0.164) (0.164) 
Liquidity 0.00181 0.00174 0.00174 0.00191 0.00168 0.000776 
(0.00185) (0.00197) (0.00118) (0.00125) (0.00131) (0.000730) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.826*** 
     (0.0533) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.101*** -6.058 -6.058 -4.015 -0.00919 58.46* 
(0.0347) (4.122) (4.768) (4.804) (0.00950) (32.49) 
 
 
      
Observations 317 317 317 317 255 297 
Number of 
companies 
58 58 58 58 49 57 
       
Joint test 0.4560 0.4944 0.2338 0.0753 0.0164 0.0000 
Years test  0.6177 0.7010 0.7650  0.6995 
Hausman test    0.6664   
Weak-
instrument test 
     0.0000 
B. Tendency to finance with external debt (ratio >=0.5) 
Not enough observations 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is a continuation of Table 3.11 but rather concentrates on oil and gas production. As in Table 3.10, 
the regression results are based on various specifications for data estimation. The regression methodology 
was performed as discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy was defined as the ratio of ‘R&D 
expenditure to total assets’. The definitions of dependent and explanatory measures are presented in Sections 
3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint test, years test and weak-instrument tests are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to 
the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 3.A.5: Panel estimates of R&D: The energy sector with additional controls for 
firm age, 1995–2007 
 
 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
      1.        Firm age (<5 years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.0078 -0.00269 -0.00269 -0.01 -0.0784 0.0093 
(0.0680) (0.0699) (0.0992) (0.1060) (0.0858) (0.0827) 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
-0.0408 -0.057 -0.057 -0.0413 0.0686 -0.035 
(0.0760) (0.0820) (0.1340) (0.1430) (0.0902) (0.1250) 
Operating income -0.0218 -0.0381 -0.0381 -0.0165 -0.0567 -0.0254 
(0.0412) (0.0444) (0.0398) (0.0439) (0.0369) (0.0384) 
Tax to total assets 0.175 0.317 0.317 0.404 -0.124 -0.184 
(0.2370) (0.2470) (0.3130) (0.3280) (0.2040) (0.2740) 
Liquidity 0.00249 0.00158 0.00158 0.000643 -0.00333 0.00127 
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0073) (0.0023) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.736*** 
          (0.0702) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.107*** -11.30** -11.30** -10.40* 0.000947 85.00** 
(0.0259) (5.2020) (5.5680) (5.8980) (0.0125) (38.2600) 
        
Threshold debt level 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.12 0.57 0.13 
       
Observations 243 243 243 243 162 224 
Number of companies 79 79 79 79 57 75 
            
Joint test  0.8443 0.4501 0.5497 0.7729 0.7031 0.0000 
Years test    0.0781 0.2522 0.1761   0.4537 
Hausman test       1.0000     
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
2.        Firm age (6-10 years) 
Total debt to total assets -0.115 -0.0842 -0.0842 0.194 0.0849 0.0734 
(0.2490) (0.2600) (0.1810) (0.1790) (0.0812) (0.0724) 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
0.169 0.141 0.141 -0.166 -0.0452 -0.077 
(0.3640) (0.3780) (0.2840) (0.2740) (0.1090) (0.1180) 
Operating income -0.0574 -0.0777 -0.0777 0.00857 0.00172 -0.0103 
(0.0545) (0.0607) (0.0646) (0.0592) (0.0160) (0.0306) 
Tax to total assets 0.114 -0.0326 -0.0326 -0.157 -0.0958 -0.114 
(0.3010) (0.3360) (0.4380) (0.4680) (0.3670) (0.2040) 
Liquidity -0.00749 -0.00801 -0.00801** -0.0117*** 0.00864 0.00450*** 
(0.0069) (0.0072) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0055) (0.0016) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.865*** 
          (0.0405) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.133*** -4.306 -4.306 0.892 -0.000974 -1.634 
(0.0420) (4.6290) (7.5090) (7.2650) (0.0032) (22.5400) 
        
Threshold debt level 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.58 0.94 0.48 
       
Observations 206 206 206 206 174 199 
Number of companies 69 69 69 69 57 65 
            
Joint test  0.4304 0.2556 0.1257 0.0013 0.3086 0.0000 
Years test    0.5300 0.9664 0.7385   0.8099 
Hausman test       0.0005     
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
3.        Firm age (11-15 years) 
Total debt to total assets -0.253* -0.250* -0.250** -0.294** -0.427** -0.0985 
(0.1440) (0.1440) (0.1110) (0.1150) (0.2000) (0.0772) 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
0.454* 0.447* 0.447** 0.417** 0.742** 0.256* 
(0.2550) (0.2550) (0.1920) (0.1920) (0.3520) (0.1450) 
Operating income -0.101 -0.0991 -0.0991 0.0062 -0.139 -0.198*** 
(0.0723) (0.0816) (0.0632) (0.0626) (0.0875) (0.0554) 
Tax to total assets 0.0116 0.0194 0.0194 0.0191 -0.438** -0.548*** 
(0.2140) (0.2530) (0.1980) (0.1950) (0.2070) (0.2090) 
Liquidity -0.000285 -0.000275 -0.000275 1.03E-06 4.94E-05 -0.00242*** 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.825*** 
          (0.0542) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0989*** -0.884 -0.884 0.302 0.0036 2.329 
(0.0263) (4.2340) (5.3310) (6.8210) (0.0033) (22.7300) 
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Threshold debt level 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.29 0.19 
       
Observations 168 168 168 168 134 153 
Number of companies 59 59 59 59 53 58 
            
Joint test  0.2301 0.3494 0.1678 0.2126 0.1327 0.0000 
Years test    0.7760 0.9145 0.6199   0.9166 
Hausman test       0.0001     
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
4.        Firm age (16-25 years) 
Total debt to total assets -0.272 -0.26 -0.26 -0.164 0.137 0.144 
-0.181 -0.227 -0.224 -0.278 -0.202 -0.117 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
0.298 0.28 0.28 0.185 -0.285 -0.291 
(0.2340) (0.3060) (0.3550) (0.4210) (0.2630) (0.1880) 
Operating income -0.105 -0.0899 -0.0899* -0.0467 -0.0728 -0.0865** 
(0.0878) (0.0984) (0.0539) (0.0552) (0.0535) (0.0339) 
Tax to total assets 0.362 0.41 0.41 0.00827 0.307 0.0973 
(0.5050) (0.4960) (0.5210) (0.5850) (0.3110) (0.2880) 
Liquidity -0.000767 1.92E-05 1.92E-05 -0.000318 0.00277 0.00308 
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0024) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.593*** 
          (0.0473) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.125*** 3.881 3.881 10.14 -0.00109 -0.936 
(0.0446) (7.8400) (16.4900) (16.8400) (0.0049) (31.3300) 
       
 Threshold debt level 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.24 0.25 
       
Observations 146 146 146 146 132 140 
Number of companies 39 39 39 39 36 38 
            
Joint test  0.5264 0.6211 0.1789 0.8968 0.3497 0.0000 
Years test    0.2873 0.8455 0.6287   0.2613 
Hausman test       0.0000     
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
5.        Firm age (26-45 years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.669*** 0.631** 0.631** 0.213 0.686*** 0.402*** 
(0.1590) (0.2930) (0.3160) (0.2040) (0.2200) (0.1350) 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
-0.893*** -0.751 -0.751 -0.233 -1.086*** -0.677*** 
(0.2740) (0.4670) (0.5070) (0.3170) (0.3580) (0.2120) 
Operating income 0.177 -0.368 -0.368* 0.469*** 0.431*** 0.471*** 
(0.1840) (0.4420) (0.1890) (0.1240) (0.0880) (0.1130) 
Tax to total assets 0.107 0.134 0.134 0.0133 0.124 0.959*** 
(0.1560) (0.3370) (0.4300) (0.2380) (0.1330) (0.2030) 
Liquidity 0.00590*** 0.00613*** 0.00613*** 0.0082 0.00357*** 0.00582*** 
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0023) (0.0224) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.846*** 
          (0.0660) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant -0.00714 -2.631 -2.631 -11.99 -0.00201 41.93 
(0.0478) (6.6190) (15.3600) (8.6900) (0.0063) (42.7600) 
       
 Threshold debt level 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.32 0.30
       
Observations 83 83 83 83 72 82 
Number of companies 17 17 17 17 17 17 
            
Joint test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0125 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 
Years test    0.0002 0.6727 0.1040   0.6140 
Hausman test       0.0001     
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
6.        Firm age (46-65 years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.0473 0.218 0.218 0.0421 -0.0128 0.155 
(0.1190) (0.1720) (0.1880) (0.1740) (0.0849) (0.0976) 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
0.0957 -0.124 -0.124 0.157 0.0912 -0.158 
(0.1810) (0.2700) (0.2690) (0.2330) (0.1230) (0.1590) 
Operating income -0.276*** -0.111 -0.111 -0.316** -0.0219 0.107 
(0.1010) (0.1520) (0.1490) (0.1370) (0.0434) (0.0850) 
Tax to total assets -0.509 -0.559 -0.559 -0.0135 -0.246 -0.343 
(0.4380) (0.6220) (0.5330) (0.4740) (0.2750) (0.2890) 
Liquidity 0.0248 0.0222 0.0222 -0.0234 -0.000175 0.0269** 
(0.0167) (0.0190) (0.0240) (0.0219) (0.0073) (0.0105) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.758*** 
          (0.0745) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0256 -8.854** -8.854** -10.42*** 0.0178 -25.26 
(0.0258) (3.8120) (3.8160) (2.9760) (0.0180) (22.7900) 
       
 Threshold debt level -0.25 0.88 0.88 -0.13 0.07 0.49
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Observations 91 91 91 91 80 90 
Number of companies 15 15 15 15 13 15 
            
Joint test  0.0011 0.0069 0.0731 0.0177 0.8263 0.0000 
Years test    0.0340 0.4292 0.0251   0.0951 
Hausman test       0.0001     
Weak-instrument test      0.0001 
7.        Firm age (66-85 years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.601** 0.502** 0.502** 0.414 0.573 0.264** 
(0.2600) (0.2220) (0.2440) (0.3610) (0.4280) (0.1250) 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
-1.118** -0.883 -0.883* -1.045 -1.494** -0.703** 
(0.5460) (0.5700) (0.5360) (0.6550) (0.7310) (0.2720) 
Operating income -0.356 -0.847** -0.847*** -0.393 0.137 -0.000154 
(0.3400) (0.3770) (0.2830) (0.3280) (0.1440) (0.1510) 
Tax to total assets -0.542 -0.511 -0.511 -0.397 -0.116 0.39 
(0.3620) (0.5280) (0.5330) (0.4650) (0.0920) (0.2670) 
Liquidity -0.0098 0.00734 0.00734 -0.0181 0.00034 0.000323 
(0.0108) (0.0162) (0.0141) (0.0116) (0.0066) (0.0072) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.945*** 
          (0.0636) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0266 -23.11** -23.11** -21.08** 0.00955** -29.67 
(0.0347) (11.0700) (11.5100) (9.9870) (0.0044) (53.0700) 
       
 Threshold debt level 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.20 0.19 0.19
       
Observations 87 87 87 87 76 85 
Number of companies 10 10 10 10 9 10 
            
Joint test  0.0113 0.0077 0.0037 0.1123 0.1126 0.0000 
Years test    0.6147 0.7500 0.1813   0.7494 
Hausman test       0.0010     
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
8.        Firm age (86-105 years) 
Total debt to total assets -0.253 -0.445* -0.445*** -0.467** -0.0373 0.037 
(0.2690) (0.2490) (0.1690) (0.1800) (0.2580) (0.1160) 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
-0.0801 0.0473 0.0473 0.0533 -0.195 -0.217 
(0.4750) (0.4310) (0.3060) (0.3260) (0.3130) (0.2100) 
Operating income 0.12 0.112 0.112 0.129 0.0411 -0.0943 
(0.1790) (0.1760) (0.1610) (0.1760) (0.1190) (0.0944) 
Tax to total assets 0.779 1.001** 1.001** 1.020** 0.316 0.231 
(0.4810) (0.4350) (0.4320) (0.4630) (0.3890) (0.3110) 
Liquidity -0.0228*** -0.0248*** -0.0248*** -0.0258*** -0.0251*** 0.00651 
(0.0075) (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0074) (0.0036) (0.0101) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.924*** 
          (0.0295) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.185*** -0.33 -0.33 -0.017 0.00218 38.03 
(0.0502) (3.2720) (4.2660) (4.5350) (0.0039) (42.0100) 
        
Threshold debt level -1.58 4.70 4.70 4.38 -0.10 0.09 
       
Observations 87 87 87 87 77 85 
Number of companies 14 14 14 14 12 14 
            
Joint test  0.0011 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Years test    0.0030 0.0831 0.1591   0.0833 
Hausman test       0.0002     
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
9.        Firm age (106+ years) 
Total debt to total assets 0.953** 1.159*** 1.159*** 1.287*** 0.766 0.844*** 
(0.4160) (0.2720) (0.2150) (0.4650) (0.5570) (0.2100) 
Total debt to total assets, 
squared 
-1.702** -2.131*** -2.131*** -2.141*** -1.703** -1.649*** 
(0.7280) (0.4760) (0.3820) (0.7400) (0.8130) (0.3780) 
Operating income -0.858** -1.877*** -1.877*** -0.336 -0.232 -0.963*** 
(0.3890) (0.2850) (0.2520) (0.3980) (0.5360) (0.2920) 
Tax to total assets 0.648 -0.754 -0.754 0.747 0.793 -0.0743 
(0.6090) (0.7560) (0.8070) (0.6860) (0.5780) (0.8310) 
Liquidity 0.0459 0.0223 0.0223 0.0474*** 0.0656 0.0308** 
(0.0349) (0.0281) (0.0143) (0.0161) (0.0463) (0.0133) 
Lag of R&D dependent           0.470*** 
          (0.1050) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0238 -21.88*** -21.88** -10.51 0.0055 95.02 
(0.0787) (7.6070) (9.8190) (7.4510) (0.0075) (72.0100) 
        
Threshold debt level 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.26 
       
Observations 80 80 80 80 69 78 
Number of companies 15 15 15 15 15 15 
            
Joint test  0.0678 0.0000 0.0000 0.0080 0.1045 0.0000 
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Years test    0.0057 0.1016 0.4892   0.0674 
Hausman test       0.0000     
Weak-instrument test           0.0001 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table presents detailed information on the age groups as presented in Table 3.13. As in Table 3.13, the 
regression results are based on various specifications for data estimation (refer to Chapter 2). The main 
dependent R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total assets’. The dependent and 
explanatory definitions are presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint test, years test and weak-instrument 
test are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels 
(* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 3.A.6: Panel estimates of R&D: Utilities with additional controls for ownership 
type, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. ‘Private’ ownership 
Total debt to total assets 0.154** 0.129** 0.129** 0.114* 0.0453 0.119** 
(0.0647) (0.0606) (0.0567) (0.0588) (0.0804) (0.0515) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.178** -0.154* -0.154* -0.139* -0.104 -0.239*** 
(0.0870) (0.0833) (0.0834) (0.0857) (0.0879) (0.0888) 
Operating income -0.0223 -0.0307 -0.0307 -0.0150 -0.0181 -0.0386 
(0.0345) (0.0324) (0.0439) (0.0450) (0.0137) (0.0419) 
Tax to total assets 0.399*** 0.284* 0.284 0.293 0.154 0.168 
(0.153) (0.147) (0.192) (0.196) (0.121) (0.199) 
Liquidity -0.000732 0.000254 0.000254 0.000170 -0.00193 0.00520* 
(0.00593) (0.00580) (0.00298) (0.00308) (0.0115) (0.00298) 
Lag of R&D dependent      0.751*** 
     (0.0373) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0625*** -5.979** -5.979** -5.897** 0.00353 31.46* 
(0.0160) (2.547) (2.546) (2.568) (0.00231) (17.37) 
 
 
      
Threshold Debt Level 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.22 0.25 
       
Observations 533 533 533 533 449 514 
Number of companies 77 77 77 77 70 76 
       
Joint test  0.0058 0.0284 0.0738 0.0981 0.1170 0.0000 
Years test   0.0027 0.0116 0.0116  0.0387 
Hausman test    0.0979   
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
B. ‘State’ ownership 
Total debt to total assets 0.550*** 0.347** 0.347** 0.144* -0.268* 0.209* 
(0.131) (0.135) (0.166) (0.201) (0.162) (0.114) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.721*** -0.427** -0.427 -0.0978 0.318 -0.342* 
(0.200) (0.214) (0.279) (0.316) (0.223) (0.189) 
Operating income -0.223 -0.0820 -0.0820 -0.137 -0.261 -0.0439 
(0.272) (0.260) (0.263) (0.265) (0.166) (0.209) 
Tax to total assets -0.0719 0.486 0.486 1.034* 0.255 -0.275 
(0.547) (0.443) (0.610) (0.621) (0.354) (0.462) 
Liquidity 0.0238** 0.00980 0.00980 -0.00569 0.0151 0.0166* 
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0126) (0.0150) (0.0134) (0.00865) 
Lag of R&D dependent      0.782*** 
     (0.0789) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant -0.0260 -14.25*** -14.25*** -15.93*** 0.00913** -29.31 
(0.0201) (3.772) (5.420) (5.346) (0.00450) (29.66) 
 
 
      
Threshold Debt Level 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.74 0.42 0.31 
       
Observations 116 116 116 116 99 116 
Number of companies 17 17 17 17 17 17 
       
Joint test  0.0005 0.0748 0.1821 0.1837 0.2214 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0044 0.0019  0.0822 
Hausman test    0.0001   
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table advances on Table 3.12 by providing the ownership distribution for the utilities sector. As before, 
the regression results are based on various specifications for data estimation. The main dependent R&D 
proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total assets’. The dependent and explanatory variable 
definitions are presented in Section 3.3.1.-3.3.3. The joint test, years test and weak-instrument test are 
presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; 
** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 3.A.7: Panel estimates of R&D: Oil and gas producers with additional control 
for ownership type, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled OLS OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. ‘Private’ ownership 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.323* 0.309 0.309* 0.520*** 0.452* 0.0738 
(0.188) (0.189) (0.174) (0.188) (0.267) (0.0977) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.694** -0.716** -0.716** -1.046*** -0.975** -0.127 
(0.296) (0.299) (0.302) (0.334) (0.405) (0.170) 
Operating income -0.0115 -0.0140 -0.0140 0.0429 0.0219 -0.00111 
(0.0628) (0.0601) (0.0468) (0.0489) (0.0473) (0.0377) 
Tax to total assets 0.0970 0.216 0.216 0.0772 -0.0559 0.201 
(0.195) (0.200) (0.266) (0.276) (0.138) (0.174) 
Liquidity -0.00384* -0.00381* -0.00381*** -0.00452*** 0.00243 0.00104 
(0.00222) (0.00228) (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00150) (0.000756) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.764*** 
     (0.0461) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.134*** -7.565 -7.565 -4.984 -0.00936 58.90* 
(0.0389) (5.090) (6.237) (6.208) (0.0103) (33.71) 
 
 
      
Threshold Debt Level 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.29 
       
Observations 322 322 322 322 247 297 
Number of companies 64 64 64 64 51 60 
       
Joint test  0.0225 0.0159 0.0023 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 
Years test   0.3440 0.6580 0.6397  0.6467 
Hausman test    0.0001   
Weak-instrument test      0.0001 
B. ‘State’ ownership 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.230*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.192* -0.163 0.164 
(0.0419) (0.0605) (0.0595) (0.164) (0.151) (0.151) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.592*** -0.687*** -0.687*** 0.222 0.118 -0.520 
(0.107) (0.209) (0.197) (0.349) (0.270) (0.327) 
Operating income 0.164 0.195 0.195 -0.00378 0.0383 0.119 
(0.110) (0.141) (0.144) (0.127) (0.113) (0.211) 
Tax to total assets 0.251 0.177 0.177 0.141 0.357* 0.171 
(0.203) (0.260) (0.274) (0.207) (0.191) (0.363) 
Liquidity -0.0249* -0.0257* -0.0257* -0.0260** -0.0263* -0.0314 
(0.0134) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0105) (0.0137) (0.0193) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.356 
     (0.423) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0331 2.101 2.101 -0.344 0.000419 -9.573 
(0.0218) (1.794) (1.910) (1.652) (0.00227) (24.78) 
 
 
      
Threshold Debt Level 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.43 0.69 0.16 
       
Observations 26 26 26 26 23 26 
Number of companies 3 3 3 3 3 3 
       
Joint test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0174 0.2060 0.0104 
Years test   0.0000 0.0203 0.0183  0.0574 
Hausman test    0.0896   
Weak-instrument test      0.0001 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table advances on Table 3.13 by providing ownership distribution results for oil and gas producers. As 
before the regression results  based on various methods for data estimation. The regression methodology was 
performed as discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D 
expenditure to total assets’. The dependent and explanatory measures definitions are presented in Sections 
3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to 
the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 3.A.8: Panel estimates of R&D: Utilities with additional control for EU 
integration, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. ‘Old’ EU countries (joined prior to 2004) 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.235** 0.192* 0.192** 0.239*** 0.0773 0.0272* 
(0.119) (0.113) (0.0795) (0.0840) (0.0828) (0.0568) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.155 -0.155 -0.155 -0.210 -0.0876 -0.00991 
(0.192) (0.188) (0.130) (0.135) (0.125) (0.106) 
Operating income -0.439*** -0.408*** -0.408*** -0.371*** -0.237* -0.0378 
(0.129) (0.119) (0.120) (0.125) (0.130) (0.100) 
Tax to total assets 0.0554 -0.0159 -0.0159 0.0133 -0.0517 -0.0581 
(0.201) (0.189) (0.208) (0.212) (0.157) (0.217) 
Liquidity -0.0144** -0.0127** -0.0127*** -0.0137*** -0.0260** -0.00601 
(0.00568) (0.00606) (0.00379) (0.00388) (0.0107) (0.00391) 
Lag of R&D dependent      0.947*** 
     (0.0414) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0663*** 0 0 -9.271*** 0.00680*** 26.94* 
(0.0245) (0) (0) (3.107) (0.00230) (14.97) 
 
 
      
Threshold Debt Level 0.76 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.44 1.37 
       
Observations 331 331 331 331 261 316 
Number of companies 66 66 66 66 57 64 
       
Joint test  0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0536 0.0000 
Years test   0.0000 0.0000 0.0029  0.0130 
Hausman test    0.0074   
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
B. ‘New’ EU countries (joined post 2004) 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.164** 0.162** 0.162* 0.0159 -0.0724 0.398*** 
(0.0644) (0.0657) (0.0832) (0.0990) (0.122) (0.0664) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.206** -0.203** -0.203* -0.0464 0.0129 -0.598*** 
(0.0857) (0.0857) (0.108) (0.122) (0.119) (0.105) 
Operating income -0.0256 -0.0286 -0.0286 -0.0129 -0.0180 -0.0582 
(0.0243) (0.0238) (0.0453) (0.0464) (0.0224) (0.0424) 
Tax to total assets 0.295 0.311 0.311 0.391 0.338** 0.228 
(0.237) (0.239) (0.297) (0.309) (0.140) (0.251) 
Liquidity 0.00766 0.00738 0.00738* 0.00858** 0.0148 0.00984*** 
(0.00915) (0.00899) (0.00384) (0.00403) (0.0131) (0.00323) 
Lag of R&D dependent      0.254*** 
     (0.0719) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0521*** 0 0 -1.365 0.000953 8.105 
(0.0141) (0) (0) (4.866) (0.00342) (14.49) 
 
 
      
Threshold Debt Level 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.17 2.81 0.33 
       
Observations 318 318 318 318 287 314 
Number of companies 92 92 92 92 86 91 
       
Joint test  0.0669 0.0716 0.1272 0.2325 0.2280 0.0000 
Years test   0.0005 0.0310 0.0079  0.0064 
Hausman test    0.0092   
Weak-instrument test      0.0002 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table advances on Table 3.14 by providing EU integration results for utilities. As before the regression 
results are based on various methods for data estimation. The regression specification was performed as 
discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total 
assets’. The dependent and explanatory measures definitions are presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint 
test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the 
coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01).  
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Table 3.A.9: Panel estimates of R&D: Oil and gas producers with additional controls 
for EU integration, 1995–2007 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS RE OLS FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
A. ‘Old’ EU countries (joined prior to 2004) 
Total debt to total 
assets 
-0.103 -0.0847 -0.0847 0.112 0.0834 -0.0281 
(0.216) (0.205) (0.174) (0.193) (0.210) (0.0970) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
0.0606 0.00102 0.00102 -0.257 -0.357 -0.0293 
(0.319) (0.306) (0.306) (0.318) (0.385) (0.177) 
Operating income -0.0686 -0.0743 -0.0743 0.00830 -0.0195 -0.0315 
(0.101) (0.106) (0.0470) (0.0493) (0.0399) (0.0310) 
Tax to total assets -0.0757 0.254 0.254 0.315 0.138 0.156 
(0.330) (0.335) (0.358) (0.347) (0.105) (0.216) 
Liquidity 0.00528 0.00481 0.00481 0.00377 0.00157 0.00384** 
(0.00479) (0.00473) (0.00301) (0.00317) (0.00212) (0.00180) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     1.109*** 
     (0.0543) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0901** 0 0 -21.98*** 0.00890 -0.451 
(0.0370) (0) (0) (6.072) (0.00565) (25.82) 
 
 
      
Threshold debt level 0.85 41.52 41.52 0.22 0.12 -0.48 
       
Observations 175 175 175 175 139 165 
Number of 
companies 
35 35 35 35 33 34 
       
Joint test  0.5737 0.4661 0.0709 0.0065 0.6223 0.0000 
Years test   0.0124 0.0010 0.0107  0.0095 
Hausman test    0.0001   
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
B. ‘New’ EU countries (joined after 2004) 
Total debt to total 
assets 
0.264 0.161 0.161 0.450 0.829** 0.193 
(0.255) (0.259) (0.279) (0.337) (0.345) (0.154) 
Total debt to total 
assets, squared 
-0.726* -0.598 -0.598 -1.131* -1.621*** -0.276 
(0.418) (0.410) (0.459) (0.576) (0.529) (0.256) 
Operating income -0.0307 -0.0369 -0.0369 0.0612 0.0678 0.0395 
(0.0676) (0.0672) (0.0705) (0.0757) (0.0784) (0.0719) 
Tax to total assets 0.365 0.342 0.342 0.177 -0.0443 0.352 
(0.236) (0.231) (0.337) (0.367) (0.164) (0.234) 
Liquidity -0.00294 -0.00285 -0.00285** -0.00376*** 0.00136 0.00123 
(0.00283) (0.00283) (0.00129) (0.00130) (0.00124) (0.000918) 
Lag of R&D 
dependent 
     0.661*** 
     (0.0669) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.158*** 0 0 27.22 -0.0157 53.54 
(0.0455) (0) (0) (18.14) (0.0119) (38.58) 
 
 
      
Threshold debt level 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.35 
       
Observations 173 173 173 173 131 158 
Number of 
companies 
63 63 63 63 50 59 
R-squared       0.145     
       
Joint test  0.3185 0.2688 0.0823 0.0228 0.0000 0.0000 
Years test   0.0028 0.0002 0.0378  0.05346 
Hausman test    0.0248   
Weak-instrument test      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table advances on Table 3.14 by providing EU integration results for oil and gas producers. As before, 
the regression results are based on various panel data. The regression specification was performed as 
discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent R&D proxy is defined as the ratio of ‘R&D expenditure to total 
assets’. The dependent and explanatory variable definitions are presented in Sections 3.3.1-3.3.3. The joint 
test, years test and weak-instrument test are presented as ‘Prob>F’. The legends (*) to the right of the 
coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Appendix 3.B: Summary of additional R&D measures not included in the 
modelling, 1995–2007 
 
   
Utilities 
Oil and 
gas 
producers 
All sectors 
Science and technology: Investment in knowledge as 
related to GDP ratio 
0.02 0.02 0.02 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
    
Ratio of R&D intangibles to company employment 
level 
102.57 312.06 256.57 
(268.61) (1343.81) (3327.42) 
Science and technology: Patents, Triadic Patent 
Families (when patent was applied in all three 
existing agencies) 
1,509 1,078 1,258 
(1868) (880) (1464) 
Number of patents granted by the USPTO by priority 
year at the national level 
50.35 44.73 47.98 
(44.99) (31.33) (40.87) 
R&D of the energy sector as related to the R&D total 
of a country 
0.15 0.15 0.15 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D 0.02 0.01 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
   Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses ( ) 
 
There are other alternative R&D indicators; although these have not been included 
in the estimates, we give a general overview of the descriptive statistics for a broader 
understanding of the energy sector. 
 
R&D in human resources 
Following Hall (2002), almost half of innovation costs relate directly to the wages 
and salaries of researchers—scientists, engineers and economists—and hence human 
resources represent a main source of future income generation. We have broadened this 
measure by introducing R&D as intangible assets to the number of employees in a 
company, as this is the information we could obtain from the statistical database. There is, 
however, another related human capital measure, which is investment in knowledge as 
related to the GDP ratio (OECD, 2008). The second investment in knowledge as related to 
the GDP ratio is at the country-level and not the company level, as presented in the first 
human resource–related index. It is interesting to compare these two ratios, as we would 
expect them to follow the same pattern for the observed countries, which would support 
the plausibility of the employed human resource R&D measurements. 
A general comparison of the two human resource R&D measures shows that on an 
average basis across all sectors, the R&D to employment ratio is 257 (a ratio close to 1 
shows that there is a minimum input provided by one employed person, while a higher 
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ratio demonstrates the maximum input from every employee). The second measure is a 
proportion of the investment in knowledge in relation to country GDP level; the higher the 
ratio, the better, as this represents greater investment in education and knowledge. As the 
measure is at the country level and not the firm level, the average investments in 
knowledge are the same for all sectors, at 2% of the GDP, while the standard deviation is 
2%, which shows that there are country-to-country variations. 
 
Patents as a measure of R&D 
Other authors use the number of patents to demonstrate R&D activity. Trajtenberg 
(1990) argues that patent-related measures are a better indicator of innovation productivity. 
We use two types of patent-based R&D, available from Eurostat and OECD Factbook 
2008, respectively: (a) patents granted by the USA Patent and Trademark Office (US PTO) 
by priority year at the national level, and (b) patents granted by a Triadic Patent Family (a 
patent family is defined as a set of patents taken in various countries (i.e., patent offices) to 
protect the same invention. Triadic patent families are a set of patents taken at all three of 
these major patent offices – the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office 
(JPO) and the USPTO, based on the OECD Factbook 2008 explanation. On a general 
sample level, we have patent-related data available for almost every country in consecutive 
years with a mean patent number of 48 registered by the US PTO, and with an average of 
1,258 patents registered with the Triadic Patent Family for the same inventions. The largest 
number of patents obtained in both instances was observed in the utilities sector: 50 (US 
PTO) and 1,509 (Triadic Patent Family). However, we need to bear in mind that these two 
patent parameters are not energy-sector specific but rather represent every possible 
invention within a particular country, which generalises the effect of R&D. 
 
The ratio of energy sector R&D to total R&D for a given country 
To measure the degree of investment in the energy sector, we applied the R&D 
energy share of all countries’ sectors based on data available from Research Framework 
programmes 1-7 covering the 1983–2013 period (European Commission, CORDIS). The 
R&D energy sector share of each country’s total expenditure on R&D is available at the 
general European level and thus relates to every observed company within a given time 
period (four consecutive years). According to the CORDIS data, R&D expenditure has 
dropped from a 22% share in 1995–1998 to a 7% share in 2007–2013. 
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The ratio of R&D to gross domestic product (GDP) 
The fact that energy companies do not restrict themselves to specific countries and 
tend to internationalise and diversify investment portfolios would allow us to compare 
gross domestic expenditure to R&D. The relevant data were obtained from the OECD 
Factbook 2008. Interestingly, there are six countries where there is no R&D expenditure at 
all: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, the Netherlands and Romania. The average 
mean GDP to R&D proxy demonstrates that the highest level is achieved within the 
utilities sector (0.02), although the ratios were similar for the oil and gas production sector 
and the overall energy industry (0.01). 
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Appendix 3.C: Summary of country-level R&D and leverage proxies, 1995–2007 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the European energy companies; we do not 
analyse individual countries or companies. This work is planned for future analyses. At 
time, we are aware that the majority of the companies studied are located in the UK, 
France, Italy, Spain and Germany (refer to Figure 3.2).  
 
Country 
R&D 
expenditure to 
total assets 
ratio 
R&D 
expenditure to 
operating 
revenues (net 
sales) ratio 
Total debt to 
total assets 
ratio 
Total 
liabilities to 
total assets 
ratio 
Mean St dev Mean St dev Mean St dev Mean St dev 
         
Austria 0.06 (0.07) 0.15 (0.20) 0.25 (0.14) 0.65 (0.11) 
Belgium 0.08 (0.17) 0.01 (0.01) 0.40 (0.21) 0.66 (0.17) 
Cyprus 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.20 (0.12) 0.51 (0.17) 
Czech Republic 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.03) 0.10 (0.08) 0.40 (0.14) 
Germany 0.06 (0.07) 0.12 (0.17) 0.20 (0.19) 0.69 (0.17) 
Denmark 0.09 (0.14) 0.14 (0.27) 0.32 (0.19) 0.51 (0.16) 
Estonia 0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02) 0.45 (0.12) 0.52 (0.12) 
Spain 0.07 (0.10) 0.14 (0.19) 0.31 (0.14) 0.65 (0.12) 
Finland 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.30 (0.06) 0.60 (0.06) 
France 0.10 (0.12) 0.16 (0.21) 0.21 (0.18) 0.68 (0.18) 
UK 0.11 (0.15) 0.15 (0.17) 0.23 (0.18) 0.48 (0.23) 
Greece 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.04) 0.29 (0.16) 0.56 (0.18) 
Hungary 0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.19 (0.11) 0.50 (0.10) 
Ireland 0.35 (0.30) 0.29 (0.33) 0.12 (0.18) 0.29 (0.21) 
Italy 0.10 (0.10) 0.21 (0.23) 0.30 (0.15) 0.61 (0.14) 
Lithuania 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.07) 0.15 (0.13) 0.30 (0.12) 
Luxemburg 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.18 (0.23) 0.49 (0.17) 
Latvia 0.05 (0.07) 0.20 (0.26) 0.10 (0.13) 0.26 (0.12) 
Netherlands*         
Poland 0.04 (0.11) 0.02 (0.03) 0.16 (0.09) 0.43 (0.10) 
Portugal 0.07 (0.05) 0.15 (0.14) 0.34 (0.08) 0.66 (0.11) 
Romania 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.04) 0.12 (0.12) 0.40 (0.10) 
Sweden 0.12 (0.28) 0.07 (0.11) 0.34 (0.21) 0.59 (0.17) 
Slovakia 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.15 (0.12) 0.61 (0.26) 
All EU-24 0.10 (0.17) 0.13 (0.19) 0.24 (0.18) 0.55 (0.21) 
*Netherlands: no observations 
Note: S tandard deviations are in parentheses ( ). 
 
In our analyses, we focus on general R&D measures – expenditure to total assets 
and capital structure – total debt to total assets, as guided by data availability. The standard 
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deviation in all measures is high, which suggests inter-country variability. All R&D and 
leverage measures were obtained from the OSIRIS dataset. 
The highest level of average intangible assets to total assets is observed in Ireland 
(0.35), followed by Sweden (0.12) and the UK (0.11), with the EU-24 average at 0.08. The 
highest R&D sales measure was observed for Ireland (0.29) followed by Italy (0.21) and 
Latvia (0.20); in all other countries, however, the average of this variable is 0.13. 
We also compare the sample averages with those obtained by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Booth et al. (2001)
7
. We report that the energy industry has about the same 
average debt level as documented by Rajan and Zingales (1995), 0.23. We contrast with 
Rajan and Zingales in reporting that the liabilities ratio was less than the general country 
level of 0.66. Booth et al. (2001) found that the average ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets for a given country was 0.67, which is higher compared to the energy sector data 
presented here. 
  
                                                 
7
 Note that both Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. (2001) examined only four countries that were 
included in our sample (Germany, France, the UK and Italy). However, these countries provided the largest 
amounts of firm data for our research. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
4. Does corporate governance reform necessarily boost firm value? Recent evidence 
from Russia 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines whether the introduction of CG reforms in general and that of T&D 
rules in particular can necessarily boost firm value. Existing literature suggests that CG 
reforms can boost value because they can resolve the conflict of interest between the 
controlling and the minority owners, especially in societies with a highly skewed 
distribution of ownership. We, however, argue that the success of CG reform would, in 
addition, depend on whether the reforms may initiate further conflict, for example, conflict 
between the state and the controlling owners. Using recent data from Russia for 2000–
2008, we find that the introduction of CG codes in Russia had limited success in improving 
indices of firm value in our sample. We argue that this arises from the predatory behaviour 
of the central and local governments: greater transparency makes businesses easy targets 
for aggressive tax-enforcement policies from the central government, while the 
decentralised local governments may increase bribe prices to protect businesses from high 
central taxes, which may also tempt some businesses to go underground, thus harming firm 
value. 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
Existing research suggests that the financial markets are more likely to benefit from 
external investment if investors enjoy robust legal protection. Both equity and debt 
investments attract higher prices when CG laws protect the investors against expropriation 
by controlling owners. By limiting the expropriation through controlling owners, especially 
when ownership distribution is highly skewed, CG laws may encourage the external 
financing of corporate investment and, hence, firm value and growth. The question is 
whether this perceived link between the introduction of CG codes and firm value will, 
necessarily, always hold. The present chapter tests the validity of this hypothesis by 
considering large listed corporations in Russia, a country which introduced CG codes in 
2002 (and that were made effective from 2004 onwards) amidst a series of other reforms in 
a radical bid to boost the ailing economy under President Putin. 
Russia is a special case in point. Many Russian firms remain family controlled and 
highly concentrated, leading to large-scale expropriation of small investors including 
minority shareholders and creditors. Consequently, Russian firms often face difficulties 
securing external funds and are therefore forced to finance most investment internally 
(Blasi and Shleifer, 1996). Until 2002, Russia had no recognised accounting standards or 
other official CG mechanism capable of insuring the type of corporate integrity within 
companies that stimulates investment incentives and financial markets. Low protection of 
property rights remained a preferred policy of the rich in a country plagued with a very 
high degree of income inequality. The result was significant undervaluation of Russian 
firms, which necessitated the introduction of better CG structures to induce external 
investment. After years of expropriations of minority shareholders and fierce battles for 
assets, Russian oligarchs finally began to understand that the only way to sustain the 
development of their companies was through attracting external funds. 
When Mr. Putin succeeded Mr. Yeltsin in March 2000, his goal was to reassert 
Kremlin control over a chaotic, cash-strapped state. First, there was a radical tax reform in 
2001 that strengthened tax administration and enforcement by the centralized state (Desai, 
Dyck and Zingales, 2007).
.
 Next, Russia quickly caught up with the West in adjusting its 
company and bankruptcy laws to Western standards and it introduced the CG codes in 
2002. However, law enforcement remains poor (Pistor et al., 2000), primarily due to 
widespread corruption in courts, regulatory bodies, and law enforcement agencies and also 
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due to the conflict of interest between central and local governments (Treisman, 2000) in 
this decentralised framework.
8
 
The question that we raise here is whether the introduction of T&D rules in this 
kind of investment climate can necessarily boost firm value. Despite privatisation, different 
levels of government still remain as company stakeholders. However, the central 
government also has a claim on any firm as a tax collector and, as such, there may arise a 
conflict of interest between the central government as a the stakeholder and its role as a tax 
collector. While the introduction of T&D rules (and also the overall CG codes) can resolve 
the conflict of interest between the controlling and minority owners, thus boosting firm 
value, it may worsen the conflict between the state as the tax collector and the private 
controlling owners in Russia. In particular, the increasing transparency of businesses may 
make those firms easy targets for aggressive tax-enforcement policies from the central 
government and may thus reduce income sheltering or tax evasion strategies. 
Heinrich (2006) suggests that many oil and gas sector firms feared that too much 
transparency would make them vulnerable to attack from Russia’s state agencies. The case 
of Mikhail Khodrokovsky, founder of the Russian oil and gas giant Yukos, who has been 
convicted of embezzlement, fraud and tax evasion is particularly noteworthy in this 
context. This involved a conspicuously aggressive case of state predatory behaviour. 
Further, Treisman (2000) argued that there arose a conflict of interest between the central 
and local governments in Russia’s decentralised economy, which may thwart the central 
government’s objective of lessening tax-evasion strategies. First, in Russia’s politically 
decentralised society, sub-national governments can attract businesses by offering 
protection against the central government tax collectors, regulators or bankruptcy agencies 
(Treisman, 2000). Second, greater fiscal decentralisation in a politically decentralised 
society may lower the incentive of the regional government to protect businesses against 
paying taxes, but may, in turn, increase the price paid in bribes to protect businesses 
against central taxes (which, in turn, may act to increase tax for private businesses). 
Finally, greater fiscal decentralisation may also induce private enterprises to shift part of 
their output underground, thus adversely affecting the performance of the legal entity. 
Thus, the objective of firm-value maximization through the introduction of T&D rules may 
                                                 
8
 The distinctive features of the tax reforms of 2001 have been the significant emphasis placed on compliance 
with tax laws and also the introduction of changes to the administration and enforcement of the laws. In 
particular, incentives were offered to regional governments to have a greater share of local tax revenue in an 
attempt to prevent them from protecting local tax payers from paying central taxes. Further, the tax rate on 
dividends was raised from 15% to 30%, while corporate tax rate remained unchanged at 30% (subsequently, 
it was reduced to a flat rate of 24%). Thus, desperate government attempts to re-establish control over private 
businesses through aggressive tax enforcement policies resulted in a war between the state and private 
businesses. 
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be compromised by various factors that inherently characterise the Russian political and 
economic set-up. Accordingly, we argue that the net effect of the introduction of CG 
reform in Russia could be positive, negative or insignificant (when the positive and 
negative effects of CG reform outweigh each other).
9
 In the absence of any prior evidence 
in this respect, we empirically explore the effect of the introduction of CG codes in general 
and that of T&D rules in particular, in Russia. 
Our analysis focuses on the largest listed companies in Russia generally for the 
period 2000–200810, the period which witnessed the introduction, implementation and 
further development of CG codes, along with the reform of tax administration 
enforcement, and also political and fiscal decentralisation measures. The companies 
studied are those that are included in S&P’s T&D data, covering 80% of the cumulative 
market capitalisation of the Russian Stock Market in 2007, which were all subject to the 
newly introduced CG codes. We merge the T&D data compiled by S&P with firm-level 
accounting data extracted from the OSIRIS database available from the Bureau van Dijk. 
T&D data covers six indices on ownership structure, shareholder rights, financial 
and operational performance, and board and management structure and processes, all of 
which are important elements that affect a firm’s attractiveness to investors. We also use a 
measure of composite T&D (obtained by using principal component analysis of six 
available indices), which allows us to test our central hypothesis that better T&D improves 
a firm’s value in Russia. While we do not observe the sample firms’ responses to tax 
reform or their alliances with local governments in order to evade central taxes, it can be 
argued that these factors are controlled by the firm and year fixed effects in our analysis. 
For the purpose of this chapter, we experiment with two measures of firm value as 
defined by Tobin’s Q (Tobin, 1969), which focus on the market valuation of the firm in 
relation to the cost of capital. In the absence of any prior research in this respect, we use 
our data to explore this further: 
 First, we exploit the inter-firm variation in the adoption of T&D rules (an 
exogenous policy intervention) to identify the effect of introducing the CG code on 
firm value; in doing so, we also control for additional firm (e.g., including firm 
size, leverage, age and market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index), 
sector characteristics, which may otherwise influence firm value. 
                                                 
9
 T&D is a key aspect of the modern CG mechanism and an important element affecting how attractive a firm 
appears to be in the eyes of potential investors. This is a set of rules, which covers various aspects of 
corporate practice including a firm’s openness about financial and operational information, its ownership 
structure, and shareholders’ rights under the company’s governing legal documents, and the capabilities of 
the individual board members and management. 
10
 Note that our analysis using S&P’s T&D indices only focused on the period 2003–2007, as this data is only 
available for this period. Please see the further discussion in the data section. 
  
90 
 
 Next, we compare the effects of T&D rules (pertaining to ownership structure, 
shareholder rights, financial and operational performance, and board and 
management structure and processes) not only on all firms, but also on energy and 
non-energy sector firms individually in our sample for the period 2003–2007 for 
which this data is available. 
 Finally, we assess the impact of the introduction of the overall CG codes made 
effective from 2004 onwards on firm value indices in Russia using 2000–2008 data. 
Note that in this case we are not constrained by 2003–2007 T&D data available 
from S&P and, hence, we use a slightly larger sample that allows us to extend the 
end data point to 2008 (the latest year available on OSIRIS when we initiated this 
research). Accordingly, we replace the T&D rules’ indices by a binary indicator of 
the introduction of CG codes made effective from 2004 onwards. The variable 
takes a value of 1 for all the years from 2004–2008, but zero otherwise. 
However, in order to assess the impact of the CG code over this period, we also 
need to identify some firms that may be considered as being the control group (i.e., those 
who were not covered by the introduction of Russian CG codes in 2004). Our analysis in 
this respect exploits the variation in the adoption of the CG code by those Russian listed 
firms who were also listed on the international stock exchange. The underlying idea is that 
in the post-2000 years of rapid Russian recovery and subsequent growth, some Russian 
listed firms also became listed on international financial markets (mainly on the London 
Stock Exchange) to raise external finance. These firms would often adopt more stringent 
international CG codes than those listed only on the Russian Stock Exchange. As such, the 
adoption of international CG codes by these firms would not necessarily coincide with the 
introduction of Russian CG codes and, hence, we treat these internationally listed Russian 
firms as our control group. This allows us to exploit the variation in the adoption of CG 
codes between domestic and foreign listed companies before and after the effective 
introduction of Russian CG codes in 2004 with a view to identifying an effect brought 
about by the introduction of CG codes. 
There is evidence from our analysis that both composite T&D rules as well as T&D 
in financial and operational information significantly boosted the value of firms, 
particularly for utility firms in our sample. However, the effect of T&D of any kind 
remains insignificant in terms of explaining firm value
11
 among oil and gas companies, 
which hold a particularly prominent place in the Russian economy (see the further 
                                                 
11
 Among the two measures of firm value (EBIT and market valuation based Tobin’s Q), we find that the 
effect of T&D indices on EBIT as a share of total assets is always insignificant; hence, our analysis is 
essentially based on the results obtained using Tobin’s Q. 
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discussion in Section 4.2). The latter can perhaps be attributed to the conflict of interest 
between the state and the controlling oligarchs as well as that between the central and the 
local governments supporting private businesses, thus wiping out any improvement in firm 
value that would have otherwise taken place. Regarding the impact of the introduction of 
CG codes in 2004, results from the second part of our analysis suggest that internationally 
listed Russian firms, which require much higher informational disclosure than for entry 
onto the Russian Stock Exchange, have significantly higher firm value, though the 
differential effect of the CG reform of 2004 for internationally listed firms turns out to be 
insignificant. 
Our analysis contributes to a sizeable and growing literature on CG in emerging 
economies and also the limited literature on tax and CG. In their pioneering article, 
Schleifer and Vishny (1997) highlighted the beneficial influence of good CG laws on firm 
performance and value. There is evidence from around the world that firms with better CG 
practices enjoy a lower cost of capital (La Porta et al., 1998; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; 
Errunza and Mazumdar, 2001; Ashbaugh et al., 2004), lower credit-rate spreads (Yu, 2005) 
and lower risk (Gompers et al., 2003; Brown and Caylor, 2006). While the earlier literature 
tends to focus on the ownership and board composition as derived from the agency-cost 
theory (an ownership and management separation theory explained by Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), since the 1990s, the focus has shifted to the legal rules (English common 
law and French civil law countries) defining creditors’ and shareholders’ rights. Other 
studies examine legal enforcement in terms of the rule of law, judicial efficiency and 
corruption at both country and firm level. Later, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. 
(1998) and others found that combining rules relating to ownership and board composition 
with legal protection for shareholders’ rights provides a better understanding of CG 
practices. More recently, the attention has been shifted to the importance of T&D rules. 
Patel and Dallas’s (2002) study is one of the first studies on T&D, which highlighted that 
firms with good T&D have lower costs in terms of equity capital. Gompers et al. (2003) 
included T&D as one of the components of CG rules and found that stronger rights in the 
USA have led to better firm performance. Similarly, Klapper and Love (2002) and Black et 
al. (2006) considered T&D parameters along with other CG practices. Other studies used 
CG indices provided by specialised ranking agencies or constructed their own proxies (see 
e.g., Black et al., 2000; McKinsey & Company, 2002; and Aggarwal et al., 2007). The 
general consensus in this literature is that better T&D rules tend to lower the cost of 
capital, increase firm performance and provide a better understanding of the firm’s 
business environment. This is because better CG resolves the conflict of interest between 
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the controlling and minority owners. Turning now to the limited literature on CG in Russia, 
we find three recent studies; namely, Black (2001), Goetzmann, Spiegel and Ukhov (2004) 
and Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006). All these studies tend to focus on a relatively small 
sample and none of them particularly focused on the period after the introduction of the 
CG codes in 2002. The most recent of these studies, namely that by Black, Love and 
Rachinsky (2006), analysed overall governance indices over the years 1999–2004. Thus, 
the access to the unique S&P data on T&D rules in the post-reform period allows us to 
update the effect of CG on firm value in Russia. We go beyond this literature, in that in 
addition to the conflict of interest between controlling and minority owners, our analysis 
highlights how the introduction of T&D rules may not be an unmixed blessing, especially 
if it instigates a conflict of interest between the state and the controlling owners as well as 
between the central and the local governments in a decentralised framework. Further, we 
conduct a formal impact evaluation analysis of the introduction of Russian CG codes in 
2004 by exploiting the differential behaviour of domestic and internationally listed Russian 
firms in our sample over 2000–2008. There is a suggestion that the international (as 
opposed to the domestic) listing of Russian firms may improve the value of Russian firms, 
though the average impact of the CG reform turns out to be insignificant for the period of 
2000–2008. Our results also complement the limited literature on tax and CG that argues 
that a stringent tax-enforcement regime can increase the amount outside shareholders will 
receive, even accounting for increased levels of taxation (see e.g., Desai, Dyck and 
Zingales, 2007). Instead, we argue that higher taxes and stringent tax enforcement may 
generate a conflict of interest not only between the controlling owner and the central 
government, but also between the central and local governments (supporting private 
businesses), which may counteract the effectiveness of CG reforms (including the T&D 
rules). 
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 4.2 describes the history of CG in 
Russia with special reference to the recent CG codes and Section 3 describes the data. 
Section 4.4 refers to methodology, while Section 4.5 presents and analyses the results. The 
final Section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2. Hypothesis development: The perceived link between CG and firm value may 
not always hold 
 
CG laws/rules have evolved over centuries, often in response to corporate failures 
or systemic crises. Many think that inadequate and inconsistent regulation of financial 
markets caused the first global economic crisis of the 21
st
 century. The inadequate 
availability of accurate information on risk exposure has further highlighted the crucial 
importance of risk management and disclosure by financial institutions around the globe. 
As President Obama said in his inaugural address, “this crisis has reminded us that without 
a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control.” Lax oversight allowed corporations to 
take on excessive risks, and poor disclosure practices left investors unaware of the dangers 
lurking in their portfolios. 
 
4.2.1. Background 
Russia is a unique case in the context of CG. Barring successful CG systems such 
as those in the USA, Germany or Japan, legal protection of investors in most countries is 
rather weak, either because the laws are weak or because the courts do not enforce the 
laws. As a consequence, most firms remain family controlled and highly concentrated, 
leading to large-scale expropriation of small investors including minority shareholders and 
creditors. This results in the serious undervaluation of Russian firms. 
The present chapter primarily focuses on one aspect of the CG mechanism in 
Russia that deals with T&D rules. In our case, T&D is the only available, consistent and 
up-to-date information for firms in our sample. Russia set good T&D mechanisms in place, 
essentially to protect the rights of the minority shareholders, creditors and other outsiders 
who do not have first-hand knowledge about the firm and its prospects, against extraction 
of private benefits by insiders taking advantage of their superior information. 
We focus on the period 2000–2008, which has been a period of rapid political and 
economic change in Russia when Mr. Putin succeeded Mr. Yeltsin in March 2000. Putin’s 
goal was to reassert Kremlin control over a chaotic, cash-strapped state dominated by big 
businessmen with a view to replacing the oligarchs of Boris Yeltsin's presidency, who 
hustled their way to wealth in murky post-Soviet privatisations through his own allies. 
Under President Yeltsin, high tax rates and low levels of tax enforcement encouraged 
Russian firms to shelter income aggressively. Multiple taxes from different levels of 
government meant that tax obligations could exceed profits. Company executives were not 
shy about how this tax burden affected their behaviour. As Yukos Oil CEO Khodorkovsky 
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argued, “As long as the tax regime is unjust, I will try to find a way around it.”12 Putin 
radically strengthened the tax-enforcement regime with no change (at least for the first two 
years) in tax rates and signalled his intentions to crack down on tax evasion by releasing a 
memorandum with a list of the worst corporate tax offenders (release date July 28
th
, 2000). 
The result was dramatic. Two Yeltsin allies, Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir 
Gusinsky, fled abroad in 2000, facing fraud charges after clashing with the president. 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner of oil giant Yukos, was arrested three years later on fraud 
charges and his oil company was hit with a $28bn back tax bill. The Yukos case taught 
Putin’s loyal private businessmen that they held their assets at the Kremlin's pleasure and 
that they should only become involved in politics at their peril. However, there was still a 
conflict of interest between the central and local governments. In a decentralised set-up, 
the local governments tried to attract private businesses to their municipalities by 
protecting these businesses against paying central taxes. The Kremlin tried to resolve the 
conflict of interest between the central and the local governments by increasing the extent 
of fiscal decentralisation that allowed the local governments to retain 100% of local 
revenue raised from personal income taxes. Some municipalities still tried to protect 
private enterprises from paying central taxes in lieu of high bribery prices, which is a drag 
on firm value. Sometimes these excessive interventions both from the central and local 
governments induced the private businesses to shift part of their output underground, thus 
adversely affecting the value of the legal entity. The result could be a negative or 
insignificant (when positive and negative effects outweigh each other) effect of the 
introduction of CG codes on firm value. 
 
4.2.2. The 2002 Russian corporate governance codes 
The Russian CG codes, as with countless similar documents enacted throughout 
Europe, claim to embody universal values of good corporate behaviour. Russia asked the 
Coudert Brothers, an American law firm, to prepare the international level of its CG with 
the cooperation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
OECD, the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. 
Before the CG codes were introduced in 2002, several institutions applied a variety 
of measures to assess the level of CG in Russia. These assessments created useful baseline 
measures. The Brunswick Warburg Investment Bank (now as a part of UBS) has rated 
governance implications since 1999. The Troika Dialog Investment House has been 
                                                 
12
 This quotation is taken from “Oligarch? No, I'm just an oil magnate”, Observer, Sunday June 4, 2000. 
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assessing selected firms since 2000. Two non-profit organisations, Corporate Law and 
Governance and the Russian Institute of Directors, have measured CG since 2001 and 
2004, respectively. The change in the corporate environment brought about by the 
introduction of the CG codes in 2002 has been facilitated by a set of policies, which 
necessitates a firm to be open and willing to disclose financial and management 
information to the general public (see a detailed explanation of various CG sub-policies in 
Bollard, 2003). A growing body of literature suggests, however, that Russia’s national 
culture and socio-political environment will also significantly influence how the CG 
system develops (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2001). 
The CG code has made some progress since its introduction in 2002. Despite all the 
drawbacks and lack of a necessary business/political environment, the joint venture 
between the two energy giants TNK and BP demonstrated Russia’s emerging openness to 
foreign investors. Another positive example of CG implementation within energy firms 
concerns the reorganization of the utility holding company RAO UES. GAZPROM, the 
second-largest company in 2003 (by capitalised market value) is seen as having huge 
business potential. Yukos, the largest energy company, has made progress in CG despite 
(or perhaps leading to) the arrests of several of its executives on charges of tax evasion and 
economic crimes. Yukos has been releasing financial statements prepared in accordance 
with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) since 2001 and was audited 
by the international accounting firm PriceWaterhouseCooper (PWC) (Yukos website). 
Given the availability of the T&D indices for the period 2003–2007, as compiled 
by S&P, we first consider the sample for 2003–2007. In doing so, we not only distinguish 
between energy and non-energy sector firms, but also distinguish between utility and oil 
and gas sector firms within the energy sector with a view to comparing the effect of CG 
codes across sectors. We also check the robustness of our results in various ways (see the 
further discussion in Section 4.3). We further extend our analysis to consider the overall 
effect of the introduction of the CG code in 2002 (which came into effect in 2004) on firm 
value in our sample for 2000–2008 (which includes the years before and after the official 
introduction of CG codes). In this case, we are also able to account for the differential 
effect, if any, of the CG reform for internationally listed Russian firms (relative to those 
listed domestically). This is motivated by the fact that the international listing of Russian 
firms required a much greater transparency than is required by the Moscow Stock 
Exchange and did not coincide with the introduction of CG reform in 2004. 
Some Russian companies moved towards greater T&D, providing opportunities for 
foreign investors to acquire an interest in the company and adopting international 
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management practices such as international accounting standards, listings on international 
stock exchanges and, thus, improved standards of CG. Despite advances by these few CG 
adopters, however, Russia is still characterised by a general lack of transparency in a 
political environment plagued by centralized state bureaucracy, corruption and an 
inefficient judicial system, where state machinery often preys on private businesses. 
 
4.3. Data and methodology 
The data used in this analysis has been obtained primarily from OSIRIS firm-level 
data for Russian energy companies, which has been widely used in the related academic 
literature (see e.g., Black, 2001; Klapper and Love, 2002; Goetzmann, Spiegel and Ukhov, 
2004; Black et al., 2006; and Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006). OSIRIS is a fully 
integrated public listed company database and analytical information solution produced by 
the Bureau van Dijk, an electronic data publishing company. In this respect, we consider 
the listed Russian firms from 2000 to 2008, which has been a period of rapid economic 
recovery and subsequent growth under the leadership of President Putin. OSIRIS data was 
then merged with the firm-level T&D data obtained from S&P (see Appendix 4.B for 
further details on the construction of these indices). 
We apply GICS 4-digit code to classify firms in our sample. As we focus on the 
energy industry, GICS allowed us to identify nine main energy subsectors within the 
energy industry. We have selected utilities and oil and gas producers as the two largest 
ones consisting of 64% of the overall energy sector. The two largest energy sectors consist 
of 23 companies. The remaining energy sector companies are labelled as the ‘other energy’ 
sector (which consists of 13 companies). Figure 4.1 and Appendix 4.C provide some 
summary statistics for the selected sectors and subsectors. Given that S&P’s T&D indices 
focus on the largest energy sector firms, we considered the 36 largest firms in 2007. While 
181 Russian energy firms are available in the OSIRIS, the 36 within S&P’s database are 
the largest ones. Further, we distinguish energy sector firms from leading non-energy 
sectors, which include firms operating in telecommunications, metallurgy, banking, food, 
consumer and retail markets and IT engineering. 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of energy sector firms, 1995–2007 
 
Company data for the analysis has primarily been obtained from OSIRIS firm-level data (1995–2008) based 
on the companies included in the T&D studies provided by Standard & Poor (2003–2007). As we are 
interested in the energy sector firms, we separate and define the energy sector firms based on the GICS 
sectoral description available through OSIRIS. There is a clear pattern of an increased number of companies 
from 4 in 1995 to 68 being observed in 2007, where energy companies consist of 53% of all firms within the 
sample. 
 
 
Russia’s stock market is dominated by the natural resource sectors, which comprise 
about two-thirds of the market (Lazareva et al., 2007). Russia has the largest proven 
natural gas reserves in the world (1,688 trillion cubic feet) and the seventh-largest proven 
oil reserves (60.0 billion to 74.4 billion barrels) (BP review, 2007). Europe depends on 
Russian energy: Russia provides 33.5% of the oil consumed in the EU and 42% of its gas 
usage (Erixon, 2008). The importance of the energy sector in our study can be further 
highlighted by the two following observations. First of all, the Russian energy companies 
are significant because of how much they contribute to the economy. When Russia began 
implementing its CG mechanism, five energy giants – namely, Yukos, Gazprom, Lukoil, 
Surgutneftegaz and Sibneft – cumulatively represented 56% of the value of all the stocks 
listed on the Russian Stock Market: USD 106,408 million out of USD 189,029 million in 
2003 (Expert RA, 2004). Foreign investors often considered stock in Russian energy firms 
to be a key holding in their international portfolios. Furthermore, a comparison of total 
sales by companies in these two sectors between 2003 and 2007 clearly highlights the 
importance of energy sector firms in Russia. The percentage of total sales by energy 
industry varies between 82% and 85% during this period; in other words, only about 15%–
18% of total sales pertain to the non-energy sector of the country. 
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Firm-level balance sheet data from OSIRIS pertains to profit and loss accounts and 
cash flow statements for all existing firms. Although we use the comprehensive firm-level 
database to analyse effects within the energy sector, the consistency of information from 
OSIRIS and S&P allows us to be confident of the descriptive statistics and regression 
analyses we produce. 
 
4.3.1. Transparency and disclosure indices 
 We obtained a number of different T&D indices from S&P covering various 
aspects of corporate financial behaviour. This allows us to assess the predictive power of 
different measures of T&D. It is important to choose the most acceptable T&D measures. 
Unlike much of the existing literature, we have access to S&P’s T&D indices that have 
been consistently constructed for the 80 largest listed Russian companies with the most 
liquid stocks (90% of cumulative market capitalisation of the Russian Stock Market in 
2007) over the period from 2003–2007 (S&P’s reports, 2003–2007). 
A clarification is in order before we begin: while there are more than 300 public 
companies in Russia, we focus on the largest companies covered by S&P; this sample may 
not be representative of all Russian companies. As the larger companies tend to be more 
transparent than the smaller ones, our sampling method is likely to generate an upward bias 
in assessing transparency of the entire population of public Russian companies. In contrast, 
since the companies included in this survey account for approximately 90% of the 
cumulative capitalisation of the Russian Stock Market, they represent the major part of the 
Russian economy in terms of assets and operations. Subject to these clarifications, we 
considered the following T&D indices
13
: 
 T&D financial and operational information 
 T&D ownership structure and shareholders’ rights 
 T&D board and management structure 
                                                 
13
 S&P applied two criteria to select the companies in the study: size and liquidity. As a rule, the liquidity of 
stocks positively depends on the size of the company, but there are exceptions, especially in cases of a minor 
free-float. Each T&D index is based on about 30 survey questions for each of the sections: T&D financial 
and operational information, T&D ownership structure and shareholders’ rights, and T&D board and 
management structure. These questionnaires were circulated to the top Russian firms from various industries 
such as telecommunications, energy, manufacturing and advertising. S&P analysis accounts for information 
included in the three major sources of public information: annual reports, Web-based disclosures and public 
regulatory reporting. S&P views corporate transparency as an important factor affecting a firm’s 
attractiveness to investors and an important element of corporate governance. The study includes around 80 
of the largest Russian stock companies with the most liquid assets. The companies included in the survey 
account for approximately 90% of the cumulative capitalisation of the Russian Stock Market and they 
represent the major part of the Russian economy in terms of assets and operations.  
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We used the T&D overall score, which measures general implementation of the CG 
code. As defined by S&P, T&D’s ‘financial & operational’ index measures the openness 
and availability of accounting data, employment standards, consistency with regulations, 
an explanation and description of the firm and its market position etc. The T&D’s 
‘ownership’ index demonstrates the availability of data on the ownership structure. The 
T&D’s ‘board & shareholders’ index shows the disclosure of the management structure. 
S&P measures the T&D score in percentages with a maximum of 100%; a higher score 
means better T&D within the company. The same T&D indices, but for a shorter period of 
time, were used by Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006). 
Our research not only covered the energy sector, but was also extended to non-
energy sector firms covering telecommunications, retail, communications, and real estate 
among others. Our results clearly show that the energy industry generally underperformed 
relative to the non-energy related sectors (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1). Despite its lower 
performance initially, the T&D overall index for the energy sector corporations 
subsequently increased so that the energy sector firms are now in line with the other 
industries. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Means and standard deviations of selected T&D indexes, 2003–2007 
 
Variable 
All industries 
Non-energy 
sector 
Energy sector 
Oil and gas 
producers 
Utilities 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
             
T&D overall 0.52 0.16 0.54 0.17 0.50 0.15 0.50 0.17 0.46 0.12 
T&D financial 
& operational 
0.54 0.18 0.56 0.18 0.52 0.18 0.53 0.20 0.44 0.15 
T&D 
ownership 
0.52 0.18 0.55 0.20 0.49 0.16 0.47 0.19 0.47 0.12 
T&D board & 
shareholders 
0.48 0.16 0.50 0.18 0.46 0.14 0.44 0.16 0.47 0.13 
The four T&D indexes that are described and presented in Figure 4.2. That is, there are four transparency & 
disclosure (T&D) indexes as proxies of corporate governance (CG) provided by Standard & Poor’s year-to-
year studies from 2003–2007. T&D overall measures the general implementation of the CG code, T&D 
financial & operational information defines openness and availability of accounting data, employed 
standards, consistency with regulations, an explanation and description of the firm and its market position 
etc. T&D ownership demonstrates the data availability on the ownership structure. T&D board & 
shareholders shows the disclosure of the management structure. T&D is measured in percentages with a 
maximum of 100% where a higher score means better T&D within a company. 
 
Next, we considered the trend in T&D indices over the sample years, as shown in 
Figure 4.2. It follows that the energy sector’s T&D overall index increased from 40% in 
the first two years after the CG policy implementation to around 55% in 2007, which 
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moves into line with the average level for the country as a whole. Although the non-energy 
companies started at a higher level of T&D than the energy companies in 2003, by 2007 
they were at the same level as energy companies, indicating that overall transparency 
increased faster for firms in the energy sector. Similar observations are noted when we 
consider individual T&D indices: the progress was faster in the energy sector. Black, Love 
and Rachinsky (2006) made similar observations for the period 1999-2004. Figure 4.2 
summarises the change in various T&D measures and also the composite T&D measure 
over 2003-2007, which highlights a growing trend of firm-level transparency on all 
accounts in our sample. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: T&D indexes, 2003–2007 
 
       
       
 
 
 
There are four transparency & disclosure (T&D) indexes as proxies of corporate governance (CG) provided 
by Standard & Poor’s year-to-year studies from 2003–2007. T&D overall measures the general 
implementation of the CG code, T&D financial & operational information defines openness and availability 
of accounting data, employed standards, consistency with regulations, an explanation and description of the 
firm and its market position etc. T&D ownership demonstrates the data availability on the ownership 
structure. T&D board & shareholders shows the disclosure of the management structure. T&D is measured in 
percentages with a maximum of 100% where a higher score means better T&D within a company. The same 
T&D indexes, but over a shorter period of time, were examined by Black et al. (2006). 
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4.3.1. Control groups: Internationally versus domestic listed companies 
 
Although all sample firms were listed on the stock exchange, it is important for us 
to find out if some firms were listed on any international stock exchanges; the latter may 
sometimes be labelled as cross-listing, as these firms were not only listed on the Russian 
Stock Exchange, but also on some other foreign stock exchanges. This is particularly 
important for the post-2000 period, which was the period of economic recovery that 
subsequently gave rise to rapid economic growth in Russia. 
During this period, many of the largest Russian firms went into listing on foreign 
stock exchanges (often on the London Stock Exchange). While we can extract information 
from OSIRIS as to whether a firm was listed on the international stock exchange in the 
latest year of the survey, unfortunately, this information was not available for the other 
years from 2000 and 2007. 
However, given that a listing is relatively time invariant, we use this 2008 
information to assess if internationally listed Russian firms behave differently from other 
domestically listed firms (see the further discussion in Section 4.4.2) because they were 
subject to more stringent international CG codes. In other words, we consider domestically 
listed Russian firms as the treatment group, as they were primarily guided by the Russian 
CG codes introduced in 2002 that came into effect from 2004 onwards. In contrast, 
internationally listed Russian firms constitute the control groups, as they are guided by 
different international rules. 
 
4.3.2. Firm value as a Tobin’s Q measure 
Tobin’s Q is a widely used measure of firm value in the literature (e.g., Mueller & 
Reardon 1993; Blanchard et al., 1993; Denis and McConnell, 2003 and La Porta et al., 
2002). In our study, we constructed two alternative measures of Tobin’s Q: 
 firm market capitalisation divided by total assets 
 firm market capitalisation plus total debt divided by total assets14 
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show the descriptive statistics for the firm value in our 
sample. Note that the average value of Tobin’s Q varies between 0.87 and 2.27, depending 
on the particular definition of the variable and also on the sector in which they were 
operating. Researchers have suggested that the largest Russian companies find themselves 
overvalued, since the market value of a company is greater than the recorded assets (e.g., 
                                                 
14
 We also tried other profitability parameters such as return on assets and earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by total assets, but were unable to find any significant evidence with these alternative measures. 
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Tobin and Brainard, 1977). In our investigation, utility firms have the smallest value index, 
at approximately 1.00, which still points towards overvaluation. 
 
Table 4.2: Means and standard deviations of selected Tobin’s Q, 2003–2007 
Variable 
All industries 
Non-energy 
sector 
Energy sector 
Oil and gas 
producers 
Utilities 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
             
Tobin’s Q 
#1 ver. 
1.17 1.35 1.31 1.73 1.03 0.78 1.11 0.75 0.87 0.85 
Tobin’s Q 
#2 ver. 
1.61 1.32 1.87 1.66 1.36 0.79 1.44 0.75 1.15 0.87 
The firm’s value as defined through two Tobin’s Q alternative ratios and as presented over time in Figure 4.3. 
The first ratio is the company’s market capitalisation to total assets and the second proxy is defined as a 
firm’s market capitalisation including total debt to total assets ratio. The Tobin’s Q, in general, measures the 
firm’s investment to its cost of capital and was first employed by Mueller and Reardon (1993). 
 
Figure 4.3: Firm value, 2003–2007 
     
 
 
The firm’s value defined through two Tobin’s Q alternative ratios. The first ratio is the company’s market 
capitalisation to total assets and the second proxy is defined as a firm’s market capitalisation including total 
debt to total assets ratio. The Tobin’s Q, in general, measures the firm’s investment to its cost of capital and 
was first employed by Mueller and Reardon (1993). 
 
 
4.3.3. Additional firm-level measures 
In order to identify the effect of T&D on Tobin’s Q, we controlled for additional 
firm-level characteristics, which are likely to influence firm value. These control variables 
include firm age, the Herfindahl index of market concentration, company size (as the 
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natural logarithm of total assets) and leverage (the ratio of total liabilities to total assets). 
Choice of these variables is guided by the literature, for example, Franks and Mayer 
(2002), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Booth et al. (2001), de Haas and Peters (2004), Cole 
(2008) and Driffield and Pal (2010). 
We measured market concentration using the Herfindahl index, named after its 
original proponent, Herfindahl (1950). Essentially, the Herfindahl index measures how 
concentrated the industry is; how many competitors in a sector results in a lower 
concentration, while fewer competitors increases the level of concentration. As a rule of 
thumb, a Herfindahl index below 0.10 signals a low concentration or an unconcentrated 
market, while a Herfindahl index above 0.18 signals a high concentration. An index falling 
between 0.10 and 0.18 indicates that the industry is moderately concentrated
15
. Table 4.3 
shows that the average Herfindahl index is high for all the sectors considered in our 
analysis, implying a monopolistic market environment in Russia. 
 
 
Table 4.3: Means and standard deviations of selected additional variables, 2003–2007 
Variable 
All industries 
Non-energy 
sector 
Energy sector 
Oil and gas 
producers 
Utilities 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
             
Firm concentration 
Herfindalh 
index 
261 303 315 367 282 312 301 298 529 452 
            
Firm size, leverage, age 
Ln of total 
assets 
14.31 1.79 13.80 1.65 14.84 1.77 15.47 1.98 14.12 1.57 
Liabilities to 
assets 
0.45 0.23 0.53 0.22 0.37 0.21 0.36 0.19 0.33 0.19 
Firm age 17.53 26.43 16.66 24.16 18.53 28.82 4.89 4.54 27.96 43.86 
We include widely used additional explanatory variables as firm size denoted through the natural log of total 
assets, the leverage level as total liabilities to total assets ratio and firm age (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
De Haas and Peters, 2004; Cole, 2008; Driffield and Pal, 2010). 
 
 
We also included how long the firm had been in existence. In general, Table 1 
demonstrates that the average age of all the firms in our study is 20 years. The most 
recently established firms in the oil and gas production sector average 7 years old; the 
oldest companies in the utilities sector average 30 years old. The average ratio of total 
                                                 
15
 In our analysis, we have multiplied the Herfindahl index by 100 in order to standardize the variable. The 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in the ‘Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ apply a 
Herfindahl indexation up to 100
2
 or in the 10,000s.  
(http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm#N_17_). 
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liabilities to total assets is approximately 0.45. It follows that, compared to utilities, firms 
in the oil and gas subsector are not only larger on average, but are also more leveraged. 
 
 
4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1. Panel estimates of firm value, 2003–2007 
To start with, we employ a pooled panel data model using OLS. Our sample 
consists of unbalanced panel data arranged for a group of firms observed over the years 
2003–2007. Choice of the sample period is guided by the fact that the T&D indices are 
available only for 2003–2007. The measure of firm value is Tobin’s Q. In addition, we 
implement a control for other possible covariates; namely, firm size, age and the 
Herfindahl index.  
The detailed estimation procedure is described in Chapter 2. Hence, we start 
estimation with the pooled OLS. However, each observed firm may have its own 
individual characteristics, which may or may not influence the regression results. 
Therefore, we estimate with various panel data specifications such as OLS-RE, OLS-FE, 
OLS-FD, a discussion on elasticities and the GMM estimator to control for the inclusion 
for the lagged dependent among the regressors. In regards to the GMM estimator, 
following Arellano and Bond (1991), the lagged dependent variable is treated as 
endogenous, and the independent variables are treated as strictly exogenous (T&D, size, 
age, Herfindahl index and leverage measure). In this instance, the GMM estimator used the 
second lag of the endogenous variable. Additionally, we utilize only internal instruments 
and, hence, no additional external instruments are included. In each of the panel estimation 
specifications, we control for heteroscedasticity (White’s standard errors’ implementation). 
We apply post-estimation tests for the statistical validity of the findings following the 
theoretical background from Chapter 2. Our empirical analysis focuses on the size, sign 
and significance of the estimated coefficients and the elasticity. That is, the general 
equation of the firm value of the i-th firm in year t is given by: 
 
Qit = γ1Qit-1 + β1T&Dit + β2Sizeit + β3Ageit + β4Herfindahlit + β5Leverageit + αi + uit 
 Eq. (4.1) 
 
 
 
  
105 
 
where 
Qit = Tobin’s Q of the i-th firm in the t-th year, 
t = 2003–2007, 
γ and β = coefficients of the variables, 
αi = firm-specific unobserved factor, 
uit= firm (i) and year (t) specific error term. 
 
At first, to test that T&D indexes influence firm value, we start with Eq. (3.1) by 
including the overall index (Tables 4.4 and 4.6). In order to test specific T&D proxies, we 
estimate various T&Ds and demonstrate the effect of T&D financial and operational 
information, as the results for two additional T&D measures are insignificant (Tables 4.7 
and 4.8). In doing so, we present results for all industries, for both the energy and non-
energy sector, as well as for two major subsectors: utilities and oil and gas producers. This 
industry and sectoral segmentation allows us to see if the potential of T&D specification 
may impact differently on the company valuation among the companies.  
Further, there is a fair possibility that in addition to T&D, there is a set of control 
variables that could result in diverse patterns in the relationship between T&D and Tobin’s 
Q. For this reason, we introduce control measures, which are commonly used in relation to 
firm valuation, as described in Section 4.2. In addition, the control for the previous period 
of T&D activity has been implemented by inclusion of the lagged dependent among the 
regressors yielding the GMM estimator. 
 
4.4.2. Panel estimates of firm value: CG and stock-market allocations 
Although we do not have access to any T&D indices for the period before 2003, 
(T&D information is available only for 2003–2007), we generate a binary variable 
indicating the introduction of CG rules in the country. Recalling that Russia introduced the 
CG mechanism in 2002, the first reporting year under these new rules was 2003, for which 
the financial reports did not become available until 2004. Accordingly, we constructed a 
dummy variable CG2004 that takes a value of 1 for the year 2004 and beyond and zero for 
the years before 2004. The rationale for doing this is to exploit the exogenous introduction 
of CG reform as an instrument for T&D rules in our sample. Impact assessment also 
necessitated the identification of a control group of firms who were not necessarily 
affected by the introduction of the CG codes in 2004. As a result, we are also able to 
consider the larger sample of 2000–2008 in this case. Given that many Russian firms 
became internationally listed post-2000, a period of rapid economic recovery and 
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subsequent growth in Russia, we treat these firms as our control (untreated by the CG 
codes) group. Accordingly, we create a second binary variable LI that takes a value of 1 if 
a sample firm was listed during 2000–2008 and 0 otherwise. Internationally listed Russian 
firms were subject to more stringent CG rules and, as such, we can exploit this variation 
across domestically and internationally listed firms to identify the differential effect of CG 
reform, if any, on internationally listed firms (this is captured by the inclusion of the 
interaction between CG2004 and LI). Accordingly, we specify a model determining 
Tobin’s Q of the i-th firm as follows: 
 
Qit = γ1Qit-1 + β1CG2004 + β2LI + β3(CG2004*LI) + β4Sizeit + β5Ageit + β6Herfindahlit +           
+ β7Leverageit + αi + uit Eq. (4.2) 
 
where 
Qit = Tobin’s Q of the i-th firm in the t-th year, 
t = 2003–2007, 
γ and β = coefficients of the variables, 
αi = firm-specific unobserved factor, 
uit= firm (i) and year (t) specific error term. 
 
As before, we included other covariates, which consist of firm size, age, the 
Herfindahl index and leverage to identify the effect of overall CG mechanism 
implementation on Tobin’s Q (Table 4.9). The sector control would capture the effects of 
the unobserved sector level factors including taxes, tax enforcement and/or any shocks.  
Ceteris paribus, the estimated coefficient of the period dummy CG2004 would 
highlight the effect of the introduction of CG codes on firm value for all sample firms. 
Note, however, that the CG2004 dummy incorporates the overall effect of all CG reform 
and not just the effect of the T&D rules that we considered in Section 4.1. The estimated 
coefficient of LI (internationally listed Russian firms) would, however, highlight the effect 
of an international listing LI on Tobin’s Q in our sample. The variable of particular interest 
to us is β2LI, which is the interaction term between LI and CG2004. The estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term would allow us to identify the differential effect of the 
introduction of the CG code on internationally listed firms, if any. This is the essential 
coefficient that determines the mean impact of the introduction of the CG code in our 
sample. 
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4.5. Results 
 
This section presents and analyses the estimates. Section 4.5.1 discusses the 
estimates of Eq. (4.1) for the utilities and oil and gas subsectors within the energy sector 
and also compares the estimates for the overall energy sector firms with other non-energy 
sector firms. Section 4.5.2 presents and analyses the estimates of Eq. (4.2) for the period of 
2000–2008. Appendix 4.A provides detailed tables for the alternative Tobin’s Q definition 
and T&D indices’ estimates for the non-energy sector. 
 
4.5.1. Panel estimates of firm value, 2003–2007 
 Our results on the T&D impact on firm value suggest that the estimated coefficients 
of the particular T&D index are not only significant for the whole sector taken together, 
but also for the energy industry (utilities and the oil and gas sectors) pooled together. After 
controlling for all other factors, the significant positive effect of T&D rules appears when 
considering composite T&D and T&D financial and operational information availability. 
These findings support John and Senbet (1998), Errunza and Mazumdar (2001), Roberts 
(2004) and Yeoh (2007), who argued that recognised accounting and corporate integrity 
within companies can stimulate investment incentives and, in the end, financial markets, 
thus explaining higher firm value. If, however, we compare the estimates between the two 
major energy subsectors – utilities and oil and gas producers – the T&D effect is 
significant only for utilities. It thus appears that the estimate for the overall energy sector 
has been driven by the utilities (note that results for an alternative Tobin’s Q measure 
provide similar significant results with all industries and the energy sector as the main 
proxy, and are presented in Appendix 4.A). A possible explanation for the lack of 
significance of T&D in the oil and gas sector may arise from the conflict of interest 
between the controlling owner and the state as well as from the conflict between the central 
and state governments. As indicated earlier, this is a sector dominated by the five energy 
giants comprising approximately 56% of the total market capital of the Moscow Stock 
Exchange. Evidently, these energy firms are significantly larger than other non-energy 
sector firms, and, as such, may be subject to greater predatory behaviour of the state, thus 
giving rise to a conflict of interest between the controlling owners and the state, which may 
counteract the purpose of introducing T&D rules. Accordingly, the energy giants may have 
greater risks when under the prying eyes of state agencies, especially when the new CG 
code requires them to be transparent. This is because greater transparency may make them 
more vulnerable to higher taxes by the state agencies (the recent high profile case of 
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Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Yukos is a pointer to this argument). Thus, the conflict of 
interest between the controlling owner and the state may harm firm value in the oil and gas 
sector in various ways; it may be attributable to the high bribery costs paid by these large 
companies to shelter high revenue and/or in transferring part of the output underground to 
avoid tax intervention by the government (Triesman, 2000). 
 
Table 4.4: Estimates of Tobin’s Q: 
T&D overall for all industries and the energy sector, 2003–2007 
  Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
A. All industries (energy and non-energy) 
T&D overall 1.273 1.273* 1.323* 2.247** 0.7480* 
(1.001) (0.719) (0.792) (0.876) (0.499) 
Herfindalh index -0.0143** -0.0143* 0.0202 0.0159 0.0302*** 
(0.00638) (0.00861) (0.0145) (0.0118) (0.00992) 
Total assets -0.358** -0.358*** -0.674** 0.0251 -0.105** 
(0.152) (0.124) (0.274) (0.331) (0.0493) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.773 -0.773 -0.612 -0.212 -1.026** 
(0.602) (0.667) (0.809) (1.015) (0.423) 
Firm age -0.00201 -0.00201 0.265***   0.00110 
(0.00498) (0.00804) (0.0967)   (0.00240) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.302*** 
    (0.0858) 
Constant 7.494*** 7.494*** 3.529 0.0732 0.219 
(2.366) (2.020) (3.802) (0.118) (1.211) 
       Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0199 0.0147 0.0210 0.0755 0.0000 
Hausman test   0.0268   
Weak instruments      0.0001 
B. Energy industry 
      
T&D overall 1.311 1.311* 1.328* 2.257** 0.5710* 
(1.005) (0.720) (0.795) (0.879) (0.503) 
Herfindalh index -0.00984* -0.00984 0.0127 0.00951 0.0201*** 
(0.00503) (0.00656) (0.00999) (0.00793) (0.00769) 
Total assets -0.350** -0.350*** -0.668** 0.0334 -0.111** 
(0.152) (0.124) (0.275) (0.332) (0.0496) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.757 -0.757 -0.612 -0.221 -1.056** 
(0.600) (0.668) (0.811) (1.018) (0.426) 
Firm age -0.00185 -0.00185 0.242***   0.00104 
(0.00496) (0.00806) (0.0887)   (0.00242) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.288*** 
    (0.0864) 
Constant 7.215*** 7.215*** 4.259 0.0485 0.703 
(2.345) (1.990) (3.615) (0.112) (1.188) 
 
 
     
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0419 0.0185 0.0240 0.0898 0.0000 
Hausman test   0.0227   
Weak instruments       0.0030 
Note: White’s standard errors were applied to control for heteroscedasticity 
 
This table demonstrates the main target we would like to assess, which is the implication of T&D overall 
implementation for firm value, with control for explanatory measures. The regression results are based on 
various panel data specifications, which are presented in detail, and with an alternative Tobin’s Q proxy in 
Appendix 4.A. The theoretical methodology was discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent variable is 
defined as ‘firm market capitalisation divided by total assets’. Dependent variable and explanatory measures 
definitions are presented in related sections. The joint test, years test and weak tests are presented as 
‘Prob>F’. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients, denoting the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01). 
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While the positive T&D effect for all firms in our sample tends to be in line with 
the existing literature concerning Russian corporations (see e.g., Black, 2001; Goetzmann, 
Spiegel and Ukhov, 2004; Black, Love and Rachinsky, 2006), we believe that the 
identification of the potential negative effect of the introduction of T&D rules, which may 
render the total effect to be insignificant, as in the case of the Russian oil and gas sector, is 
a novel contribution of our analysis and we attribute this to the predatory behaviour of the 
state. 
Among other results, our research shows that a firm’s size (measured by total 
assets) and leverage (calculated as the ratio of liabilities to assets) both tend to lower firm 
value, irrespective of the Tobin’s Q measure chosen. In contrast, firm value is significantly 
better for older firms. There is also a significant negative relationship between the 
Herfindahl index of market concentration and firm value for firms in the oil and gas 
production sector and for all non-energy industries. The negative effect in non-energy 
firms is almost three times as large compared to the oil and gas companies. 
Furthermore, the results on the elasticity define the percentage change in the firm 
value for a 1% change in the explanatory variables. The advantage of elasticity over the 
coefficient estimates (i.e. in Table 4.4) is that it measures the proportionate terms between 
the two measures (Wang and Jain, 2003). Following Table 4.5, the market concentration 
(Herfindalh index) and the company size are considered to be elastic in terms of a firm’s 
value (i.e. the size of the elasticity is greater than 1). That means that the market 
concentration and the firm size tend not to be the most important measures when assessing 
company value, although they remain statistically significant. On the other hand, the T&D 
index, company liabilities, firm age and previous year firm value are inelastic (less than 1), 
meaning that these things are more important to the Tobin’s Q calculation. 
Following the theoretical background description in Chapter 2, the panel data 
estimation, including control for heteroscedasticity and the reported post-estimation tests, 
suggests that the given results are valid. The reported statistics for the joined significance 
of the included explanatory variables suggest that these are jointly significant and, hence, 
should be included. The years test indicates that the year’s coefficients are jointly equal to 
zero and thus controlling for the specific time occurrences is important. Further, the 
Hausman test indicates that fixed effects should be preferred in the OLS specification, 
allowing for the control of the correlation between the individual and/or time effects and 
the independent variables. In regards to the dynamic panel specification (GMM), the weak 
instruments control for a potential of selecting the "weak" instruments that are poor 
predictors of the endogenous predictor in the first-stage equation. We do not include 
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additional external instruments and, therefore, the Sargan test is not reported. We may 
experiment with the external instruments, but because of too many alternatives, the future 
analysis is aimed to focus on this particular issue. 
Note, however, that the introduction of T&D rules is only one aspect of overall CG 
reform in Russia and, hence, we next consider the effect of the overall CG reform on firm 
value in Russia. In doing so, we also consider the larger sample of listed firms available 
from OSIRIS in Section 4.2. In a sense, this additional exercise would allow us to test the 
robustness of our results pertaining to the introduction of T&D rules. 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Estimates of Tobin’s Q: As elasticity  
T&D overall for all industries and the energy sector, 2003–2007 
  Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
A. All industries (energy and non-energy) 
T&D overall 0.57 0.57 0.59 1.00 0.33 
Herfindalh index -3.19 -3.19 4.51 3.55 6.74 
Total assets -4.38 -4.38 -8.24 0.307 -1.28 
Liabilities to total 
assets 
-0.30 -0.30 -0.24 -0.082 -0.39 
Firm age -0.03 -0.03 3.97  0.02 
Lag of dependent 
Tobin’s Q 
    0.30 
B. Energy industry 
T&D overall 0.64 0.64 0.64 1.10 0.28 
Herfindalh index -2.69 -2.69 3.48 2.60 5.50 
Total assets -5.04 -5.04 -9.62 0.481 -1.60 
Liabilities to total 
assets 
-0.27 -0.27 -0.22 -0.079 -0.38 
Firm age -0.03 -0.03 4.35  0.02 
Lag of dependent 
Tobin’s Q 
    0.29 
 
This table continues on from Table 4.4 by presenting the elasticity for the energy sector and two subsectors. 
The elasticity defines the percentage change in the dependent variable for a one per cent change in the 
explanatory variable. The mathematical presentation is ‘Elasticity = Estimated explanatory coefficient * 
(Mean explanatory measure/Mean dependent measure)’. Chapter 2 provides a detailed explanation on 
elasticity. For instance, in the GMM application for all industries, the ‘T&D overall’ elasticity of 0.33 means 
that, on average, for a 1% increase in the T&D index, the firm value would increase by 0.33%. (Elasticity = 
0.7480*(0.52/1.17) = 0.33, where the explanatory coefficient is from Table 4.4, and the mean measures are 
from Tables 4.1 and Table 4.2.) 
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Table 4.6: Estimates of Tobin’s Q: 
T&D overall for utilities and oil and gas producers, 2003–2007 
 
  Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
A. Utilities 
T&D overall 1.126 1.126 1.274 2.426*** 0.7733* 
(0.978) (0.714) (0.788) (0.856) (0.480) 
Herfindalh index -0.00152*** -0.00152** 0.00266 0.00262* 0.00283*** 
(0.000478) (0.000655) (0.00180) (0.00153) (0.000704) 
Total assets -0.387** -0.387*** -0.683** 0.0574 -0.0855* 
(0.152) (0.124) (0.274) (0.331) (0.0480) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.824 -0.824 -0.674 -0.272 -0.879** 
(0.616) (0.659) (0.804) (1.026) (0.411) 
Firm age -0.00263 -0.00263 0.362**   0.00121 
(0.00509) (0.00796) (0.148)   (0.00233) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.360*** 
    (0.0832) 
Constant 7.817*** 7.817*** 1.608 0.174 0.401 
(2.326) (1.908) (4.558) (0.168) (0.990) 
 
 
     
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0014 0.0045 0.0190 0.0183 0.0001 
Hausman test   0.0161   
Weak instruments       0.0000 
B. Oil and gas producers 
T&D overall 0.708 0.708 0.771 2.025** 0.3180** 
(0.920) (0.701) (0.790) (0.865) (0.495) 
Herfindalh index -0.0125*** -0.0125*** -0.0247** -0.0201** -0.0132*** 
(0.00258) (0.00332) (0.0102) (0.00888) (0.00367) 
Total assets -0.434*** -0.434*** -0.526* 0.204 -0.0767 
(0.148) (0.123) (0.267) (0.322) (0.0500) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.943 -0.943 -0.821 -0.339 -0.768* 
(0.634) (0.638) (0.786) (1.018) (0.430) 
Firm age -0.00397 -0.00397 -0.189   0.00119 
(0.00553) (0.00791) (0.157)   (0.00240) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.380*** 
    (0.0864) 
Constant 9.640*** 9.640*** 16.46*** -0.269* -0.00245 
(2.319) (1.952) (5.122) (0.146) (1.132) 
       
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0000 0.0001 0.0043 0.0042 0.0000 
Hausman test   0.0077   
Weak instruments      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is a continuation of Table 4.4 but demonstrates the implication of T&D overall implementation for 
firm value, controlling for explanatory measures for the two main subsectors: utilities and oil and gas 
producers. The regression results based on various panel data specifications, which are presented in detail in 
the theoretical methodology discussed in Chapter 2. The main dependent is defined as ‘firm market 
capitalisation divided by total assets’. Dependent and explanatory definitions are presented in related 
sections. The joint test, years test and weak tests are presented as ‘Prob>F’. Legends (*) to the right of the 
coefficients and denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 4.7: Estimates of Tobin’s Q: 
T&D financial and operational information 
for all industries and the energy industry, 2003–2007 
 
  Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
A. All industries 
T&D fin. & oper. 1.233 1.233** 1.176** 1.593** 0.0580 
(0.809) (0.541) (0.575) (0.660) (0.441) 
Herfindalh index -0.0149*** -0.0149* 0.0184 0.0132 0.0300*** 
(0.00578) (0.00832) (0.0143) (0.0118) (0.00989) 
Total assets -0.359** -0.359*** -0.670** -0.0114 -0.3100** 
(0.152) (0.123) (0.270) (0.336) (0.0497) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.820 -0.820 -0.735 -0.488 -0.989** 
(0.601) (0.662) (0.799) (1.025) (0.406) 
Firm age -0.00222 -0.00222 0.260***   0.00108 
(0.00496) (0.00802) (0.0960)   (0.00241) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.310*** 
    (0.0857) 
Constant 7.568*** 7.568*** 3.820 0.0824 0.180 
(2.450) (2.002) (3.779) (0.119) (1.205) 
 
 
     
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      
Joint test  0.0204 0.0060 0.0120 0.1030 0.0300 
Hausman test   0.0364   
Weak instruments      0.0002 
B. Energy industry 
T&D fin. & oper. 1.251 1.251** 1.189** 1.612** 0.0446 
(0.811) (0.542) (0.576) (0.661) (0.444) 
Herfindalh index -0.0103** -0.0103 0.0116 0.00781 0.0200** 
(0.00456) (0.00635) (0.00984) (0.00793) (0.00767) 
Total assets -0.350** -0.350*** -0.666** -0.00608 -0.108** 
(0.152) (0.123) (0.270) (0.337) (0.0499) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.804 -0.804 -0.734 -0.499 -1.024** 
(0.599) (0.664) (0.801) (1.026) (0.408) 
Firm age -0.00206 -0.00206 0.239***   0.00101 
(0.00494) (0.00804) (0.0879)   (0.00242) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.296*** 
    (0.0863) 
Constant 7.281*** 7.281*** 4.477 0.0616 0.663 
(2.425) (1.974) (3.587) (0.112) (1.183) 
 
 
     
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0434 0.0079 0.0134 0.1160 0.0000 
Hausman test   0.0274   
Weak instruments       0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is a continuation of Table 4.4 but demonstrates the implication of T&D financial and operational 
information implementation for firm value. The regression results are based on various panel data 
specifications which are presented in detail in the theoretical methodology discussed in Chapter 2. The main 
dependent is defined as ‘firm market capitalisation divided by total assets’. The dependent and explanatory 
definitions are presented in the relevant sections. The joint test, years test and weak tests are presented as 
‘Prob>F’. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients and denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; 
*** p<0.01). 
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Table 4.8: Estimates of Tobin’s Q: 
T&D financial and operational information 
for utilities and oil and gas producers, 2003–2007 
 
  Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
Difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
A. Utilities 
T&D fin. & oper. 1.157 1.157** 1.126* 1.621** 0.0507 
(0.798) (0.536) (0.575) (0.653) (0.425) 
Herfindalh index -0.00154*** -0.00154** 0.00235 0.00217 0.00283*** 
(0.000440) (0.000632) (0.00178) (0.00157) (0.000703) 
Total assets -0.391** -0.391*** -0.676** 0.00692 -0.0832* 
(0.152) (0.123) (0.270) (0.336) (0.0484) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.868 -0.868 -0.788 -0.535 -0.842** 
(0.614) (0.654) (0.795) (1.032) (0.395) 
Firm age -0.00284 -0.00284 0.342**   0.00119 
(0.00505) (0.00793) (0.148)   (0.00233) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.367*** 
    (0.0834) 
Constant 7.865*** 7.865*** 2.199 0.171 0.354 
(2.400) (1.893) (4.550) (0.169) (0.986) 
 
 
     
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0013 0.0017 0.0116 0.0445 0.0000 
Hausman test   0.0443   
Weak instruments     0.0000 
B. Oil and gas producers 
T&D fin. & oper. 0.835 0.835 0.820 1.333** 0.8065** 
(0.782) (0.531) (0.581) (0.670) (0.438) 
Herfindalh index -0.0121*** -0.0121*** -0.0233** -0.0194** 0.0133*** 
(0.00245) (0.00324) (0.0102) (0.00922) (0.00367) 
Total assets -0.437*** -0.437*** -0.540** 0.150 -0.0766 
(0.146) (0.122) (0.264) (0.329) (0.0503) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.967 -0.967 -0.884 -0.540 -0.756* 
(0.627) (0.635) (0.778) (1.022) (0.414) 
Firm age -0.00405 -0.00405 -0.169   0.00118 
(0.00550) (0.00789) (0.157)   (0.00241) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.382*** 
    (0.0867) 
Constant 9.556*** 9.556*** 16.00*** -0.234 -0.0584 
(2.348) (1.941) (5.109) (0.148) (1.126) 
       
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.0092 0.0001 
Hausman test   0.0077   
Weak instruments      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is a continuation of Table 4.4 but demonstrates the implication of T&D financial and operational 
information implementation for firm value, controlling for the explanatory measures for the two main 
subsectors: utilities and oil and gas producers. The regression results are based on various panel data 
specifications, which are presented in detail within the theoretical methodology section discussed in Chapter 
2. The main dependent is defined as ‘firm market capitalisation divided by total assets’. The dependent and 
explanatory definitions are presented in related sections. The joint test, years test and weak tests are presented 
as ‘Prob>F’. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients and denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
 
  
  
114 
 
4.5.2. CG reform and stock-market allocations, 2000–2008 
 In this section, we assess the effect of overall CG reform on selected indices of firm 
value in Russia. Since information on whether a firm is listed on an international stock 
exchange is generally time-invariant, we are assuming that the 2008 information on 
whether a Russian firm is listed on an international stock exchange is also pertinent for all 
the years between 2000 and 2008. Accordingly, we shall, in this subsection, consider the 
estimates of Eq. (4.2) for the same Russian listed firms as in Section 4.1, but for the longer 
period of 2000–2008. The various specifications of the panel data estimates of Tobin’s Q 
are summarised in Table 4.9. 
First, an introduction of CG codes is associated with significantly higher values of 
Tobin’s Q (irrespective of the definition). In contrast, internationally listed companies tend 
to have a significantly higher Tobin’s Q. There is thus evidence from our analysis that, 
ceteris paribus, internationally (relative to domestically) listed Russian firms tend to have 
significantly higher firm value in our sample. However, the interaction term measuring the 
mean impact of the CG reform turns out to be statistically insignificant; in other words, 
there is no evidence from our sample that internationally listed Russian firms enjoyed 
higher firm value in the post-CG reform period in our sample, after holding other factors 
constant. 
To summarise, these estimates again confirm the limited effectiveness of the 
introduction of CG codes in Russia, even when we pool all sectors together. Given that 
there is evidence of an increase in T&D indices in our sample (see the discussion in 
Section 4.1), we argue that the introduction of the CG reform in 2004 has not been 
associated with a statistically significant increase in firm value; the latter can be attributed 
to the conflict of interest between the controlling owner and the state, which intervenes in 
private businesses through excessive taxes. It can also be attributed to the conflict of 
interest between the central and local governments in a decentralised set up, which may not 
only impose a high bribery cost for helping private businesses to evade central taxes, but 
may also drive parts of some private businesses underground in a desperate attempt to 
avoid paying taxes. 
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Table 4.9: Estimates of Tobin’s Q: 
CG dummy and stock-market allocations for all industries and the energy industry, 
2000–2008 
 
  Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
A. All industries 
CG dummy 0.104 0.104 0.928*** 1.127*** 1.459*** 
(0.149) (0.184) (0.260) (0.269) (0.396) 
Listed internationally dummy 0.571 0.571*   0.423* 
(0.488) (0.593)   (0.463) 
CG*Listed internationally dummy -0.721* -0.721 -0.494 -0.591 -0.558 
(0.401) (0.509) (0.502) (0.690) (0.527) 
Herfindalh index -0.0489*** -0.0489*** -0.0425*** -0.0459*** 0.0690*** 
(0.00826) (0.00914) (0.00895) (0.00832) (0.0169) 
Total assets -0.358*** -0.358*** -0.644** 0.113 -0.133** 
(0.0859) (0.0778) (0.271) (0.353) (0.0553) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.887* -0.887 0.597 0.453 -0.843* 
(0.518) (0.550) (0.853) (0.943) (0.457) 
Firm age -0.00281 -0.00281 -0.240***   -0.000892 
(0.00286) (0.00445) (0.0852)   (0.00261) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.301*** 
    (0.0904) 
Constant 10.40*** 10.40*** 18.06*** -0.466*** -3.468* 
(1.545) (1.338) (2.860) (0.122) (1.900) 
 
 
     
Observations 220 220 220 166 175 
Number of companies 54 54 54 52 53 
      Joint test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 
Hausman test   0.0005   
Weak instrument      0.0010 
B. Energy industry 
CG dummy 0.194 0.194 1.053*** 1.224*** 1.288*** 
(0.148) (0.186) (0.260) (0.280) (0.382) 
Listed internationally dummy 0.293 0.293 0.293* dropped  0.0848 
(0.588) (0.599) (0.578)   (0.452) 
CG*Listed internationally dummy -0.455 -0.455 -0.259 -0.573 0.0660 
(0.483) (0.513) (0.503) (0.707) (0.518) 
Herfindalh index -0.0326*** -0.0326*** -0.0297*** -0.0334*** 0.0481*** 
(0.00672) (0.00759) (0.00736) (0.00692) (0.0133) 
Total assets -0.364*** -0.364*** -0.668** 0.101 -0.138** 
(0.0866) (0.0790) (0.276) (0.361) (0.0559) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.867 -0.867 0.701 0.516 -0.910* 
(0.528) (0.561) (0.868) (0.963) (0.462) 
Firm age -0.00314 -0.00314 -0.258*** dropped  -0.000308 
(0.00305) (0.00451) (0.0870)   (0.00264) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.270*** 
    (0.0910) 
Constant -5.869*** 9.775*** 18.20*** -0.489*** -2.522 
(1.168) (1.375) (2.919) (0.125) (1.850) 
       
Observations 220 220 220 220 175 
Number of companies 54 54 54 54 53 
      Joint test  0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 
Hausman test   0.0001   
Weak instruments     0.030 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table demonstrates the further objective we would like to assess, which is the implication of CG 
mechanism implementation on firm value, controlling for explanatory measures and, additionally, controlling 
for stock-market allocation. The regression results are based on various panel data specifications, which are 
presented in detail within the theoretical methodology section, as discussed in Chapter 2. The main 
dependent variable is defined as ‘firm market capitalisation divided by total assets’. The dependent variable 
and explanatory measures definitions are presented in the relevant sections. The joint test, years test and 
weak tests are presented as ‘Prob>F’. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the significance 
levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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4.6. Concluding comments 
 
Using recent firm-level panel data from Russia, this chapter investigates whether an 
introduction of CG codes would necessarily boost firm value. We argue that an 
understanding of CG in Russia requires an identification of the conflict of interests, not 
only between the controlling and minority owners, but also between the controlling owners 
and the centralized state as well as that between the central and local governments in a 
decentralised set-up. The state may not only act as the stakeholder of a company, but also 
has the tax-setting power. While the introduction of CG codes may increase firm value by 
resolving the conflict of interest between the controlling and minority owners in Russia’s 
highly concentrated ownership structure, introduction of tax reforms, stringent tax 
enforcement and decentralisation may counteract the CG reforms. Consequently, the net 
effect of the introduction of CG codes may be positive, negative or have no effect at all, 
when the positive and negative effects exactly outweigh each other. 
Unlike many existing studies, our analysis has been facilitated by the recent 
availability of S&P data on T&D for the top-listed firms in Russia for the period of 2003–
2007. We were able not only to consider Russian energy firms, but also to compare the 
specific cases of Russia’s non-energy sector companies. Even within the energy sector, we 
have been able to compare the cases of the utilities and oil and gas subsectors for their 
obvious contributions (significance) to the Russian economy. There is evidence from our 
panel data estimates that the various T&D rules have met with only limited success in 
terms of boosting firm value, especially for the all-important oil and gas sector. This is 
because CG reforms initiated a conflict of interest between the large energy giants and the 
centralized state, while the tax reforms and decentralisation generate the conflict of interest 
between the central and local governments. The impact of the introduction of the CG code 
is even weaker when we examine the impact of the introduction of CG codes (which 
include broader measures over and above T&D rules) in 2002 (which became effective 
from 2004 onwards) on various indices of firm value, after exploiting the variation in the 
impact of the code between domestic and internationally listed Russian firms in our sample 
for 2000–2008: while the CG dummy remains insignificant in determining firm value, 
ceteris paribus, internationally listed Russian firms tend to have significantly higher 
market value. There is, however, no significant differential positive effect of CG reform on 
firm value among internationally listed firms; consequently, the average impact effect turns 
out to be insignificant. We argue that these results support our central hypothesis and also 
complement Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007), who argued that stringent tax enforcement 
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can increase the amount outside shareholders will receive, even when accounting for 
increased levels of taxation. We argue that higher taxes, stringent tax enforcement and 
fiscal decentralisation may generate a conflict of interest between the controlling owner 
and the state and also between the central and local governments, which may counteract 
the effectiveness of other CG reforms. Although this is a case study of Russia, the results 
from this study have wider implications beyond the country, especially in other central and 
eastern European countries as well as the countries from the community of independent 
states (CIS), where state control over private businesses often remains firm even after 
radical privatisation programmes. This conflict of interest between Russian corporate 
oligarchs and the state has induced many Russian oligarchs to invest abroad. The latter, in 
turn, have gradually been paving the way for increasing inward foreign investment in 
Russia, as highlighted by the recent BP deal in the oil and gas sector of the country. It 
would be interesting to see whether and how inward foreign multinational investment can 
resolve the conflict of interest between the state and the controlling private owners, thus 
contributing to sustained improvement in firm value in Russia.  
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Appendix 4.A: Detailed regression estimates for various controls 
 
Table 4.A.1: Estimates of Tobin’s Q (alternative proxy): 
T&D overall for all industries and the energy sector, 2003–2007 
  Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
A. All industries (energy and non-energy) 
T&D overall 1.409 1.409** 1.366* 2.295*** 0.274 
(0.998) (0.714) (0.785) (0.866) (0.496) 
Herfindalh index -0.0140** -0.0140 0.0204 0.0156 0.0278*** 
(0.00615) (0.00855) (0.0144) (0.0116) (0.00968) 
Total assets -0.316** -0.316** -0.556** 0.112 -0.135*** 
(0.157) (0.127) (0.272) (0.327) (0.0499) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.446 -0.446 -0.563 -0.498 -0.532 
(0.584) (0.664) (0.801) (1.004) (0.405) 
Firm age -0.00161 -0.00161 0.260***   0.000849 
(0.00530) (0.00808) (0.0958)   (0.00238) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.269*** 
    (0.0840) 
Constant 7.090*** 7.090*** 2.270 0.0743 0.913 
(2.395) (2.059) (3.764) (0.117) (1.204) 
       Observations 136 136 136 83 137 
Number of companies 51 51 51 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0148 0.0318 0.0213 0.0000 0.0010 
Hausman test   0.0229   
Weak instruments      0.0000 
B. Energy industry 
      
T&D overall 1.448 1.448** 1.371* 2.303*** 0.256 
(1.000) (0.715) (0.788) (0.869) (0.500) 
Herfindalh index -0.00956** -0.00956 0.0127 0.00920 0.0188** 
(0.00486) (0.00652) (0.00989) (0.00784) (0.00751) 
Total assets -0.308** -0.308** -0.550** 0.120 -0.141*** 
(0.156) (0.127) (0.272) (0.328) (0.0502) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.429 -0.429 -0.562 -0.509 -0.549 
(0.582) (0.665) (0.804) (1.007) (0.407) 
Firm age -0.00145 -0.00145 0.237***   0.000797 
(0.00527) (0.00809) (0.0879)   (0.00239) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.253*** 
    (0.0846) 
Constant 6.800*** 6.800*** 3.009 0.0493 1.348 
(2.378) (2.028) (3.578) (0.111) (1.181) 
 
 
     
Observations 136 136 136 83 137 
Number of companies 51 51 51 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0373 0.0400 0.0244 0.0450 0.0020 
Hausman test   0.0199   
Weak instruments       0.0120 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table demonstrates the main objective as per Table 4.4 but with an alternative Tobin’s Q measure; that 
is, the implication of T&D overall implementation for firm value, controlling for explanatory measures and, 
additionally, controlling for stock-market allocation. The regression results are based on various panel data 
specifications, which are presented in detail within the theoretical methodology section, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The alternative dependent is defined as ‘firm market capitalisation including debt divided by total 
assets’. The dependent and explanatory definitions are presented in the relevant sections. The joint test, years 
test and weak tests are presented as ‘Prob>F’. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the 
significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01). 
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Table 4.A.2: Estimates of Tobin’s Q: 
T&D overall for non-energy industries, 2003–2007 
 
  Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 
      
A. T&D overall 
T&D overall 0.821 0.821 1.086 2.059** 0.5470* 
(0.897) (0.690) (0.771) (0.861) (0.370) 
Herfindalh index -0.0408*** -0.0408*** -0.0752** -0.0533** 0.0456*** 
(0.00818) (0.0107) (0.0306) (0.0253) (0.00912) 
Total assets -0.441*** -0.441*** -0.586** 0.100 -0.6680* 
(0.148) (0.123) (0.265) (0.325) (0.0376) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.863 -0.863 -0.556 -0.119 -0.672** 
(0.640) (0.635) (0.788) (1.001) (0.324) 
Firm age -0.00388 -0.00388 -0.162   0.00114 
(0.00538) (0.00786) (0.145)   (0.00180) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.421*** 
    (0.0653) 
Constant 9.982*** 9.982*** 16.86*** -0.217 -0.701 
(2.391) (1.991) (5.217) (0.136) (0.907) 
 
 
     
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0234 0.0100 
Hausman test   0.0068   
Weak instruments      0.0030 
B. T&D financial & operational information 
T&D fin. & oper. 0.917 0.917* 1.022* 1.439** -0.0130 
(0.769) (0.523) (0.564) (0.656) (0.326) 
Herfindalh index -0.0400*** -0.0400*** -0.0724** -0.0491* 0.0458*** 
(0.00803) (0.0105) (0.0305) (0.0256) (0.00908) 
Total assets -0.444*** -0.444*** -0.591** 0.0615 -0.0659* 
(0.147) (0.121) (0.261) (0.331) (0.0378) 
Liabilities to total assets -0.893 -0.893 -0.656 -0.366 -0.669** 
(0.634) (0.631) (0.780) (1.012) (0.311) 
Firm age -0.00400 -0.00400 -0.148   0.00114 
(0.00534) (0.00785) (0.144)   (0.00180) 
Lag of dependent Tobin’s Q     0.422*** 
    (0.0655) 
Constant 9.927*** 9.927*** 16.53*** -0.178 -0.733 
(2.428) (1.979) (5.168) (0.137) (0.900) 
 
 
     
Observations 137 137 137 83 138 
Number of companies 52 52 52 36 52 
      Joint test  0.0000 0.0000 0.0024 0.0352 0.0000 
Hausman test   0.0071   
Weak instruments      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
This table is a continuation of Tables 4.4 and 4.6 but demonstrates the implication of T&D overall and 
financial and operational information implementation for firm value, controlling for explanatory measures for 
the non-energy sectors. The regression results are based on various panel data specifications, which are 
presented in detail within the theoretical methodology section, as discussed in Chapter 2. The main 
dependent is defined as ‘firm market capitalisation divided by total assets’. The dependent and explanatory 
definitions are presented in the relevant sections. The joint test, years test and weak tests are presented as 
‘Prob>F’. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients denote the significance levels (* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01). 
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Appendix 4.B: Construction of T&D indices from 2003–2007 by S&P 
 
The T&D survey was conducted by the S&P. S&P uses only publicly available 
information, thus emphasising that a company’s transparency score should not be 
compared with its CG score (CGS), or otherwise interpreted as a measure of governance 
standards. A CGS is our assessment of a company’s CG practices, which is not limited to 
information disclosure. In addition, these scores are assigned on the basis of an in-depth, 
interactive analytical process involving both public and non-public data.  
 
Number of companies included 
The latest 2007 study covers 80 of the largest public Russian companies with the 
most liquid stock. In 2006, S&P analysed 70 companies. In 2005, 2004 and 2003, the 
survey covered 54, 50 and 45 companies, respectively. 
 
Criteria to select companies 
S&P used two criteria to select the companies in the study: size and liquidity. As a 
rule, the liquidity of stocks positively depends on the size of the company, but there are 
exceptions, especially in cases of a minor free-float. There are more than 300 public 
companies in Russia, and this sample may not be representative of all Russian public 
companies. As the larger companies tend to be more transparent than smaller ones, our 
sampling method is likely to cause an upward bias in assessing transparency of the entire 
population of public Russian companies. On the other hand, as the companies included in 
the survey account for about 80% of the cumulative capitalisation of the Russian Stock 
Market, they represent the major part of the Russian economy in terms of assets and 
operations. 
 
S&P’s covered industries 
S&P covers such industries as telecommunications, metallurgy, utilities, oil and 
gas, banking, food, consumer and retail markets and IT engineering. In our analysis, we 
classify these industries between energy and non-energy sectors and compare those with all 
industries together. We apply GICS codes to classify firms in our sample. As we focus on 
the energy industry, GICS allowed us to identify nine main energy subsectors within the 
energy industry. We have selected utilities and oil and gas producers as the two largest 
ones, consisting of 64% of the entire energy sector. We provide companies sectoral 
breakdown in Appendix 4.C. 
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Components of T&D indices and scoring 
S&P have introduced six components and grouped these into three T&D scores. 
Subject to these clarifications, these are: 
 T&D ownership structure and shareholders rights 
 T&D financial and operational information 
 T&D board and management structure 
The first T&D score consists of “ownership structure” and “shareholder rights”, which 
are represented by 17 questions each. The next T&D score is a composition of “financial 
information” and “operational information” disclosure. These are based on 31and 16 
questions, respectively. The last T&D score consists of “board and management 
information” and “board and management remuneration”, based on 16 and 8 questions. 
S&P then calculated the scores for each answer in every section and provided the total 
scores for each T&D for the observed companies. The score has a range of 0% to a 
maximum of 100% for the best T&D. S&P does not explain the methodology behind the 
percentage score as it uses a specially designed method. We show the T&D scorings for 
each observed company in Appendix 2. 
 
Component 1. Ownership structure 
 
Disclosure of: 
1. The number and par value of issued ordinary shares. 
2. The number and par value of issued other types of shares disclosed. 
3. The number and par value of authorised but unissued shares of all types. 
4. The identity of the largest shareholder. 
5. The identity of holders of all large stakes (blocking: > 25%; controlling: > 50%). 
6. The identity of shareholders holding at least 25% of voting shares in total. 
7. The identity of shareholders holding at least 50% of voting shares in total. 
8. The identity of shareholders holding at least 75% of voting shares in total. 
9. The number and identity of each shareholder holding more than 10%. 
10. The indication that management is not aware of the existence of any stake exceeding 
5% except for those that are reported. 
11. Shareholding in the company by individual senior managers. 
12. Shareholding in the company by individual directors. 
13. The description of share classes. 
14. A review of shareholders by type. 
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15. The percentage of cross-ownership. 
16. Information about listings on exchanges. 
17. Information about indirect ownership (e.g., convertible instruments). 
 
Component 2. Shareholder rights 
 
Disclosure of: 
18. Corporate governance charter or corporate governance guidelines. 
19. Evidence of existence of a code of business conduct and ethics. 
20. The contents of the code of business conduct and ethics. 
21. Articles of association (including changes). 
22. Voting rights for each voting or nonvoting share. 
23. The way that shareholders nominate directors to the board. 
24. The way that shareholders convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM). 
25. Procedure for initiating inquiries with the board. 
26. Procedure for putting forward proposals at shareholders’ meetings. 
27. Formalized dividend policy. 
28. Announcement of recommended dividends before the record date. 
29. Review of the last shareholders’ meeting. 
30. Full general shareholder meeting (GSM) minutes. 
31. Calendar of important shareholder future dates. 
32. GSM materials published on the Web site. 
33. Detailed press releases covering last corporate events. 
34. Policy on information disclosure. 
 
Component 3. Financial information 
 
Disclosure of: 
35. The company’s accounting policy. 
36. The accounting standards it uses for its accounts. 
37. Accounts according to local standards. 
38. Annual financial statements according to an internationally recognised accounting 
standard (IFRS/U.S. GAAP). 
39. Notes to annual financial statements according to IFRS/U.S. GAAP. 
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40. Independent auditor’s report on annual financial statements according to IFRS/U.S. 
GAAP. 
41. Unqualified (clean) audit opinion on annual financial statements according to 
IFRS/U.S. GAAP. 
42. Audited IFRS/U.S. GAAP financial statements published before the end of April. 
43. Unaudited IFRS/U.S. GAAP financial statements published before the end of April. 
44. Audited IFRS/U.S. GAAP financial statements published before annual general 
meeting. 
45. Unaudited IFRS/U.S. GAAP financial statements published before the end of June. 
46. Disclosure of related-party transactions (RPTs): sales to/purchases from payables 
to/receivables from related parties. 
47. Indication that RPTs are made on market or nonmarket terms. 
48. Exact terms of RPTs. 
49. Interim (quarterly or semi-annual) financial statements according to an internationally 
recognised accounting standard (IFRS/U.S. GAAP). 
50. Notes to these financial statements. 
51. Whether these financial statements are audited or at least reviewed. 
52. Consolidated financial statements according to the local standards. 
53. Methods of asset valuation. 
54. A list of affiliates in which the company holds a minority stake. 
55. The ownership structure of affiliates. 
56. A basic earnings forecast of any kind. 
57. A detailed earnings forecast. 
58. Segment analysis (results broken down by business line). 
59. Revenue structure (detailed breakdown). 
60. Cost structure (high degree of detail). 
61. The name of the auditing firm. 
62. Whether the audit firm is a top-tier auditor. 
63. Auditor rotation policy. 
64. How much the company pays in audit fees to the auditor. 
65. Whether auditor renders non-audit services. 
66. Non-audit fees paid to the auditor. 
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Component 4. Operational information 
 
Disclosure of: 
67. Details of the type of business the company is in. 
68. Details of the products or services the company produces or provides. 
69. Output in physical terms. 
70. A description of functional relationships between key operating units within the group. 
71. Industry indicators that allow comparison with peers. 
72. Other financial indicators. 
73. Characteristics of fixed assets employed (including licenses). 
74. Efficiency indicators. 
75. A discussion of corporate strategy. 
76. Any plans for investment in the coming years. 
77. Detailed information about investment plans in the coming year. 
78. An output forecast of any kind. 
79. An overview of trends in its industry; regulatory environment with regards to industry. 
80. The market share for any or all of the company’s businesses. 
81. Social reporting (e.g., Global Reporting Initiative). 
82. Overview of compliance with environmental law. 
83. Principles of corporate citizenship. 
 
Component 5. Board and management information 
 
Disclosure of: 
84. The list of board members (names). 
85. Details about the current employment and position of directors. 
86. Other details: previous employment and positions, education etc. 
87. When each director joined the board. 
88. The name of the chairman. 
89. Details about role of the board of directors at the company. 
90. A list of matters reserved for the board. 
91. A list of board committees. 
92. Names of all members of each existing committee. 
93. The bylaws on other internal audit functions besides the audit committee. 
94. Information about the ratio of in absentia and in person board meetings. 
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95. Attendance record for board meetings. 
96. The list of senior managers not on the board of directors. 
97. The backgrounds of senior managers. 
98. The non-financial details of the CEO’s contract. 
99. The number of shares held in other affiliated companies by managers. 
100. Policy on assessment of board of directors and on training provided to them. 
 
Component 6. Board and management remuneration 
 
Disclosure of: 
101. The decision-making process for directors’ pay. 
102. The specifics of directors’ pay, including the salary levels. 
103. The form of directors’ salaries, such as whether they are in cash or shares. 
104. The specifics of performance-related pay for directors. 
105. The decision-making process for determining managerial (not board) pay. 
106. The specifics of managers’ (not board) pay, such as salary levels and bonuses. 
107. The form of managers’ (not board) pay. 
108. The specifics of performance-related pay for managers. 
  
 
 
Appendix 4.C: T&D scores by companies, 2003–2007 
 
Companies sectoral 
breakdown  
Ownership structure and 
shareholders’ rights, % 
  
Financial and operational 
information, % 
  
Board and management 
structure and process, % 
 
Overall T&D score, % 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 
                        
All sectors 
 (69 companies; energy & 
non-energy) 
Mean 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.55 
 
0.45 0.47 0.53 0.58 0.57 
 
0.41 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.50 
 
0.44 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.55 
St Dev. 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.16  0.19 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.15  0.17 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14  0.17 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.13 
                                               
1. Energy sector Mean 0.40 0.43 0.46 0.52 0.53  0.43 0.41 0.50 0.56 0.57  0.39 0.43 0.47 0.48 0.49  0.41 0.42 0.48 0.52 0.55 
(36 companies) St Dev. 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.15  0.13 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.16  0.10 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12  0.09 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.13 
                                               
Energy sector – Utilities 
(10 companies) 
Mean 0.37 0.45 0.43 0.50 0.53  0.38 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.50  0.36 0.44 0.44 0.53 0.50  0.37 0.42 0.43 0.49 0.51 
St Dev. 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.11  0.14 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.13  0.09 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.13  0.09 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.11 
                                               
1.2. Energy sector - Oil 
and gas producers 
(13 companies) 
Mean 0.41 0.43 0.47 0.50 0.49  0.47 0.40 0.50 0.58 0.58  0.40 0.43 0.52 0.43 0.45  0.43 0.41 0.50 0.52 0.54 
St Dev. 0.09 0.23 0.17 0.21 0.20  0.12 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.16  0.12 0.25 0.16 0.16 0.14  0.08 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.17 
                                               
1.3. Energy sector - 
Other 
(13 companies) 
Mean 0.43 0.41 0.47 0.55 0.58  0.47 0.44 0.56 0.64 0.62  0.44 0.42 0.44 0.48 0.53  0.45 0.43 0.50 0.57 0.59 
St Dev. 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.15 0.10  0.15 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.16  0.09 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.09  0.13 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.10 
                                               
2. Non-energy sector 
(33 companies) 
Mean 0.48 0.57 0.53 0.58 0.56  0.48 0.55 0.57 0.61 0.57  0.43 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.51  0.46 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.56 
St Dev. 0.26 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.18  0.24 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.14  0.22 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16  0.23 0.18 0.20 0.14 0.13 
 
Source: S&P Reports (various). 
 
This table provides three T&D indices and its scores between 0% for worth relating to T&D to the maximum of 100% for the best corporate performance. All the information obtained from 
S&P studies pertain to 2003 and 2007. Companies are classified using the GICS industry classification. The energy firms are represented by a sample of 36 firms, where non-energy 
industry is covered by 33 companies. We have focused on the two largest energy sectors – utilities and oil and gas producers – and organised other energy sectors in the ‘other energy’ 
section. These two largest energy sectors consist of 23 companies, where other energy sectors is represented by 13 companies. We also compare energy firms with 33 non-energy 
companies, which cover such industries as telecommunications, metallurgy, utilities, oil and gas, banking, food, consumer and retail markets and IT engineering. 
1
2
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
5. Resource abundance, resource rents, corruption and FDI: A country panel 
analysis 
 
Abstract 
This chapter examines whether and how the introduction of natural resource abundance 
and corruption determine primary FDI. It is argued that the attraction of primary FDI not 
only depends on higher economic gains received compared to other industries, but also on 
whether the environment of corruption allows for investors and governments to protect the 
returns when engaging in capital investments. Using a panel of countries for 1992–2001, 
we find that the introduction of corruption significantly reduces the attraction for natural 
resource activities and, therefore, significantly affects primary FDI inflows. However, the 
effects of natural rents and corruption remain insignificant for total FDI, even after 
controlling for other commonly used factors of FDI. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
Existing research suggests that FDI is a good instrument of economic policy, 
providing the potential for economic growth. The general argument in favour of FDI is that 
it fosters the economic development of a country. Nevertheless, the studies highlight the 
issues of allocating FDI according to the expected profitability of the investments, in 
particular, for those natural resource-rich countries where the natural resources provide 
higher economic rents compared to other industries (Dunning, 1974 and 1980; World 
Bank, 2006; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2009; Poelhekke and Van der Ploeg, 2010). 
Further, it is emphasised that corruption exists at every stage of natural resource activity, 
from pre-exploration activities and licensing agencies to complex financial arrangements, 
because corruption allows for investors to protect their returns and for governments to stay 
in power (Bloningen, 2005). From this perspective, the present chapter examines the 
complex relationship between natural resource activity, corruption and FDI inflows in the 
primary industry. 
In the context of natural resource abundance and corruption, we investigate three 
hypotheses: 
 Whether greater access to natural resources promotes primary FDI inflows. 
 Whether greater corruption increases or decreases inward FDI in the 
primary sector. 
 Whether the effect of natural resource activity on primary FDI depends on 
the extent of corruption (the interaction between natural resource activity 
and corruption). 
The examination of these hypotheses advances on existing studies, which showed 
that the extent of institutional mechanisms may or may not lead to lower or higher primary 
FDI inflows, so that the impact of both resource activity and corruption on FDI is unclear. 
Most previous studies focused on aggregate FDI levels (Smarzynska and Wei, 
2000; Bloningen, 2005) and outward resource investments (Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 
2010). Only a limited number of studies pertained to natural resource investments, and 
even fewer explored the effect of natural resource abundance on primary FDI. In our study, 
we consider the resource-seeking FDI inflows into the country. While it might be expected 
that the presence of natural resources in a country may boost resource-seeking FDI, some 
resource-rich countries are more successful than others (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Kinoshita 
and Campos, 2010). Conversely, Dunning’s ownership-location-internationalisation (OLI) 
paradigm postulates that natural resource abundance is the major factor for attracting FDI 
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to resource-rich countries because of the higher economic gains received compared to 
investments in other industries (Dunning, 1974 and 1980). 
We found some evidence that the presence of corruption significantly reduced the 
attraction of natural resource rents and, therefore, significantly impacted primary FDI 
inflows. However, the effect of natural rents and corruption remains insignificant for total 
FDI, even after controlling for other measures. The latter perhaps may be explained by the 
weak natural resource rents exposure beyond the primary sector; there are few countries 
demonstrating successful use of the rent gains in terms of distribution to other industries, 
mainly because of good governance practice being in place (Hausman and Rigobon, 2002; 
Kinoshita and Campos, 2010; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010). 
Our analysis contributes to a growing literature on natural resource abundance and 
corruption for primary FDI investments. In two pioneering studies, Dunning (1974, 1980) 
highlighted how factors such as ownership, location and internationalisation create 
preconditions for international investments, where primary FDI pertains to the resource-
seeking motives. While earlier literature tended to focus on the aggregated FDI 
(Smarzynska and Wei, 2000; Bloningen, 2005), in the recent literature, the focus has 
shifted to natural resource foreign capital investments (Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Poelhekke 
and van der Ploeg, 2010). Academic literature also suggests that although each primary 
FDI targets its specific interests, in general, access to resources, availability of cheap 
labour, high economic value from the natural rents received compared to other industries, 
legal stability and a low level of bureaucracy and corruption attract higher levels of FDI. 
For instance, Asiedu (2002) and, later, Asiedu and Lien (2011) linked resource activity 
with democracy effects. In another study, Kronenberg (2004) explored the effect of natural 
resource intensity on economic development but not on FDI. In a more recent paper, 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) focused on the relations between natural resources and 
corruption. Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010) and van der Ploeg (2011) explored the 
effect of natural resources on FDI through institutional quality, but the authors considered 
aggregated FDI, not primary FDI. The general agreement is that resource abundance and 
the resulting potential economic benefits both influence and are influenced by the 
institutional environment. We go beyond this literature in that, in the absence of prior 
evidence, we are able to identify possible ways through which the introduction of access to 
natural resources can influence FDI inflows in the primary sector. In doing so, our analysis 
highlights that corruption is especially prone to primary FDI decision making after 
controlling for other factors. We are not aware of any existing study that pertains to the 
effect of natural resources and corruption on the primary FDI inflows. 
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Our analysis focuses on a panel of 136 countries that are natural resource-rich, 
covering the period from 1992 to 2001, based on inward FDI data availability from the 
UNCTAD database. We merged FDI data compiled by UNCTAD with natural resource 
activity measures, corruption proxies and other control variables extracted from World 
Bank World Development Indicators (WBWDI) and ICRG databanks. Section 4.2 refers to 
the discussion of selected measures. We used FDI inflows to GDP ratio as a dependent 
variable in our estimations, which is a commonly applied FDI measure (Poelhekke and van 
der Ploeg, 2010; Asiedu and Lien, 2011). In regard to natural resource activity, we used the 
ratio of natural resource rents to GDP (World Bank, 2006; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 
2009) and for the corruption measure we have applied the generally accepted ICRG proxy 
for financial corruption and excessive patronage (Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010; 
Asiedu and Lien, 2011). These natural resource activity and corruption measures are the 
regression variables, and their selection is driven by the quantity of data for the countries in 
our sample in order to minimise the risk of sample selection bias and to cover a wider time 
dimension. 
To identify accurately the effect of natural resource activity and corruption in terms 
of FDI inflows, we have introduced control measures, comprising of factors that are likely 
to impact on FDI inflows including trade openness (natural log of % of GDP), GDP per 
capita (natural log), level of credits obtained from banking institutions, military power in 
the state and number of telephone lines per 100 citizens as a control for infrastructure 
(Asiedu, 2002; Alfaro et al., 2004; Caselli and Cunningham, 2009; Kinoshita and Campos, 
2010; Asiedu and Lien, 2011). In addition to performing estimations for resource-based 
FDI investments, we compared the results with the overall FDI inflows in the countries. 
We have started with OLS and included a random effect, a fixed effects option, and 
first-difference models and presented results as elasticity in accordance with the theoretical 
background in Chapter 2. In addition, we proceeded with a GMM estimator. We did this 
because the inclusion of the lagged dependent FDI measure on the right-hand-side (RHS) 
of the equation may bias the OLS estimates, as the lagged dependent is correlated with 
country specific characteristics. The GMM estimator should remove the country fixed 
effects through the differencing, and any endogeneity that might arise due to a correlation 
of country FE and explanatory variables will be removed (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 5.2 establishes hypotheses of the 
effect of natural resource activity and corruption on primary FDI inflows. Section 5.3 
describes data and Section 5.4 refers to methodology. Section 5.5 presents and analyses the 
results, and Section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2. Hypotheses 
 
Three hypotheses are developed in this section. The first hypothesis concerns 
whether greater access to natural resources may promote inward FDI in the primary sector. 
The second hypothesis examines whether greater corruption may increase or decrease 
inward FDI in the primary sector. The third hypothesis concerns determining whether the 
effect of natural resources on primary FDI depends on the extent of corruption in the 
country. 
5.2.1. H1: Greater access to natural resources may promote inward FDI in 
the primary sector 
 The eclectic paradigm of internationalisation merged various isolated theories of 
international economies into one and highlighted the importance of Dunning’s seminal 
OLI paradigm factors as preconditions for any international activities. 
Dunning (1974, 1980) particularly distinguished FDI as being of four types: 
resource-seeking, market-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic-assets-seeking FDI. In 
this regard, the first type, resource-based investments, concentrate on abundant natural 
resources and can target local, home or international markets. The main factors in making a 
resource investment are the existence of the resource, availability of cheap labour and the 
necessary physical infrastructure, which is supported with empirical studies for the 
resource-abundant countries (Hausman and Rigobon, 2002; Kinoshita and Campos, 2010). 
The second type, market-seeking FDI, focuses on existing and new local markets. The 
determining factor for market-based investments is the size of the market and its potential 
for growth (van der Ploeg, 2011). The objective of the third type, efficiency-seeking FDI, 
is to gain from close ties between countries. For instance, the European Union benefits 
from the economic area, which is governed by common legalisation, inter-connected 
transportation links and flexible movement of labour (Bevan and Estrin, 2000). The fourth 
type, strategic-asset FDI, is concerned with sustaining and advancing a company or 
government in international markets. For instance, Wang (2007) highlighted that China is a 
major economic and trade market for many countries and now pursues policies of strategic 
outward FDI to develop trade and diversify investment. 
Academic literature also suggests that although each type of FDI targets its specific 
interests, in general, access to resources, market potential, availability of the necessary 
labour force, current or developable infrastructure, legal stability and a low level of 
bureaucracy and corruption attract higher levels of FDI. We particularly focus on whether 
access to resources boosts FDI in the primary sector. 
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Dunning’s OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1974, 1980) postulates that natural resource 
abundance is the major factor for attracting FDI to resource-rich countries. Dunning’s OLI 
theory states that countries that are rich in natural resources would expect to receive more 
FDI directed to those resource sectors, compared to other sectors of their economy, 
because of the high economic value received from the extraction of the natural resources 
compared to other industries. Measuring the level of primary resource intensity is therefore 
important in examining resource-seeking FDI. A number of studies control for the intensity 
of natural resources. Among those who apply resource control in their various proxies are 
Asiedu (2002), Kronenberg (2004), the World Bank (2006), Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2009), Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010), van der Ploeg (2011) and Asiedu and Lien 
(2011). These studies pursued different motives and therefore used natural activity 
measures for different purposes. Further, the difference is that the natural resource 
measures have been dictated by the data availability for the selected country samples and 
for the time periods observed. 
For instance, Asiedu (2002) and later Asiedu and Lien (2011) linked resource 
activity with democracy effects. These authors used the existence of the proportion of total 
exports that comes from fuels, minerals and oil as a measure for resource abundance. In a 
later study, Kronenberg (2004) explored the effect of natural resource intensity on 
economic development but not on FDI, controlling for resource abundance through the 
share of primary goods in total exports. In a more recent paper, Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2009) have focused on the relations between natural resources and corruption, but not on 
FDI, with the application of a log of resource rents per capita from the World Bank with 
reference to Hamilton and Clements (1999). The two most recent studies by Poelhekke and 
van der Ploeg (2010) and van der Ploeg (2011) are the closest to our research. These two 
papers explored the effect of natural resources on FDI through institutional quality, but the 
authors considered aggregated FDI, not primary FDI. Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010) 
valued the resource presence through the export net of production costs as a dummy 
variable when the rents were non-zero. Their objective was to measure the resource 
discovery instead of the resource change over time. 
The findings of subsequent studies have shown that it is very likely that resource 
abundance and the resulting potential economic benefits both influence and are influenced 
by the institutional environment. However, at this stage, we explore the initial effect of 
resource abundance on primary FDI and will study the institutional effect by moving to 
another two hypotheses. Therefore, we propose the first hypothesis: greater access to 
natural resources may promote inward FDI in the primary sector. As noted earlier, in order 
  
133 
 
to study the further effect of natural resource activity on FDI, we now move to the next 
hypothesis to explore the effect of corruption as a measure of the cost of doing business.    
 
5.2.2. H2: Greater corruption may increase or decrease inward FDI in the 
primary sector 
Studies on aggregated FDI emphasised that corruption exists at every stage of 
natural resource wealth creation from pre-exploration activities of the parties involved, 
including complex financial arrangements, resource concessions, capital lenders, insurance 
companies, intermediary agencies and governments, to numerous local and international 
subcontractors (Bloningen, 2005). Corruption captures the extent to which the 
governmental, institutional and court decisions can be used in favour of investors to protect 
their returns on investments. The empirical findings are generally mixed, referring both to 
positive and negative effects between corruption and natural resource activities. 
First, Kronenberg (2004), Egger and Winner (2005), Robinson et al. (2006) and 
Caselli and Cunningham (2009) found a positive relation between corruption and natural 
resource activities. These studies found that those involved in resource exploitation benefit 
from high economic gains: investments are not deterred by corruption because the latter 
allows for the profits to stay with investors. A recent study by Kinoshita and Campos 
(2010) showed that rich resource-abundant countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Russia have attracted substantial FDI to their resource-based sectors because they are rich 
in oil and natural gas, although the FDI has had a wider adverse effect on the economic 
development and social contributions to these countries because of the corruption levels. 
These results are supported by the earlier study of Hausman and Rigobon (2002) for six 
large oil-exporting countries of Angola, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Sudan and Venezuela. 
They found that between 1970 and 2003, these experienced less than half the GDP growth 
rate compared with other countries because of corruption-related issues.  
 Second, Smarzynska and Wei (2000), Egger and Winner (2005) and Kronenberg 
(2004) found a negative effect between corruption and natural resource activities. For 
instance, Egger and Winner (2005) showed empirical evidence that in the short run, 
corruption raises the cost of foreign investment, since firms have to pay bribes and bear 
extra contract risks as corruption contracts are not legally enforceable. However, 
corruption may also speed up the bureaucratic processes required to obtain legal 
permissions for setting up a foreign plant or gaining access to publicly funded projects. To 
this extent, Kronenberg (2004) found that corruption is the main driver in the inefficient 
use of natural resources in transition countries. The negative effects of corruption on 
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aggregate FDI are also highlighted in Smarzynska and Wei (2000). Their evidence 
suggests that corruption might have an overall reducing effect on FDI, and in shifting 
foreign investor involvement towards joint ventures with local firms rather than setting up 
local subsidiaries, which decreases as the firms become more technologically advanced.  
Besides corruption, other measures of institutions are also used. For example, 
Olson's (1993) findings suggest that democracies, since they tend to allocate the surplus to 
producers more efficiently, tend to provide more favourable environments for FDI. For 
instance, both Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) and Asiedu and Lien (2011) used 
democracy as a measure of the quality of state institutions. They found that the quality of 
democratic institutions has a significant impact on investors’ decisions to engage in 
extractive industries since democracy levels tend to be associated with changes in 
governmental decisions. Evidence of the institutional significance for capital investments 
has been found in both recent and earlier studies that focused on the institutional regimes 
of countries.  
To summarise, existing evidence suggests that corruption in the natural resource 
sector may lead to lower or higher investment activity and less efficient investment 
allocation, especially if weak institutional mechanisms are in place. While there are studies 
explaining the effects of institutional factors (e.g. democracy is a common factor) on 
primary FDI, we are not aware of any study that explains the effect of corruption on 
primary FDI inflows. That is why, in our study, we emphasise the importance of the 
empirical evidence relating to the effect of corruption on primary FDI inflows. That is why 
we propose the second hypothesis: greater corruption may increase or decrease inward FDI 
in the primary sector. In order to explore further the link between corruption and resource 
rents, we now move on to our third hypothesis. 
 
Corruption measures 
 We have placed the discussion on corruption measures separately from the related 
hypothesis development, for the sake of clarity of the arguments. 
In examining the effect of corruption, the studies discussed above used various 
corruption measures mainly because of the data available for the selected country samples. 
The most commonly used data in these studies were the corruption proxies obtained from 
Transparency International (corruption perception index) and ICRG (corruption index). 
For instance, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) used the corruption index available 
from Political Risk Services (PRS) and an alternative corruption perception index from 
Transparency International. The use of this particular measure is driven by its focus on the 
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political system to study linkages between resource rents and corruption. Bhattacharyya 
and Hodler (2009) found that democracy affects the level of corruption in relation to 
natural resources. In another study, using the Transparency International data between 
1970 and 2000, van der Ploeg (2011) studied the effect of corruption on natural resources. 
He signified that countries with conflict over natural resources suffer from corruption and 
erosion of the quality of the legal system, thus discouraging saving and investment in 
productive capital. The study found that a control for the effective use of resource rents, 
corruption, rent-seeking motives and conflicts of interest in attracting effective capital 
investments should be investigated further. 
 With regard to ICRG data usage, Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010) applied the 
corruption measure among other indices as a compound measure of institutional quality. 
The source of this index is ICRG. The authors hypothesised that bad institutions, 
corruption and risk of expropriation may attract resource FDI because the lack of business 
transparency allows for the adverse use of the resource rents. They found that corruption 
among other related indices impacts primary FDI, but has no effect on non-resource 
investments because the resource-seeking motives relate to the primary sector only. In our 
study, we employed the same ICRG corruption environment proxy and found that 
corruption negatively affects the level of both primary and total FDI, although the extent of 
the effect on total investments is very close to zero. 
 Among other corruption measures, Kronenberg (2004) applied the ‘state capture 
index’ from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey conducted by 
the World Bank in 1999. His choice of this index was driven by the availability of the 
countries surveyed. In relation to alternative proxies from other sources such as the OECD, 
the EBRD and the World Bank (WB), these organisations largely cover different countries 
and time periods, which is likely to provide insufficient data or to significantly reduce the 
country sample in relation to the research conducted (Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010). 
 The relevant literature suggests that the corruption proxy selection is dependent on 
the index availability for the selected country samples. Among the most commonly used 
are ICRG’s corruption index and Transparency International’s corruption perception index. 
In our study, we will employ both corruption variables and present empirical results for the 
index with the largest available observations and also provide details of the significance of 
the results. 
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5.2.3. H3: The effect of natural resources on primary FDI depends on the 
extent of corruption in the country 
The existing literature indicates a complex and multidimensional relationship 
between corruption, resource rents and FDI inflows. The hypothesised interaction between 
corruption and natural resources can be studied from two perspectives. 
First, corruption allows governments to control governance power and reduce 
political tensions because natural resources provide high economic rents (e.g., 
Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2004). High economic rents attract more 
and more rent seekers, who harm the economy by increasing the number of less-productive 
entrepreneurs. When governments control these rents, the revenue allows them to promote 
their political views to the general population, as happened in the mineral-rich Congo 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004). 
Second, highly corrupt, resource-rich countries provide opportunities for wealthy 
businessmen to obtain import licenses, avoid taxes and buy other privileges from weak 
government institutions to avoid accountability (Robinson et al., 2006). Thus, a closed, 
vicious circle is created – corruption breeds FDI, and in natural resources, FDI breeds 
corruption-related motives because of weak institutional systems (Caselli and 
Cunningham, 2009). In this chapter, we particularly focus on corruption as an index of 
institutional quality. 
Along these lines, Asiedu and Lien (2011) argued that the effect of natural 
resources on FDI depends on the nature of political institutions, because FDI tends to be 
concentrated in extractive industries; a stable policy environment is more favourable to 
multinational corporations in the extractive industries. In this respect, because of the high 
capital investment, high uncertainty and a long gestation period are required, and an 
autocratic regime may be preferred, since democracies tend to be associated with a change 
in government officials. Furthermore, Asiedu and Lien (2011) found that natural resources 
tend to be tightly controlled by the government, and, therefore, multinationals need to build 
closer ties with the government, which are easier to develop in an autocratic regime. Their 
empirical evidence using cross-country data tends to support the following hypothesis: 
democracy facilitates FDI if countries have a low share of natural resources in total exports 
whereas democracy has a negative effect on FDI in countries where exports are dominated 
by natural resources. 
 Recent studies by Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010) and van der Ploeg (2011) 
found that the positive effect of natural resources on FDI also depends on institutional 
quality. However, the activity in the natural resource sector could undermine the positive 
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effect of FDI through a resource bonanza that would drive an appreciation in the real 
exchange rate and a subsequent decline of resource export sectors, although this evidence 
was not particularly authoritative. For instance, Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010) valued 
the resource presence through the export net of production costs as a dummy variable when 
the rents are non-zero. Their objective was to measure the resource discovery instead of the 
resource change over time. These findings agree with two studies by Asiedu (2002) and 
Asiedu and Lien (2011), who found that resource activity promotes aggregate FDI under a 
certain level of democracy in 90 of 122 developing countries for the period 1982 to 2007. 
These authors used the existence of the proportion of total exports that comes from fuels, 
minerals and oil as a measure for resource abundance. Similarly, Kronenberg (2004) 
applied the share of primary goods in total exports, controlling for resource abundance. 
However, the authors of these studies explored the effect of natural resource activity on 
economic development, not on FDI investments. In another related study, Bhattacharyya 
and Hodler (2009) focused on the relationship between natural resources and corruption 
through the effect of the quality of democratic institutions in 124 countries from 1980 to 
2004. They found that democratic institutions significantly influence levels of both natural 
resource rents and corruption. To examine resource activity, Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2009) applied the log of resource rents per capita from the WB with reference to Hamilton 
and Clements (1999). 
The aforementioned studies not only point to the positive effect of natural resource 
activity on attracting FDI, but also highlight that the positive effect may be restricted or 
may even discourage FDI investments. This is supported by Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 
(2010), who found that natural resource rents may have different effects on primary FDI 
inflows as the investments may be controlled in some way to prevent too much 
concentration on the resource sector in order to avoid a possible economic downturn. 
Conversely, overstimulation can result from states desiring to attract more resource capital 
in order to obtain more funds for governmental needs. These findings are supported by the 
earlier study of the WB (2006), which highlighted that resource-abundant countries possess 
high economic value, added through the use of natural rents. The present study argues that 
it is important to control for the efficient use of these rents towards the economic 
development of the country. This is because the natural rents come from natural resources, 
which are treated as a special economic good that is not produced, but exists naturally. 
Both studies caution that too much competitiveness may reduce the attractiveness of 
resource returns and therefore may also distort investments. The WB (2006) defined 
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natural resource rents as the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents and 
forest rents as a percentage of GDP.  
The relevant literature reveals a complicated relationship between the corruption 
environment and resource rents regarding FDI inflows. Thus the following, third 
hypothesis can be proposed:  the effect of natural resources on primary FDI depends on the 
extent of corruption in the country. 
 
5.3. Data 
 
 Our analysis is based on panel data of countries for the period from 1992 to 2001 
(unbalanced panel, arranged by panel variable country and time variable year; on a yearly 
basis). While 142 countries are available with FDI data between 1970 and 2003, the 
majority of primary FDI data is available for 133 countries between 1991 and 2003
16
. In 
addition, not all the data on the explanatory variables is available; hence, the countries’ 
sample size is bounded by the data availability and is significantly reduced in size. The 
data caveat has been discussed within the results section. Given that FDI data is merged 
with regression measures and other control variables, the estimations are performed for the 
period of most observations, which is 1992–2001. 
They key measures in our study are FDI inflows and three explanatory variables: 
corruption, natural resource activity and the interaction between the two. Although we 
have performed estimations of other natural resource activity measures and corruption 
proxies to test the robustness of our estimations, the results were less significant. 
Subsections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 explain the selection of regression variables and control 
measures employed in this analysis. 
The FDI inflows are presented through the ratio to GDP, which is the commonly 
used FDI proxy (Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2010). Our main 
natural resource availability measure is similar to that used by the WB (2006) and 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009). It is expressed according to the total natural resource 
                                                 
16
 Four FDI inflow types are provided by UNCTAD: general FDI inflows, FDI into primary sector (as 
mining, quarrying, petroleum exploration, other energy related), FDI into secondary sector (the major ones 
are food, forestry, metallurgy, machinery, light industry and others) and FDI into tertiary industry 
(construction, distribution, wholesale, telecoms etc.). FDI inflows are presented in ‘other’ sectors, but these 
have fewer observations and do not clarify which sectors these cover. As we focus on FDI in natural 
resources and its data availability, the World Bank allows us to identify various country groups, but because 
of data availability, we could not segment to the specific regions – Latin America, the Caribbean, Central 
Europe and Asia Pacific. In addition, we are able to distinguish between developed, developing and transition 
countries. However, FDI data has a low number of observations available for Sub-Saharan Africa and 
transition countries. 
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rent. The rents are defined as the ratio of the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents 
(hard and soft), mineral rents and forest rents to the GDP ratio, which is obtained from the 
WBWDI. The main corruption measure is available from ICRG and is related to financial 
corruption and excessive patronage. It is scored between 0 and 6, where higher scores on 
the index imply a less corrupted environment.  
We have also employed a range of control variables including trade openness, GDP 
per capita, loans obtained from banks, influence of military power in the state and 
infrastructure developments according to the number of telephone lines. Further, we have 
controlled for lagged FDI among the regression measures. 
 
5.3.1. Regression variables 
With regard to natural resources, however, like much of the existing literature, we 
only have access to the widely used share of primary resources to total resources and the 
natural rents, both of which are available from the WB. However, only the natural rents 
provide sufficient observations to cover the FDI data. With regard to the corruption 
measure, we select ICRG as the most consistent data source covering countries in our 
analysis. We also used two alternative corruption proxies. 
First, we measure natural resource activity according to the natural resource rents 
available from the WBWDI database, which is similar to Bhattacharyya and Hodler 
(2009), who applied the log of resource rents per capita from the World Bank. Moreover, 
according to Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2010), natural reserves may be reported when it 
is economically sound to exploit them, so the greatest investment activity may be found 
when the natural resource gains become more attractive; thus, the natural rents may be a 
good measure to exploit. On a more general level, the authors discussed the emerging 
importance of resource inclusion at the national accounting level despite the lack of 
available data and the differences between various resource data providers, such as the 
IMF, the UN, the WB and BP statistics. 
 Second, in our study, we preferred ICRG’s corruption measure (concerned with 
financial corruption and excessive patronage, where a higher score of 6 implies a less 
corrupted environment versus the lowest 0 score for excessively corrupted settings) for the 
following reasons. The first reason concerns the quantity of data available for the countries 
in our sample. Therefore, we may be able to minimise the risk of sample selection bias and 
cover a reasonably wider time dimension. Second, this corruption proxy is used in a 
number of existing studies (see e.g., Asiedu and Lien, 2011; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 
2010). We also used an alternative corruption quality through the ICRG’s bureaucracy 
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parameter to check the robustness of our results. In addition, similar to Bhattacharayya and 
Hodler (2009), we used the corruption perception index (CPI), which is publicly available 
from Transparency International. However, the latter CPI index’s data is only available for 
1995 onwards, whereas our research starts three years earlier, covering the period from 
1992 to 2001. 
Third, in order to test that the natural rent effect on FDI depends on institutional 
quality represented by corruption, we introduce the interaction term between the two. 
  
Figure 5.1: FDI, natural resource rents and corruption, 1992–2001 
 
There are four FDI inflow types provided by UNCTAD (primary, secondary, tertiary and other). We focus on 
the total FDI inflows and FDI into the primary sector (as mining, quarrying, petroleum exploration, other 
energy related) that are the ratios to GDP. General FDIs are made into the primary sector investments, the 
secondary sector (as major ones are food, forestry, metallurgy, machinery, light industry and others) and FDI 
into tertiary industry (construction, distribution, wholesale, telecoms etc.). There are FDI inflows in ‘other’ 
sectors, but these have fewer observations and do not clarify which sectors these cover. We use the period 
from 1992–2001 where the most primary FDI inflow observations are provided. A full description of 
measures can be found in Section 5.3 and the Tables within. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that the economic return for natural resource extraction is 
between 3 and 12 times the primary capital invested, and even higher in relation to overall 
investments. The returns on those natural rents have been constantly raised since 1998, 
whereas both primary and overall FDI inflows in the countries have reduced. Throughout 
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the same time period, the corruption level has increased. This may indicate the importance 
of both natural resource rents and corruption existence in relation to the FDI investments. 
Table 5.1 demonstrates that according to the descriptive statistics, the means of 
natural resource activity (the ratio of resource rents to GDP) for both the primary sector 
and total FDI are at around the same level of 8%, which is expected, considering that 
resource rents are concentrated in the primary sector. Moving to the corruption measure 
(ICRG), the higher mean value of this index indicated that investments in the primary 
sector were found to be less corrupted when compared to overall investments. This may 
show that there is a tighter control of corruption in regard to the primary sector. 
 
Table 5.1: Means and standard deviations of selected FDI inflows, corruption, 
resource rents and additional variables, 1992–2001 
 
Variables 
FDI primary FDI total 
Obs Mean St Dev Obs Mean St Dev 
 
  
 
  
   FDI inflows to GDP ratio       
FDI inflows by types 327 0.016 0.044 387 0.026 0.070 
        
Natural resource rents and 
corruption 
      
Total natural resource rents/GDP 301 0.07 0.09 4,180 0.08 0.13 
Ln of total natural resource 
rents/GDP 
301 -3.78 1.70 4,180 -3.75 1.85 
Corruption 321 3.66 1.63 2,142 3.01 1.69 
       The FDI inflows are separated into two types: FDI in the primary sector and total FDI (combined primary, 
tertiary, secondary and other). We introduce the ratios of FDI to GDP of a country (in constant 2005 money). 
The FDI inflows, in general, measure the international investment level, and its economic significance is 
widely discussed in the existing literature and is obtained from UNCTAD. The two selected FDI inflow 
ratios are described in Section 5.2. We apply the corruption index extracted from the ICRG database, where 
the highest score of 6 represents the least corrupted country and the 0 score is for the most corrupted 
countries. Following the World Bank (WBWDI), the total natural resource rent is defined by the sum of oil 
rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents and forest rents to the GDP ratio (we use the 
natural log of the ratio). 
 
 
5.3.2. Control variables 
 We discuss control measures related to the literature reviewed in Section 4.2. These 
include trade openness (natural log of percentage of GDP), GDP per capita (natural log), 
level of credits obtained from banking institutions, military power in the state and the 
number of telephone lines per 100 citizens as a control for infrastructure. All the control 
parameters were obtained from the WB database, whereas the military in politics 
parameter is extracted from the ICRG. 
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Table 5.2: Means and standard deviations of selected control variables, 1992–2001 
 
Variables 
FDI primary FDI total 
Obs Mean St Dev Obs Mean St Dev 
 
  
 
  
   Trade openness/GDP 304 0.75 0.44 3,888 0.73 0.41 
Ln of trade openness/GDP 304 -0.43 0.53 3,888 -0.48 0.62 
GDP per capita 299 57,345 188,189 2,924 30,866 135,115 
Ln of GDP per capita 299 9.37 1.49 2,924 8.36 1.97 
Credit by banking sector 304 0.72 0.48 3,468 0.56 0.62 
Military  in politics 321 4.24 1.84 2,142 3.44 2.14 
Telephone lines per 100 citizens 320 26.95 23.05 5,240 12.77 18.18 
We implement control variables as trade openness denoted through the natural log (the sum of exports and 
imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product). GDP per capita is based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. The data is in constant 2005 international dollars. The domestic credit 
provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of 
credit to the central government, which is net. The military force measure may be used to control riots, public 
tensions and, more importantly, to provide the defence for the state budget at the expense of the budgeted 
allocations. Telephone lines per 100 citizens measures infrastructure development through the availability to 
communicate. All variables are obtained from the World Bank (WBWDI, but military force data is from the 
ICRG database. 
 
 The first measure selected, openness of trade, should favour capital inflows if there 
is a higher demand for goods and services and an increased income level in the country 
(Asiedu and Lien, 2011). Trade openness positively influences the economy and thereby 
attracts FDI inflows. The trade openness proxies two aspects: the quality of the country’s 
international trade regime and the propensity for international firms to export. Figure 5.2 
and Table 4.2 show that the average trade openness to GDP ratio for total FDI investment 
stands at 73%, but in regard to primary investments, this ratio is a few per cent higher at 
75%. The mean values indicate that countries in our sample may be attractive for 
international investors as they generate high export levels. 
 The second measure, domestic income, measured as GDP per capita, captures 
potential economies of scale. Various studies find that companies tend to invest more in 
the larger economies, where they can create new market opportunities (see e.g., Asiedu and 
Lien, 2011). According to other research, GDP per capita is also used as a control for the 
investment climate (Asiedu, 2002). Figure 5.2 and the descriptive statistics in Table 5.2 
highlight that GDP per capita is almost twice as high in those resource-abundant countries 
compared to the overall investment levels. This may indicate that investments in resource-
abundant countries may be especially important for economic wealth. 
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Figure 5.2: Country-level observations, 1992–2001 
 Trade openness/GDP GDP per capita 
    
 Domestic credit by banking sector ICRG’s military in politics 
     
 Telephone lines per 100 citizens 
 
The graphs represent mean yearly measures of country level observations used in the estimations. A full 
description of selected measures can be found in Section 5.2, and Section 5.3 provides descriptive statistics 
for the measures. We use the period of 1992–2001, where the most primary FDI inflow observations are 
provided. 
 
 The last measure, availability of commercial loans, may play an important role in 
capital-intensive industries (Alfaro et al., 2004). That is, Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2 
demonstrate that the credit obtained from a banking institution (the ratio of domestic credit 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
R
at
io
, 
%
 
,0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
U
S
D
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
R
at
io
, 
%
 
,0
,1
,2
,3
,4
,5
,6
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
S
co
re
 (
o
 m
in
, 
6
 m
ax
) 
,0
,5
,10
,15
,20
,25
,30
,35
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
te
l.
 l
in
es
 
All industries (primary, secondary and tertiary)
In the Primary sector
  
144 
 
by banking sector to GDP) stimulates primary sector investors to raise the required capital 
locally. 
 As we show in Section 5.2, capital-intensive industries that are supposed to provide 
high economic rents are likely found in corrupted business and state environments 
(Hausman and Rigobon, 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2004; Caselli and Cunningham, 2009). 
Thus, following ICRG, military force may be used to control riots, public tensions, and 
more importantly, to provide defence for the state budget at the expense of the budgeted 
allocations. For this reason, we control for the military power in the country using a related 
proxy from the ICRG, in which the maximum score of 6 indicates less military 
participation and a less politically risky environment, and the minimum score of 0 indicates 
a greater exposure of the military regime in the country. In Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2 the 
mean values of the military in politics indicate that comparatively less political tensions 
(higher scores indicate less tensions) are to be found in resource-abundant countries 
compared to overall military control over total FDI. This can indicate that revenues from 
natural resource exploration allow for institutions to promote the required political views to 
the masses and so less military interventions are required to control for possible tensions. 
As another control measure, infrastructure facilities are well known to attract FDI 
and it is expected that we will see a significant positive relation between infrastructure and 
FDI, and it is expected to be similarly important for both resource-abundant and non-
resource countries. For instance, Kinoshita and Campos (2010) used the number of 
landline telephone numbers as a proxy because they allow businesses to communicate. 
Others use the existence of utility services (water, electricity) or public transportation to 
proxy for infrastructure (see e.g., Asiedu, 2002). We also tried alternative measures such as 
a gross fixed capital formation to GDP ratio and the availability of roads, rail and ports, 
although we were unable to obtain enough data to perform these alternative estimations. 
Figure 5.2 and Table 5.2 demonstrate that, on average, significantly higher numbers of 
telephone lines are installed within primary industries compared to aggregate FDI. 
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5.4. Methodology 
 
 Our base model specifies FDI inflow type as a function of natural resource rents, 
corruption and the interaction between the two. We start with a pooled OLS estimation, 
and employ various specifications (OLS-RE, OLS-FE, OLS-FD, elasticity) as described in 
the theoretical background in Chapter 2. Then, we employ the GMM estimator because 
inclusion of the lagged dependent measure in the RHS of the equation may bias the OLS 
estimates, as the lagged dependent is correlated with country specific characteristics. The 
general regression is as follows (Table 5.3 for the energy sector and Appendix 5.A for total 
FDI inflows): 
 
FDI inflow typeit = γ1FDI inflow typeit-1 + β2Nat.res.rentsit + β3Corruptionit + 
β4(Corruption*Nat.res.rents)it + αi + uit Eq. (5.1)  
 
where 
FDI inflow typeit = primary or total FDI inflow in the i-th country in year t, 
t = 1992–2001, 
αi = the unobserved time-invariant country specific effects (fixed effects), 
uit= is a unique country’s error term. 
 
Following the methodology from Chapter 2, we start with the ordinary pooled OLS 
estimation; however, we are aware that countries have individual characteristics which 
may or may not influence regressors. Therefore, the OLS regression may be biased 
because unobserved time-invariant country effects may be correlated with regressors. We 
address the issue by employing the fixed effects option (OLS-FE), which allows us to 
control for unobserved characteristics within countries. That is, the error term, eit, will 
consist of αi, the unobserved country specific effects, and uit, the observation-specific 
errors (eit= αi + uit). Additionally, we present the estimates for OLS-RE and the Hausman 
test for the validity of either random or fixed effects selection (if there is a correlation 
between the individual and/or the time effects and the independent variables imposed, the 
OLS-FE may be suggested to mitigate the endogeneity issue). Further, we illustrate the 
OLS-FD model and discussion for elasticities to be in line with the theoretical background 
of panel data analysis. 
In the next step, we developed our model to capture the effect of lagged FDI on 
current FDI inflows. We did this because previous FDI activity may enhance current FDI 
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inflows. That is the reason for including the ‘FDI inflow typeit-1’ on the RHS of the 
equation above. The presence of the lagged dependent variable ‘FDI inflow typeit-1’ creates 
dynamic panel bias, causing the correlation between the explanatory and error term, eit-1, 
which is a function of the time-invariant country specific fixed effects, αi. The detailed 
procedure of the GMM estimator implementation is described in Chapter 2. The lagged 
dependent variables (FDI inflow types) are treated as endogenous, and the independent 
variables are treated as strictly exogenous (corruption, natural rents, the interaction term of 
natural rents and corruption and a set of control measures). The GMM estimator used the 
second lag of the endogenous variable. We utilize only internal instruments; we do not 
include additional external instruments (similarly to Asiedu and Lien’s 2011 study on the 
democracy effect for FDI). The weak instruments test is reported through F-statistics. 
Further, the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions is not reported because we do not 
have additional external instruments. 
 In order to identify the net effect of regressors, we introduce additional control 
measures that are likely to impact dependent FDI inflows. Tables 5.4 (for the energy 
sector) and Appendix 5.A (for all industries) demonstrate estimates for the inclusion of 
control measures: 
 
FDI inflow typeit = γ1FDI inflow typeit-1 + β2Nat.res.rentsit + β3Corruptionit + 
β4(Corruption*Nat.res.rents)it + βzZit + αi + uit Eq. (5.2)  
 
where 
equation indexes are as per Eq. (4.1), 
Zit = Trade opennessit, GDP per capitait, Loans from banksit, Military powerit, Telephone 
linesit. 
 
On a general level, we have focused on the years with the most observations for 
FDI inflows and explanatory variables, which are from 1992 to 2001. We compare primary 
FDI inflow estimates with the total FDI inflows. We present the results for Eq. (4.1) and 
(4.2) in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for primary FDI inflows but total FDI inflow estimates are 
located in Appendix 5.A. Finally, we included a set of time dummies (1992–2001) to see 
whether unexpected variation (special events) may affect the dependent FDI inflow type 
variables. Our empirical analysis focuses on the size, sign and significance of the estimated 
coefficients and the elasticity. 
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5.5. Results 
 
In this section, the natural resource rents and corruption effects on FDI are 
empirically evaluated after controlling for additional measures. The dependent variable is 
the FDI inflows to GDP ratio (primary and total). The explanatory variables are the natural 
resource rents to GDP ratio, and the corruption index is provided by the ICRG, the lag of 
dependent FDI and the set of additional control variables: trade openness to GDP, GDP per 
capita, credits provided by the banking sector, the military in politics and the number of 
telephone lines as an infrastructure proxy. 
 
5.5.1. Panel estimates of FDI investments (hypotheses tests), 1992–2001 
In the hypotheses development section, we showed that the natural resource 
exploration effect is likely to concentrate on primary investments, but with no significant 
exposure on overall country FDI. This is because each investment type is targeted by 
specific investor interests such as market or business potential, returns’ expectations, 
stability or the development of the country, and industry demand for the products created 
etc. In particular, Dunning’s OLI paradigm states that the natural resource sector would 
expect to attract greater capital investments because of higher economic added value and 
investment returns in a relatively shorter time period in comparison to other industries 
(Dunning, 1980). In addition, the business conditions would be an imperative element 
where institutional regulation of the industry is of importance. 
In our results, we find broad evidence of natural resource investment concentration 
in the primary industry (refer to Table 5.3 and Appendix Table 5.A.1). Similarly, the 
findings indicate that the institutional environment, measured by the corruption index, is an 
important regulatory element in investment decision making. More significantly, the 
results suggest that there is much to be done in order to balance the negative effect of 
corruption, despite the high income potential of primary investments, whilst natural 
resource economics is a driving factor and the corruption is a significant proxy for business 
regulatory power. The results also suggest that previous period-specific FDI inflows are 
not an important element for the current primary investments, but adversely influence the 
countries’ aggregate FDI inflows. The negative effect of previous-year FDI may indicate 
that investors, in general, are rather more interested in the selection of new opportunities 
than in continuing in the present markets. 
Although all regression results are in line with the hypotheses tested, there are 
caveats, which we need to be aware of whilst discussing the empirical findings. At first, the 
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current literature’s empirical evidence is rather limited, despite the theoretical framework 
of the OLI paradigm. That is, most of the existing studies refer to the effect of natural 
resource exploitation and the corruption effect on economic development. In those studies, 
where the natural resource and corruption impact on FDI is highlighted, the results often 
discuss the country level aggregated FDI inflows, but more notably, there is no interaction 
effect documented between the two variables for capital-investment activity. Therefore, 
although we can rely on the suggested results as value being added to the existing 
literature, our study should be considered as exploratory. Second, country selection is 
limited, as many of these do not possess a good set of consistent variables, and 
consequently, we have to operate with missing observations. Thus, the important 
occurrences may not be observed due to data unavailability issues. Third, although we 
control for the additional regressors (refer to the further results discussion), the variety of 
additional effects may apply to different countries. That is, to some extent we rely on the 
presumption that the selected countries may be affected to a common degree by the same 
explanatory and control variables. 
From the theoretical model specification, we have operated with different OLS 
specifications (Chapter 2 refers to the detailed discussion). The employed model and the 
post-estimation techniques indicate the likely validity of the empirical results. The joint 
significance test suggests the importance of selected explanatory variables. However, the 
years test rejects the null hypothesis that years coefficients are equal to zero, implying that 
no control for time effects is needed. This can be expected, as the investors are rather 
driven by specific interests and accessibility to the investment returns but not to various 
timing effects. Furthermore, the Hausman test demonstrates that OLS with fixed effects is 
a preferred estimation methodology. As the lagged dependent is included among the 
regressors, we undertake the weak instruments test, which indicates that there is no 
correlation between endogenous regressors and the excluded instruments (Baum et al., 
2007). We do not show the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, as no additional 
external instruments are included. We are not aware of the related FDI studies which 
implemented external instruments (for instance, Asiedu and Lien (2011) state that they do 
not consider external instruments without giving the reasons for). The future analysis shall 
concentrate on the potential inclusion of external instruments in order to improve the 
understanding of the FDI analysis. 
The results of the hypotheses testing and post-estimation techniques indicate that 
there are other factors which may expected to reflect on FDI decision making. From this  
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Table 5.3: Panel estimates of primary FDI investments (hypotheses tests), 1992–2001 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
H1: Greater access to natural resources may promote inward FDI in the primary sector 
Nat. rents/GDP 
 
0.00359* 0.00391* 0.00391* 0.00283* 0.000328 0.00311* 
(0.00223) (0.00237) (0.00228) (0.00255) (0.00270) (0.00305) 
FDI inflows 
type/GDP 
     0.175 
(0.206) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0325** 0.131 0.131 0.161 0.0708  
(0.0154) (0.293) (1.223) (1.227) (0.0990)  
 
 
      
Observations 299 299 299 299 266 235 
Number of 
companies 
32 32 32 32 32 30 
       
Joint test  0.1080 0.0983 0.0859 0.2669 0.9033 0.5817 
Years test   0.2302 
  
0.2807 0.3061  0.2618 
Hausman test    1.33   
Weak instruments      0.0232 
H2: Greater corruption may increase or decrease inward FDI in the primary sector 
Corruption -0.00279 -0.00293 -0.00293** -0.00267** -0.000633 -0.00689* 
(0.00207) (0.00220) (0.00120) (0.00123) (0.00289) (0.00688) 
FDI inflows 
type/GDP 
     0.150 
(0.205) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0274** 0.383 0.383 0.365 0.105  
(0.0137) (0.325) (1.073) (1.057) (0.257)  
 
 
      
Observations 321 321 321 321 286 251 
Number of 
companies 
34 34 34 34 34 32 
       
Joint test  0.1774 0.1817 0.0147 0.0306 0.8269 0.5966 
Years test   0.2375 0.2954 0.2861  0.2714 
Hausman test    1.0000   
Weak instruments      0.0284 
H3: The effect of natural resources on primary FDI depends on the extent of corruption 
in the country 
Nat. rents/GDP 
 
0.0125* 0.0125** 0.0125*** 0.0123*** 0.00518 0.0207 
(0.00652) (0.00636) (0.00343) (0.00370) (0.00723) (0.0123) 
Corruption -0.0122* -0.0121* -0.0121*** -0.0123*** -0.00611 -0.0257 
(0.00694) (0.00699) (0.00306) (0.00317) (0.0102) (0.0152) 
Corruption* 
Nat. rents/GDP 
-0.00231* -0.00225* -0.00225*** -0.00228*** -0.00124 -0.00507* 
(0.00125) (0.00124) (0.000681) (0.000699) (0.00174) (0.00284) 
FDI inflows 
type/GDP 
     0.101 
(0.197) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0755** 0.0686 0.0686 0.0807 -0.0631  
(0.0369) (0.336) (1.176) (1.188) (0.197)  
 
 
      
Observations 294 294 294 294 262 231 
Number of 
companies 
31 31 31 31 31 29 
       
Joint test  0.2810 0.2696 0.0002 0.0009 0.8612 0.5163 
Years test   0.3133 0.2395 0.2654  0.7196 
Hausman test    0.9600   
Weak instruments      0.0500 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
The table above shows the three hypotheses we test, which are the effect of natural resource activity (H1), 
corruption (H2) and the effects of their interaction (H3) on selected FDI inflows. The dependent variable is 
FDI primary inflows to GDP. Explanatory variables are presented in the relevant section. The estimation 
specification follows the theoretical background as of Chapter 2. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients 
represent the significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. 
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perspective, we continue with the examination of natural resource rents and the corruption 
effect on FDI with additional selected variables. 
 
5.5.2. Panel data estimates with additional control variables, 1992–2001 
The estimates of additional control variables suggest their importance for both 
primary and total FDI inflows (Table 5.4 and Appendix 5.A). In line with the existing 
literature, the control for trade openness and credit availability indicates a positive and 
significant effect on FDI attraction. In contrast, the low economic development, lack of 
infrastructure and previous FDI engagement distort capital investments. Further, the 
control for the military in politics index suggests that investments in natural resources 
exploitation are positively affected by the presence of the forces. This is because the 
military is commanded to control and mitigate tensions when confronted with high 
economic returns within natural resource-abundant countries. These findings are in line 
with Hausman and Rigobon (2002), Acemoglu et al. (2004) and Caselli and Cunningham 
(2009). 
The elasticity results demonstrate the proportionate changes in the two qualitatively 
different variables, which are measured in two different types of units, allowing for the 
comparison of quantitative changes between the two. Table 5.5 shows the sensitivity 
relationship between primary FDI inflows and the changes in the explanatory variables. 
Both corruption, economic development (as GDP) and the trade openness are elastic 
towards FDI levels. For instance, a sensitivity measure of −2.79 (for OLS-FE) means that 
the percentage change in the quantity of FDI is almost three times the percentage change in 
corruption. The negative sign indicates the adverse effect in terms of primary FDI 
attractiveness. In contrast, elasticity in regards to the trade openness means that a 1% 
change in trade openness will lead to a 1.02% to 1.59% change in the primary FDI inflows. 
The elasticity of these measures in terms of primary FDI suggests that these are important, 
but are not of as much importance as inelastic natural rents, corruption and the natural rent 
interaction term, the military in politics, credit availability and infrastructure. 
In regards to post-estimation evaluation, the statistical tests are in line with the 
general findings, and indicate the significance of the included variables (joint test) but 
reject the importance of the time effects. The Hausman test suggests that OLS-FE is a 
preferred model specification, whilst the weak instruments test indicates that there is no 
correlation between endogenous regressors and the excluded instruments when dynamic 
model specification is considered. 
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Table 5.4: Panel data estimates of primary FDI inflows: 
Including control variables, 1992–2001 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled OLS OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Nat. rents/GDP 
 
0.0101 0.0102* 0.0102** 0.0119** 0.00149 0.0277*** 
(0.00648) (0.00591) (0.00404) (0.00527) (0.0124) (0.00988) 
Corruption -0.0120 -0.0118 -0.0118*** -0.0122*** -0.00750 -0.0315*** 
(0.00842) (0.00806) (0.00356) (0.00390) (0.0120) (0.0108) 
Corruption* 
Nat. rents/GDP 
-0.00229* -0.00214* -0.00214*** -0.00233*** -0.00114 -0.00600*** 
(0.00136) (0.00127) (0.000709) (0.000750) (0.00180) (0.00190) 
Trade 
openness/GDP 
0.0217*** 0.0340*** 0.0340*** 0.0266*** 0.0301 0.0331** 
(0.00835) (0.0109) (0.00704) (0.00892) (0.0238) (0.0150) 
GDP per capita -0.0119*** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** -0.0129 -0.0269 -0.0713 
(0.00461) (0.00409) (0.00389) (0.0197) (0.0429) (0.0419) 
Credit by 
banking sector 
0.0220** 0.0184* 0.0184*** 0.0132*** 0.00805 0.0179 
(0.0109) (0.0102) (0.00461) (0.00505) (0.00772) (0.0164) 
Military in 
politics 
0.00182 0.00216 0.00216 0.000924* 0.00262 0.00759* 
(0.00231) (0.00227) (0.00149) (0.00152) (0.00305) (0.00413) 
Tel. lines per 
100 citizens 
-0.000459** -0.000168 -0.000168 0.000235 0.000694 0.00168* 
(0.000187) (0.000154) (0.000241) (0.000403) (0.000551) (0.000831) 
FDI inflows 
type/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0620 
(0.191) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.173*** 1.913** 1.913 1.705 -0.285  
(0.0596) (0.847) (1.289) (1.378) (0.454)  
       
Observations       
Number of 
companies 
273 273 273 273 241 213 
       
Joint test  0.0335 0.0279 0.0000 0.0000 0.0721 0.1158 
Years test   0.3660 0.1670 0.4616  0.3075 
Hausman test    0.0000   
Weak 
instruments 
     0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
The table above shows the three hypotheses we test with the inclusion of control measures. Respectively, this 
table is a continuation of Table 5.3, which tests the effect of natural resource activity (H1), corruption (H2) 
and the effects of their interaction (H3) on selected FDI inflows. The dependent variable is FDI primary 
inflows to GDP. Explanatory variables are presented in the relevant section. The estimation specification 
follows the theoretical background as in Chapter 2. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients represent the 
significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
  
  
152 
 
Table 5.5: Panel data estimates of primary FDI inflows: 
As elasticity including control variables, 1992–2001 
 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion of 
lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Nat. rents/GDP 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.12 
Corruption -2.75 -2.70 -2.70 -2.79 -1.72 -7.21 
Corruption* 
Nat. rents/GDP 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10 
Trade 
openness/GDP 
1.02 1.59 1.59 1.25 1.41 1.55 
GDP per capita -6.97 -6.79 -6.79 -7.55 -15.75 -41.76 
Credit by banking 
sector 
0.99 0.83 0.83 0.59 0.36 0.81 
Military in politics 0.48 0.57 0.57 0.24 0.69 2.01 
Tel. lines per 100 
citizens 
-0.77 -0.28 -0.28 0.40 1.17 2.83 
FDI inflow 
type/GDP 
     0.06 
 
This table continues from Tables 5.4 by presenting the elasticity for the energy sector and two subsectors. 
The elasticity defines the percentage change in the dependent variable for a one per cent change in the 
explanatory variable. The mathematical presentation is ‘Elasticity = Estimated explanatory coefficient * 
(Mean explanatory measure/Mean dependent measure)’. Chapter 2 provides a detailed explanation on 
elasticity. For instance, in the GMM application, a ‘Nat. rents/GDP’ elasticity of 0.12 means that, on average, 
for a 1% increase in natural rents to GDP ratio, the primary FDI would increase by 0.12%. (Elasticity = 
0.0277*(0.0700/0.0160) = 0.12, where the explanatory coefficient is from Table 5.4, and the mean measures 
are from Table 5.1 and Table 5.2.) 
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5.6. Concluding comments 
 
In this chapter, we investigated the effect of natural resource activity (natural 
resource rents) and corruption (financial corruption and excessive patronage) on FDI 
inflows in the primary and overall sector (the ratio of FDI to GDP). The analysis presented 
is of an exploratory investigation of FDI decision making. The estimations provided results 
for 133 countries where FDI data and explanatory data were available for the period from 
1992–2001. For the estimation, we have used OLS specifications and also the GMM 
estimator to control for the dynamic nature when the lagged dependent is included among 
the explanatory variables. Our theoretical predictions (hypotheses) are supported by the 
empirical estimations. 
The results are pertinent for the primary sector, where FDI inflows are associated 
with the natural resource activity depending on the extent of corruption. Our results hold 
after controlling for other measures known to influence FDI investments such as trade 
openness (natural log of % of GDP), GDP per capita (natural log), level of credits obtained 
from banking institutions, the military power in the state and the number of telephone lines 
per 100 citizens as a control for infrastructure. 
The findings imply FDI investments are driven by specific interests. That is, no 
significant effect for natural resource exploitation has been found in regards to overall 
country FDI. Although other common control variables such as trade openness, GDP, 
credit availability, the military in politics and infrastructure are of importance for both FDI 
inflows.  
The results suggest that the significance of natural resource activity depends on 
corruption, and therefore the presence of corruption significantly alters the relationship 
between natural rents and FDI inflows: 
 Essentially, we explain how corruption is used as a proxy of the institutional 
environment. In this way, corruption can either distract or attract investment 
inflows depending on its level. Corruption may raise the cost of foreign 
investments, since investors have to pay bribes and bear extra contract risks; 
but at the same time, corruption allows for the profits to stay with investors, 
and for governments to provide a high income source. 
 Second, we find that corruption significantly reduced the attraction of natural 
resource rents applied to primary FDI investments, but with no significant effect on the 
overall FDI inflows: 
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 It is very likely that the resulting potential economic benefits from natural 
resource abundance both influence and are influenced by the institutional 
environment. That is, if institutions are working towards country growth 
through economic gains from primary industries being distributed for the 
development of other industries, then these gains will not remain within the 
primary sector. 
 Thus, it is important to find the factors within the institutional environment that 
would allow for natural resource rents to promote overall capital investments in the 
countries. In addition, future work needs to acquire much more sophisticated data samples 
to provide supplementary robustness to the results, and to concentrate on specific 
geographical locations so as to be able to unmask potential country specific variances 
which may impact FDI decisions differently. We aim to continue the natural resource and 
institutional environment relationship investigation in terms of FDI in the proposed 
direction. 
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Appendix 5.A: Detailed regression estimates for various controls 
Table 5.A.1: Panel data estimates of total FDI inflows: (Hypotheses tests), 1992–2001 
  
Pooled OLS 
(without 
years control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS-
RE 
OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
H1: Greater access to natural resources may promote inward FDI in the total sector 
Nat. rents/GDP 
 
0.00322 0.00415 0.00415 0.00178 -0.0176** 0.00589 
(0.00354) (0.00346) (0.00396) (0.00512) (0.00802) (0.00820) 
FDI inflows 
type/GDP 
     -0.450** 
(0.192) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0445* 0.829 0.829 0.922 -0.781  
(0.0233) (0.853) (2.524) (2.542) (0.559)  
 
 
      
Observations 362 362 362 362 324 288 
Number of 
companies 
38 38 38 38 38 37 
       
Joint test  0.3632 
  
0.2301 0.2950 0.7781 0.0278 0.0173 
Years test   0.1669 0.1531 0.1885  0.5712 
Hausman test    1.0000   
Weak instruments      0.0000 
H2: Greater corruption may increase or decrease inward FDI in the total sector 
Corruption 0.00171 0.00154 0.00154 0.00259 0.00621 0.000838 
(0.00353) (0.00381) (0.00232) (0.00244) (0.00631) (0.00407) 
FDI inflows 
type/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.433* 
(0.223) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0208 1.289 1.289 1.219 -1.127  
(0.0224) (0.904) (2.262) (2.260) (0.941)  
 
 
      
Observations 359 359 359 359 322 285 
Number of 
companies 
37 37 37 37 37 36 
       
Joint test  0.6269 0.6869 0.5075 0.2886 0.3246 0.0015 
Years test   0.2479 0.1778 0.1893 
  
 0.5464 
Hausman test    0.2000   
Weak instruments      0.0000 
H3: The effect of natural resources on total FDI depends on the extent of corruption in the country 
Nat. rents/GDP 
 
-0.00183 -0.00308 -0.00308 -0.00757 -0.0444** -0.0125 
(0.0112) (0.0107) (0.00636) (0.00730) (0.0223) (0.00856) 
Corruption 0.00888 0.0119 0.0119* 0.0141** 0.0421 0.0184 
(0.0139) (0.0139) (0.00629) (0.00667) (0.0278) (0.0140) 
Corruption* 
Nat. rents/GDP 
0.00163 0.00239 0.00239* 0.00268* 0.00817 0.00462 
(0.00241) (0.00236) (0.00135) (0.00141) (0.00510) (0.00283) 
FDI inflows 
type/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.431* 
(0.218) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.0140 0.859 0.859 0.989 0.0585  
(0.0656) (0.943) (2.461) (2.477) (0.950)  
 
 
      
Observations 335 335 335 335 300 266 
Number of 
companies 
35 35 35 35 35 34 
       
Joint test  0.1719 0.0565 0.1556 0.1938 0.1893 0.0008 
Years test   0.1824 0.0953 0.1299  0.7841 
Hausman test    0.9999   
Weak instruments      0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
The table shows the three hypotheses we test with the inclusion of control measures. Respectively, this table 
is a continuation of Table 5.4, which is the effect of natural resource activity (H1), corruption (H2) and the 
effects of their interaction (H3) on selected FDI inflows. The dependent variable is FDI total inflows to GDP. 
Explanatory variables are presented in the related section. The estimation specification follows the theoretical 
background as in Chapter 2. Legends (*) to the right of the coefficients represent the significance levels (*** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 5.A.2: Panel data estimates of total FDI inflows: 
Including control variables, 1992–2001 
  
Pooled 
OLS 
(without 
years 
control) 
Pooled 
OLS 
OLS-RE OLS-FE 
First 
difference 
(robust 
clustered) 
GMM 
(inclusion 
of lagged 
dependent) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
       
Nat. rents/GDP 
 
-0.00677 -0.00553 -0.00553 -0.0109 -0.0671* -0.0128 
(0.0111) (0.0102) (0.00691) (0.0104) (0.0354) (0.0195) 
Corruption 0.0162 0.0159 0.0159** 0.0234*** 0.0590 0.0323* 
(0.0171) (0.0163) (0.00715) (0.00844) (0.0367) (0.0162) 
Corruption* 
Nat. rents/GDP 
0.00207 0.00246 0.00246* 0.00336** 0.00937* 0.00542* 
(0.00267) (0.00241) (0.00138) (0.00159) (0.00566) (0.00293) 
Trade 
openness/GDP 
0.0387** 0.0462** 0.0462*** 0.00700 0.0766 0.0344 
(0.0189) (0.0215) (0.0125) (0.0195) (0.0631) (0.0320) 
GDP per capita -0.0200** -0.0196** -0.0196*** 0.0130 0.00321 -0.0255 
(0.00906) (0.00829) (0.00619) (0.0367) (0.166) (0.0662) 
Credit by 
banking sector 
0.0379 0.0382 0.0382*** 0.0313*** 0.0317 0.0425 
(0.0317) (0.0281) (0.00946) (0.0111) (0.0329) (0.0265) 
Military in 
politics 
-0.00356 -0.00156 -0.00156 -0.00711** -0.0131 -0.00854** 
(0.00490) (0.00502) (0.00308) (0.00331) (0.0101) (0.00390) 
Tel. lines per 
100 citizens 
-0.000967** -0.000792** -0.000792** -0.000202 -6.40e-06 0.00194 
(0.000443) (0.000322) (0.000397) (0.000863) (0.00150) (0.00187) 
FDI inflows 
type/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.435** 
(0.196) 
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Constant 0.189* 2.164 2.164 1.505 1.037  
(0.114) (1.817) (2.725) (2.918) (1.712)  
       
Observations 314 314 314 314 279 248 
Number of 
companies 
33 33 33 33 32 32 
       
Joint test  0.0004 0.0008 0.0000 0.0299 0.7968 0.0000 
Years test   0.2929 0.1103 0.2446  0.2891 
Hausman test       
Weak 
instruments 
   0.0038  0.0000 
Note: White’s standard errors are applied to control for heteroscedasticity. 
 
Respectively, this table is a continuation of Table 5.4, which presents the effect of natural resource activity 
(H1), corruption (H2) and the effects of their interaction (H3) on selected FDI inflows with the inclusion of 
control measures. The dependent variable is FDI total inflows to GDP. Explanatory variables are presented in 
the related section. The estimation specification follows the theoretical background as in Chapter 2. Legends 
(*) to the right of the coefficients represent the significance levels (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) and 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
As the study comes to an end, we provide a summary, the contributions of our 
research, and the challenges we faced through the course of the dissertation. As such, this 
chapter consists of three sections. In Section 6.1, we introduce the summary of the 
findings; in Section 6.2, we provide an analysis of the research contributions; and, in 
Section 6.3, we discuss the shortcoming and challenges we faced, including the scope for 
further research. 
 
6.1. Summary of findings 
 
In this dissertation, we studied the implications of financing, CG, natural resource 
rents, and corruption for innovations, firm value, and FDI inflows in the energy industry. 
There are three empirical chapters. 
 
Chapter 3 
The first empirical chapter investigated financing for R&D in European energy 
companies. The central hypothesis we tested is that a lower leverage level corresponds to 
higher R&D in energy companies, as firms that are highly leveraged would be required to 
pay off greater borrowing costs from future growth opportunities generated by the R&D, 
with high outcome uncertainty. Energy companies are more likely to find investment 
support for R&D activities when their liabilities are not financially overburdened. 
Furthermore, we found support for the second hypothesis, that operating income has to be 
used to boost the necessary financing for R&D. Using firm-level data of more than 250 
companies, available from OSIRIS for the years 1995–2007, we found support for the two 
hypotheses, after controlling for other factors. 
The findings, however, highlighted that additional factors are key in attracting 
financing for innovations in both utilities and in oil and gas companies. In particular, we 
found that firm age positively affects the access for financing. That is, ‘younger’ 
companies are more likely to rely on operating income to boost the financing of R&D 
activities, because lending institutions consider firm age as a proxy of economic credibility 
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and experience. Further, energy companies located in countries that have recently joined 
the EU lack access to financing for R&D when compared to rival firms within established 
EU member countries. 
In future research, we aim to examine the differences in the factors for R&D 
between utilities and the oil and gas sector, which should contribute to sustained 
improvement of innovation activities in the common EU energy area. 
 
Chapter 4 
In the second empirical chapter, we explored the net effect of the introduction of 
CG codes in Russia, with special reference to T&D as an important element affecting the 
attraction of potential investors. The hypothesis we examined here is whether the 
introduction of T&D in this type of investment climate can necessarily boost firm value. 
While the introduction of T&D rules (and overall CG codes) can resolve the conflict of 
interest between the controlling and minority owners, the transparency of businesses may 
make them easy targets for aggressive competitors. The data on T&D measures was 
obtained from S&P’s for the years 2003–2007 for the largest listed companies with 
cumulative market capitalisation of 90% of the Russian Stock Market in 2007. Firm-level 
data was obtained from the OSIRIS database, predominantly for the 2000–2008 period. 
The results highlighted that the introduction of T&D has been met with limited 
success, especially for the oil and gas sector, perhaps because it initiated a conflict of 
interest between the controlling owners and the state. The latter has been highlighted by 
the moral hazard of revealing too much information, as Russian state agencies tend to prey 
on the more successful firms. In future research, we aim to determine how foreign 
multinational investments can resolve the conflict of interest between the state and the 
controlling owners, thus contributing to sustained improvement in firm value in Russia. 
 
Chapter 5 
In the final empirical chapter, we examined whether and how the introduction of 
natural resource activity and the existence of corruption determine primary FDI inflows. 
We followed the argument, from existing literature, that FDI depends on the existence of 
corruption, thereby allowing investors to protect their returns and governments’ natural 
resource gains to provide an important budgeting source. We established three hypotheses 
to examine whether the extent of institutional mechanisms, measured by corruption, may 
or may not lead to lower or higher primary FDI investments, which are attracted due to 
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natural resource rents. The existing literature provided mixed results, and whether both 
natural resource endowment and corruption have an impact on primary FDI is unclear. 
In our analysis, we focused on a panel of 133 countries concerned with natural 
resource abundance, with FDI data from 1992 to 2001. Our main FDI source was the 
UNCTAD dataset, where natural resource rents are from the WB and where corruption is 
measured using the ICRG’s proxy. 
We found evidence of the persistent negative effect of corruption on the attraction 
of primary FDI activities in countries abundant in natural resources, even after controlling 
for other factors. We explain this as the corruption effect being twofold: on the one hand, 
its existence eases the investment access to primary sources, but on the other hand, it 
weakens FDI, as investors are prone to having to pay extra bribes and take greater 
contractual risks. Nevertheless, the economic gains from natural resource exploitation still 
attract greater investment attention. 
Thus, it is vital to find ways of easing the negative effects of corruption in terms of 
the attraction of natural resource rents and promoting FDI investments in the primary 
industries. In future research, we aim to investigate corruption-related issues as they relate 
to primary FDI. 
 
6.2. Dissertation contributions 
 
   Our empirical studies highlighted the important role of financing arrangements 
for R&D implementation in European Union energy companies; CG implementation 
towards firm value and investor attractiveness in Russian energy firms; and the 
interrelationship between corruption and natural resource activity as they affect primary 
FDI attraction in resource-endowed countries. Focusing on three energy sector interrelated 
analyses, we demonstrated the importance of further institutional and firm-level 
developments and policies in sustained energy industry development. We hope that 
dissemination of such findings will facilitate further discussion and stimulate future 
research in the energy area. In particular, the main contributions are as follows: 
 Investigation of the effects of financing for innovations in the European energy 
sector led to an advanced understanding of the leverage effect: lower financing 
promoted R&D, while higher financial liabilities disadvantaged innovation 
activities in the important energy sector amid sustainable development and 
energy security concerns. 
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 Regarding the dependence of the European energy sector on Russian energy 
supplies, we examined the effect of the introduction of CG mechanisms on 
Russian energy firms. The study results highlighted the importance of the 
integrity of the general mechanism and the mere introduction of information 
T&D as pertaining to firm value, which aims to facilitate the attraction of 
additional investments. 
 Examination of the main factors – natural resource abundance and the 
existence of corruption – for global energy, capital-investment attraction 
highlighted the importance of corruption control in host countries (those 
attracting FDI for the primary sector). This research led to an understanding of 
the extent of corruption in resource-abundant countries. 
 
6.3. Challenges, shortcomings and future research 
 
   In the empirical analyses, we were faced with two main challenges. The first 
challenge was data availability and data sources. Second, we were limited by selected 
measures, especially for CG and FDI studies. 
In the first two empirical chapters (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), we used 
comprehensive firm-level data on balance sheets and cash flows from the OSIRIS 
database. We faced challenges in compiling the data on ownership structure and the nature 
of business descriptions (e.g., definitions of ownership type – privately owned, state owned 
etc. – are broad, mainly because of complicated definitions; business area identification 
can be assigned using a variety of business classifications, which may place the same 
company under different business categories). In order to mitigate inaccuracies in 
ownership definition, we contacted OSIRIS for clarification of the definitions; for industry 
classification, we selected the classifications with the most observations for our sample and 
checked them against the industry descriptions provided by the companies themselves 
(mainly from their websites).  
For the second challenge, the limited availability of measures, which we employed 
in the second and third empirical chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), we were able to overcome 
the problem by extending estimation testing for the robustness and validity of the main 
hypotheses. Regarding the effect of the introduction of CG in Russia, we were able to 
obtain T&D parameters for the largest energy and non-energy companies, and further 
distinguished between the two main energy sectors: utilities and oil and gas producers. 
However, the T&D index was introduced in 2002, and only five scores for each company 
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are available (on a year-to-year basis). Furthermore, T&D is the only consistent measure, 
and control for alternative CG measures is not an option. To test for the robustness of the 
T&D results, we controlled for the introduction of general CG by using dummy years, and 
we studied the slope and intercept effects of CG with each of the included explanatory and 
control measures in the estimations. Turning to the empirical analysis on FDI 
attractiveness for the primary sector, we had to concentrate on natural resource activity, 
measured though the ratio of natural resource rents to GDP. Although this measure has 
been used in other studies, we were limited by the alternative resource activity proxies. To 
ensure the robustness of the results, we estimated the net effect of both natural rents and 
corruption measures on FDI, and controlled for the interaction effect between the two; 
then, we included controls for additional factors likely to impact FDI decisions; and lastly, 
we introduced alternative estimation methodologies. In all three empirical chapters, we 
adopted a panel data methodology that minimises estimation bias due to omitted factors, 
and our results were robust to the alternative samples and methodologies considered. 
We believe that future research needs, highlighted in Section 6.1, will address the 
gaps and challenges we faced in the current dissertation. 
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